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Foreword 
This volume is the first in the Comparative Legislative Studies Series, 
which is designed to serve as a focal point for research on legislative 
studies in the United States and abroad, at national and subnational 
levels. 
Controversy over how campaign funds are raised and spent, and 
over the sheer cost of elections, is permeating American politics. As 
state legislatures grow more professional, even legislative elections 
are becoming expensive in many states. 
Anthony Gierzynski describes the development and behavior of 
campaign committees operated by legislative party leaders or cau-
cuses to raise and allocate funds for legislative candidates. Using data 
from a number of representative states, he examines the criteria used 
for targeting districts and allocating funds. Unlike political action 
committees, which give disproportionately to entrenched incum-
bents, legislative party committees fund races that are expected to 
be close and support both incumbents and challengers on that basis. 
As a consequence, legislative elections have become more competi-
tive, and these committees may actually strengthen legislative party 
leadership and cohesion. 
MALCOLM E. }EWELL 
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Introduction 
A relatively new development in legislative and party politics is the 
emergence of the legislative party as an important actor in elections in 
the form of caucus campaign committees and leadership campaign 
committees, or leadership PACs. Legislative caucus campaign com-
mittees are, as the name implies, committees of the legislative party 
caucus that are given the responsibility of raising funds and providing 
assistance to the party's legislative candidates. Leadership campaign 
committees are used by individual legislators to distribute funds to 
other legislative candidates. The involvement of these organizations 
in legislative elections is a development that should generate a great 
deal of interest among political scientists and political observers, not 
only because it is new, but also because of the major normative and 
practical implications such a development holds for party politics, leg-
islative elections, and legislative behavior. 
Because legislative party involvement in elections is relatively 
new, many questions have yet to be answered, including questions of 
origin and purpose, behavior, and effect. Why did the legislative 
party become involved in campaigns for legislative seats? What type 
of organizations are the legislative party campaign committees? Can 
they be considered party organizations or are they merely political ac-
tion committees? What exactly are they doing? To whom are they pro-
viding campaign assistance, with what, and how much? And what 
effect are they having on legislative elections, legislative behavior, 
and party politics? 
The answers to these questions have far-ranging implications for 
legislative politics and political parties. For instance, if legislative 
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party campaign committees can be considered party organizations, 
their existence changes the structure of party organization as we 
know it. Legislative party committees will have to be included in 
any delineation of the structure of party organizations, and the char-
acterization of the party-in-government as a component of party or-
ganizations concerned mainly with governing will have to be altered 
to incorporate this new electoral role. Moreover, if these committees 
are indeed party organizations, then they represent a party response 
to growing needs of legislative candidates and the increased compe-
tition for legislative seats, providing evidence of political parties' abil-
ity to adapt to the candidate-centered campaigns that typify current 
elections. 
In terms of legislative elections and behavior, if legislative party 
campaign committees utilize their resources strategically, they can 
have a significant impact on legislative elections. If they have an in-
fluence in elections, they may also affect the behavior of legislators. 
For example, legislators may vote along party lines more frequently as 
a consequence of the assistance they receive from their party's caucus 
campaign committee. Moreover, as candidates' dependence on inter-
est group contributions is decreased by the campaign resources leg-
islative parties provide, the influence these special interests exert 
over lawmaking should also decline. Finally, if legislative party cam-
paign committees concentrate their resources on marginal races and 
make them more competitive, the result would be an increase in rep-
resentation and responsiveness, thus making legislative elections 
more democratic. 
Thanks to work of scholars such as Paul Herrnson, Gary Jacob-
son, and David Adamany, a great deal is known about the activities of 
the legislative caucus campaign committees at the national level-the 
Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC), the Dem-
ocratic Senatorial Campaign Committee (DSCC), the Republican Na-
tional Congressional Committee (RNCC), and the Republican National 
Senatorial Committee (RNSC). 1 The congressional campaign commit-
tees, which are now an integral part of the national party organization, 
were all very active by 1980. The Republican congressional campaign 
committees began their independent collection of campaign funds in 
1976-77; the Democratic committees, on the other hand, did not col-
lect a significant number of funds until the 1980s. 2 Both arose from 
the void in congressional elections left by the national committees, 
which lacked the resources needed to concentrate seriously on con-
gressional elections. 
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Researchers investigating the congressional campaign commit-
tees have found that they, among other things, focus their resources 
on marginal races; recruit candidates; provide services such as poll-
ing, media facilities, campaign consultants, and fund-raising; intro-
duce candidates to major contributors; and provide a mark of 
legitimacy to challengers, helping them raise funds from individuals 
and PACs.3 Although the reported value of their assistance still rep-
resents only approximately 10 percent of all funds raised in congres-
sional elections, the undervaluation of in-kind assistance, the use of 
"soft money," and the fact that the committees influence the contri-
bution decisions of other major contributors means that these com-
mittees have come to play a key role in congressional elections. 
Herrnson reported that this is reflected in attitudes of congressional 
candidates and staff. 4 
Unfortunately, our knowledge of legislative party campaign com-
mittees and where they fit into our party system is incomplete be-
cause very little is known about the legislative party campaign 
committees at the level of state politics. Other than Malcolm Jewell's 
work, which brought the existence of legislative party campaign com-
mittees at the state level to our attention, most of the work is focused 
on a single state and/or deals exclusively with the distribution of cam-
paign committee funds. 5 These works provide some evidence that 
legislative party campaign committees concentrate their resources in 
competitive elections, and they offer bits of evidence suggesting that 
the committees may vary their strategies over time in accordance with 
partisan trends. They do not, however, provide us with any picture of 
what these committees are like in terms of organizational structure 
and practices, and they lack the comparative and theoretical approach 
necessary to make firm conclusions about the practices of legislative 
party campaign committees. 
The purpose of this book is to report on research that was de-
signed to expand our knowledge of the electoral activity of legislative 
parties by focusing on legislative party campaign committees at the 
state level. The research consists of a comparative study of legislative 
party campaign activity, with empirical analyses of campaign finance 
data in ten states and qualitative analysis of interviews conducted 
with legislative leaders and key staff on legislative caucus campaign 
committees in eleven states. The results lead to a number of impor-
tant findings regarding the organization, practices, and behavior of 
legislative party campaign committees. The findings suggest that, in 
the services they provide and the way they distribute their resources, 
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most legislative party caucus campaign . committees have developed 
into organizations that are more akin to political parties than to PACs. 
Leadership PACs, on the other hand, resemble political action com-
mittees, but the way they distribute their funds, more often than not, 
counters the effect of PAC contributions. Such conclusions obviously 
have major implications for the study of legislative politics. 
This book is organized so that the major questions of interest re-
garding the legislative party campaign committees are addressed in 
separate chapters. Chapter 1 examines the context in which legislative 
party campaign committees developed-the history of legislative 
elections and the role played by political parties throughout that his-
tory-in order to arrive at some understanding of why and how leg-
islative parties became involved in elections. Chapter 2 develops a 
theoretical framework for the comparative study of the involvement of 
legislative parties in elections. The framework focuses the research 
and provides specific assumptions for the development of testable hy-
potheses; such an approach has been conspicuously absent in the lit-
erature on campaign committees. Chapter 3 provides an analysis of 
the finances of legislative party campaign committees at the aggregate 
level, allowing for some state-to-state comparisons and an initial look 
at the distribution of resources. The qualitative analysis of interviews 
begins in chapter 4, where the results of the interviews are used to 
determine what these committees are like: the organizational struc-
ture of caucus committees, the assistance they provide candidates, 
where they get their resources, and the functions that they perform. 
Chapter 5 looks at the actual distribution of caucus committee and 
leadership campaign committee resources in terms of the marginality 
of the race and the types of candidates supported i.e., incumbents 
and nonincumbents. The differences between caucus committees and 
leadership PACs are explored in the chapter 6. Chapter 7 explores 
· the question of refined strategies that take into consideration the leg-
islative party's status in the legislature and national and state party 
trends. The conclusion provides a discussion of the implications of 
the findings and offers a look into the future. 
1 
Legislative Elections 
and Political Parties 
A suitable starting place for this inquiry is an examination of the fac-
tors that may have inspired legislative parties to become involved in 
elections. The reasons for the development of legislative party cam-
paign committees are evident in the recent history of legislative elec-
tions. Changes such as the decline in party loyalty, the phenomenal 
increase in the cost of campaigns, and the increase in party competi-
tion for control of state legislatures generated a demand for assistance 
that only a political party organization could provide. The state and 
national central party organizations, as well as the local party orga-
nizations, were in no position to help, having never fully recovered 
from the impact of the progressive reforms and the changes that oc-
curred in the nature of political campaigns. It is in this environment 
that legislative caucus campaign committees emerged, and it seems 
apparent that the reason they emerged was to fill this void. In fact, 
this was a common theme among many of the legislators and staff 
who were interviewed for this research. Senator Charles Pray, presi-
dent of the Maine Senate, for example, stated that the Democratic 
Senate Caucus Committee was "started in 1978 because we were get-
ting very little help from the party." Mark Ausmus of the House Dem-
ocratic Campaign Committee in Missouri indicated. that in the 1980s 
the Democrats "didn't have a strong state party," and that was the 
"reason why the speaker started it [the HDCC]." 
The reason for the development of leadership PACs can be found 
in the increasing amount of money in legislative campaigns and, 
more important, in the unequal distribution of that money. PACs and 
individuals tend to contribute more to incumbent candidates who are 
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most likely to win. 1 This leaves incumbent legislators, especially lead-
ers who attract the most contributions because of their positions of 
power, with excess funds. Not having to worry too much about re-
election, these leaders began to use the money to pursue other goals, 
namely, to advance their careers in terms of party and legislative lead-
ership positions. The best way to pursue these goals was to make 
campaign contributions to other candidates. Such contributions, or 
transfers, could help the legislators advance their careers by adding to 
their party's chance of holding a majority of seats and by establishing 
a group of friends in the legislature that could provide votes in lead-
ership races. 
Legislative Elections 
It is no exaggeration to say that political scientists' knowledge of leg-
islative elections is based almost entirely on research dealing with 
congressional elections. The nature of state legislative elections has 
been largely inferred from the studies at the national level. We lack a 
large body of literature on state legislative elections because data on 
state legislative contests have not been very accessible-there are few 
or no survey data on the subject and only now that the State Legis-
lative Election Returns data set has been compiled for the Inter-
university Consortium for Political and Social Research is the basic 
information on election returns available for a large number of states. 2 
It is conventional wisdom that legislative elections are character-
ized by a low level of voter information, low voter turnout, and high 
levels of incumbency reelection, and are often shaped by national 
and/or statewide partisan trends. 3 Because of the low levels of voter 
information, partisan identification undoubtedly plays a large role in 
voter choice, acting as a cue to the candidate's general issue positions. 
The high rate of incumbency is probably related to a large differential 
in the name recognition of incumbents versus challengers and the fact 
that the districts are most often relatively small and consequently ho-
mogeneous. The level of professionalism in state legislatures has in-
creased, making legislative seats more desirable, a development that 
may be reflected in the decline in legislative turnover since the 1960s. 4 
These characteristics of legislative elections, especially the low 
levels of information, mean that money can play a significant role in 
legislative contests. Money allows candidates, either little recognized 
incumbents or unknown nonincumbents, to fill in the void in voters' 
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information about their candidacy. A state legislative candidate with-
out the funds to obtain some recognition will not go far. Studies of 
money in legislative elections have shown that it plays an important 
role in the outcomes of those elections. 5 Most of these studies of leg-
islative elections, however, have found that, although money does af-
fect the outcome, its role is subordinate to other factors such as 
partisan strength in the district or the incumbency advantage. 6 
The Party Role 
The role played by political parties in the election of legislative can-
didates has changed dramatically over the years. In the heyday of the 
political machines, the parties slated the candidates and provided 
the resources necessary to win-mainly in the form of local party 
cadres that mobilized the party's voters. The parties controlled the 
candidates and to a great extent the elections.7 The extent of party 
control during this era can be illustrated by the experience of my own 
grandfather, a precinct captain in Chicago's Democratic organization, 
who ran for a seat in the Illinois legislature under the instruction of 
his employers (he held a patronage position). After he won, he re-
signed-also under instruction of his employers-so the Democratic 
machine could install their man, whom they obviously felt could not 
win an election. 
The reforms enacted as a result of the progressive movement in 
the early 1900s initiated changes in electoral procedures that eventu-
ally minimized party involvement in legislative elections. The growth 
of the direct primary as the method for nominating party candidates 
ended the parties' role in directly selecting candidates. And the over-
all weakening of the political party organizations-the loss of patron-
age, the rise of candidate-centered campaigns for national and 
statewide offices, the push toward nonpartisan local elections, and 
the growth of the welfare state-left the parties without much life and 
with few resources to devote to any campaign. 
To win a legislative seat candidates therefore found it necessary to 
create and maintain their own organizations, to obtain the necessary 
resources on their own, and to run their campaigns independent of 
party help. This candidate-centered form of politics, which came to 
dominance in the 1960s and 1970s, moved the political parties even 
further toward the fringes of the legislative electoral process. Candi-
dates developed their own organizations in order to win the primary 
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election, then they maintained these organizations in order to win the 
general election. This development, along with the decline in party 
loyalty among the electorate, led many political scientists and political 
observers to predict the eventual demise of political parties. 8 
Political parties, however, did not disappear. In fact the parties ap-
pear to be on the rebound. Their organizational strength has in-
creased, and the national central committees have come to life with 
the infusion of large sums of money collected via direct mail. 9 Even 
with this revitalization, the national and most state central party 
committees did not have the resources required to become deeply in-
volved in legislative elections, consequently it was left to the legisla-
tive parties to do so. 
The Cost of Campaigns 
Early in the era of candidate-centered campaigns, the effort needed to 
be elected or reelected was not beyond the capacity of individual can-
didates' organizations. The costs of campaigns were not unreasonable 
and candidates could always rely on the partisan base of their district 
for support. This changed with the introduction of new and more ex-
pensive campaign technologies such as campaign consultants, elec-
tronic media, and public opinion polling. Such measures were so 
effective that candidates who did not use them would be at a great 
disadvantage. Thus, the demand for campaign revenues to pay for 
these new technologies increased dramatically. 
Starting in the 1970s the cost of legislative campaigns at the state 
and national level increased dramatically. Figure 1-1 shows that the 
average cost of legislative campaigns for state legislative races in a 
number of states and U.S. Congressional races-included for the sake 
of comparison-has increased tremendously since the early 1970s. Ta-
ble 1-1 illustrates the enormous change in the total expenditures in 
these races between 1978 and 1986. Total expenditures in Oregon sen-
ate races increased 379.1 percent; in California assembly races, expen-
ditures rose 144.8 percent; while expenditures for U.S. House races 
and U.S. Senate races increased "only" 144.5 percent and 183.4 per-
cent respectively. 10 This occurred in a period of less than ten years! 
The escalating costs of campaigns even outpaced inflation in all but 
one state. 11 
In addition to the cost of new campaign technologies, this growth 
in campaign financing was fueled, in part, by the rapid increase in the 
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Table 1-1. Trends in Campaign Finance 
1978 
u.s. House Races $86,129,169 
u.s. Senate Races 64,595,510 
State House Races 
California 7,485,837 
Colorado 798,255 
Oregon 1,013, 711 
state Senate Races 
California 3,134,451 
Colorado 279,912 
Oregon 225,265 
Nebraska 360,884 
Washington H & s 2,790,000 
Total Expenditures 
1986 
210,626,146 
183,039,105 
18,322,538 
1,684,826 
2,577,216 
12,095,060 
505,642 
1,079,299 
1,470,650 
6,970,000 
\ increase \ increase in 
1978-1986 1978 dollars 
144.5\ 19.9\ 
183.4 38.9 
144.8 20.0 
111.1 3.5 
154.2 24.7 
285.9 89.2 
80.6 -11.4 
379.1 134.9 
307.5 99.8 
149.8 22.5 
~Ornstein et al., Vital Statistic• on Congreul987-1988, 1987. California Fair Political Practice• Commiuion, 1986 
General Election: Campaign Receipts and Exnenditures. July 1. 1986 through December 31. 1986, 1987. Colorado Secretary of 
State, Elections, 1986 Colorado Cai!!Daicn Reform Act Sununarv: Contributions and EXPenditures. Nebraska Accountability and 
Disclosure Commiuion, A Summarv of Political Campaign Financing: The Candidatea, 1986. Oreaon Secretary of State, 
Election~ Divili.on, Summarv Report of Canwaim Contributions and Exoenditure1: 1986 General Election. Walhincton Public 
Diacloaure Commiuion, 1986 Election Financing Fact Book. 
number of political action committees at the national level following 
the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1974. This growth explosion 
quickly caught on at the state level. u Contributions from individuals 
and PACs, however, tend to go largely to incumbent candidates who 
are relatively safe. 13 This resulted in more money in campaigns but 
proportionately less money for nonincumbents-open-seat candi-
dates and challengers-and unestablished incumbents. In other 
words, it compounded the problem of the high cost of campaigns 
rather than helping to solve it. 
The need for large sums of money in order to run for or hold onto 
a legislative seat places an enormous burden on legislative candi-
dates. As the executive director of the lllinois House Republican Cam-
paign Committee put it, "some seats are up around a hundred 
thousand dollars, and districts do not have the ability to raise that 
kind of money." It has meant that legislators have had to increase the 
time they devote to fund-raising activities. Because the rising level of 
professionalism in state legislatures has increased the time that a leg-
islator's job requires, it is probably even harder to find the time for 
fund-raising. Thus, by the mid- to late 1970s, there existed a height-
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ened demand for another source of campaign funds, one that would 
not consume any more of a legislator's time and one that could chan-
nel the funds to candidates who needed them the most. 
The Rise of Insecurity in Legislative Elections 
The 1960s and 1970s also witnessed a decline in partisan loyalty 
among the electorate. The percentage of the population identifying 
with either of the major parties declined, and the number of people 
splitting their votes between the two parties increased dramatically. 14 
The waning party loyalty of the electorate added an additional ele-
ment of uncertainty to legislative elections: no longer could a candi-
date depend on a large loyal partisan base. 15 In other words, the 
increase in "swing" voters in the districts' electorates opened up leg-
islative elections to other influences. Thus, weakened party ties trans-
lated into an increased potential for competition for a legislative seat, 
because district party strength was no longer the barrier to a serious 
challenge that it used to be. 16 
Since the 1950s, the margin of seats held by majority parties in 
state legislatures has declined. Figure 1-2 shows the margin of party 
control in state houses in four regions since 1950, measured in terms 
of the difference between the percentage of seats held by the majority 
party and by the minority party. In the South, Midwest, and North-
east there has been a decline in the difference in the percentage of 
seats held by the majority. 17 The slopes of the lines are -.260 for the 
Northeast, -.448 for the Midwest, -.561 for the South, and .002 for 
the West. All but the slope for the west were significant at a .01level. 
The decrease in legislative margins indicates an increase in competi-
tion for control of state legislatures and, consequently, a threat to the 
majority party's control. These trends mean that the 1960s and 1970s 
were not only an era of increased insecurity for the individual legis-
lative candidates but also were a time of increased insecurity for leg-
islative parties. 
The Emergence of Legislative Party Campaign Committees 
By the mid- to late 1970s, the increasing cost of campaigns and the 
added uncertainty about reelection-two developments that are un-
doubtedly strongly interrelated-meant that legislative candidates 
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Figure 1-2. Margin of Party Control in State Houses 
needed additional assistance for their campaigns. The increase in 
competition for control of the legislature denoted an increase in inse-
curity for the legislative party as well. For the individual candidate, 
plenty of PAC money was available, but most of it was being distrib-
uted to incumbent candidates, who were relatively safe. 18 There was 
a need for a centralized organization to provide assistance to candi-
dates based upon need and to protect the interests of the party within 
the legislature; in other words, the demand was for a political party 
organization. Central committees of most state and national party 
organizations, however, could not meet this demand, consequently 
leaving a void. 
The widespread existence today of legislative party campaign 
committees at the national and state levels is undoubtedly a result gf. 
the need to fill that void. Legislative party caucus campaign commit-
tees represent a centralized source of campaign funds that candidates 
in need can go to for assistance. In addition to providing cash, the 
caucus campaign committees purchase some of the expensive cam-
paign technologies-polling, media production facilities, and cam-
paign consultants-at volume discounts and pass those discounts on 
to their candidates. Furthermore, caucus campaign committees pro-
vide the legislative party with the mechanism for maintaining or 
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pursuing a legislative majority. Leadership PACs represent the redis-
tribution of campaign funds from the "wealthy" to the "needy" 
candidates, an arrangement that benefits both the recipient and the 
contributor. 
The extent to which legislative caucus campaign committees exist 
in the American states is presented in Table 1-2. The pattern of re-
gional differences is most apparent. The region where such commit-
tees seem least likely to exist is the South. Legislative elections in the 
South are still dominated by the Democratic party, with most legis-
lative elections remaining uncontested, so that there is little need for 
legislative party campaign committees to protect the interests either 
of insecure individuals or of the legislative parties. 19 In the sample 
of states used in this book the strongest caucus campaign committees 
tend to be found in states with high levels of party competition and 
high campaign expenditures, or with weak state party organizations. 
The best developed caucus campaign committees within each state 
tend to be Democratic committees-such as those in Wisconsin, 
Maine, Minnesota, and Indiana. This may have something to do with 
the fact that the Democratic state party organizations in those states 
tend to be weaker than the Republican state party organizations. 20 
Legislative leadership campaign committees (leadership PACs) 
undoubtedly have their roots in the unequal distribution of campaign 
contributions. Candidates who have funds and do not need them 
have found that campaign money can be used to advance their careers 
in the legislature.21 Consequently, these candidates have developed 
the practice of transferring funds out of their own campaign commit-
tees to the campaign committees of candidates who need them. In the 
process they build friendships that will support them in future bids 
for leadership positions. Thus, leadership PACs developed almost en-
tirely because of the enormous increases in the amount of money in-
volved in legislative elections and the unequal distribution of that 
money. They developed for different reasons than the caucus cam-
paign committees, and this is indicated by the fact that they coexist 
with caucus committees in every state in the eleven-state sample used 
in this analysis. 
In summary, an examination of the context in which legislative 
party campaign committees developed provides reasonable explana-
tions as to why the legislative party became involved in legislative 
elections. The growth in the costs of campaigns, the increased com-
petition for control of legislatures, and the weakness of state and na-
tional central party organizations created a need for political parties 
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Table 1-2. States with Legislative Caucus Campaign Committees 
Yes No Yes No 
Northeast 
Connecticut X Vermont NA** 
New Hampshire X New Jersey X 
Maine* X New York* X 
Massachusetts X Pennsylvania X 
Rhode Island X 
Midwest 
Illinois* X Kansas X 
Indiana* X Minnesota* X 
Michigan X Nebraska X 
Ohio X North Dakota X 
Wisconsin* X South Dakota X 
Iowa X 
South 
Delaware X Kentucky X 
Florida X Mississippi X 
Georgia NA Tennessee* X 
Maryland X Arkansas X 
North Carolina X Louisiana NA 
South Carolina X Oklahoma X 
Virginia X Missouri* X 
West Virginia X Texas X 
Alabama X 
West 
Arizona X Utah X 
Colorado X Wyoming X 
California* X Alaska X 
Idaho X Hawaii X 
Montana X Oregon* X 
Nevada X Washington* X 
New Mexico X 
•lndicatea state• used for analysia in the rest of the book. 
••NA indicate• infonnation was not available. 
in legislative elections. Out of this need grew the legislative caucus 
campaign committees. Leadership PACs developed at a time when a 
large amount of funding was being placed in the hands of those who 
did not need it for reelection. 
2 
Theory and Method 
What are legislative party campaign committees like? Are they party 
organizations or merely party PACs? What strategies do legislative 
party campaign committees pursue? Do they merely support their 
own-incumbent candidates-or are they more inclusive? How do 
legislative party campaign committees differ from each other? Do 
leadership PACs and caucus campaign committees differ beyond their 
organizational structures? Such questions represent the main pur-
pose of this research because of the implications the answers hold for 
legislative elections, political parties, and legislative behavior. In or-
der to answer these questions it is necessary to form some a priori 
expectations about what the answers might be: this is done by gen-
erating hypotheses from a theory of legislative party campaign com-
mittee behavior. The purpose of this chapter is to develop some a 
priori expectations about legislative party campaign committees and 
to discuss the data and methods that will be used to determine 
whether or not legislative party campaign committees conform to 
those expectations. 
Constrained Rational Decision Making: A Theoretical Framework 
Two general theoretical approaches have been used in the campaign 
finance literature: the rational choice approach and the organizational 
perspective. 1 The rational choice approach assumes that actors in-
volved in financing campaigns are rational decision makers who act to 
maximize the benefit they derive from the contributions they make. 
Welch's work provides one example of this approach.2 Welch argued 
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that there were two types of contributors, quid pro quo and ideolog-
ical, both of whom he portrayed as rational. The quid pro quo con-
tributor expects returns from his or her contribution, in terms of 
favorable policy, etc. Since the best returns come from investing in 
those who will wield power, quid pro quo contributors give over-
whelmingly to incumbents. 3 
The organizational approach argues that organizational vari-
ables-such as the decision-making structure-determine how deci-
sions will be made. This was demonstrated by Herrnson, who found 
that the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee's (DCCC) 
decisions were affected by the power that incumbent Democratic con-
gressmen had over the committee. The incumbent Democrats used 
their power over the committee to obtain additional campaign contri-
butions from the committee, consequently limiting the DCCC's ability 
to strategically target resources to close races. 4 
Unlike many other competing theories in political science, these 
two approaches are quite compatible.5 The validity of one does not 
rule out the validity of the other. In more concrete terms, it is possi-
ble, if not entirely likely, that rational decision making can exist with-
in the limitations set by organizational or environmental factors. In 
fact, to hold the decision maker to an ideal of rational decision making 
without considering such external constraints sacrifices too much re-
alism for the sake of a parsimonious theory of decision making. 6 
Integrating these two approaches to studying campaign finance 
will provide the basic theoretical framework used in this research. I 
posit that legislative party campaign committee behavior can be un-
derstood and explained within the context of three components of the 
theory: (1) the assumption that the actors involved are rational deci-
sion makers, (2) the proposition that the actors have discernible goal 
structures related to legislative party campaign committee behavior, 
and (3) the proposition that organizational factors affect the choices 
made by the legislative party campaign committees. 
The Assumption of Rationality. The cornerstone of this theoretical 
framework is the assumption that the legislators-the actors involved 
in legislative party campaign committee decisions-behave rationally. 
That legislators are rational decision makers in this case simply means 
that their behavior is goal oriented. Legislators are assumed to have 
a clear set of goals, and their behavior should follow the pattern of 
maximizing outcomes in terms of these goals, while minimizing 
costs. Understanding legislative party campaign committee activity 
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should, therefore, follow from an understanding of the goals of those 
involved. 
Assumptions regarding the rationality of decision makers are 
grounded in rational choice theory. Rational choice theorists have been 
criticized for their tendency to make demanding assumptions and to 
oversimplify the choice process in the ,real world." Their critics argue 
that their models often ignore important constraints on time, infor-
mation, and human mental capacities and that, instead of rationally 
maximizing their utility, decision makers ,muddle through" incre-
mentally, or "satisfice."7 
Because this research borrows from rational choice theory, the 
possibility that it may be open to some of the same criticisms must 
be addressed. These criticisms are not especially relevant to this re-
search for a number of reasons. First, this research is not designed to 
,test" the assertion that decision makers are rational per se. That 
assumption is simply being used as a heuristic device to organize 
and to integrate the theoretical development and to provide a 
framework for the generation of testable hypotheses and the interpre-
tation of findings. Second, this research is dealing with political elites, 
who are more likely than nonelites to meet the stringent require-
ments of the rational model; they are more likely than nonelites to 
have dear, prioritized goals and sufficient information, and they are 
more likely to select options that will lead to their goals. Thus, the 
limits on individual rationality should not pose a problem for this 
research.8 
Using rational choice assumptions in research is not something 
entirely new to political science. Political scientists have used the 
framework of rational choice theory to develop theories on a large 
number of subjects but the rational choice assumptions seem to have 
been more readily accepted when used for constructing theories of 
elite behavior. 9 The assumption of rational decision making has pro-
vided the basis for theories regarding electoral strategies, political 
parties, and legislative behavior-three aspects of legislative party 
campaign finance activity of concern in this research. 10 
Goals: Legislators, Leaders, and Parties. In the legislature there 
are three types of actors especially relevant to the study of legislative 
party campaign committees: individual legislators, the legislative 
leaders, and the legislative political parties. Each set of actors can be 
seen as having a particular goal structure related to the activity of leg-
islative party campaign committees. 
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Legislators' primary goal is to be reelected. 11 They can be ex-
pected to amass as many resources as necessary and possible to attain 
this goal, for if they are not reelected, nothing else matters. Fenno ar-
gued that, beyond reelection, legislators pursue the goals of power 
and influence in the legislature and of "good" public policy, i.e., the 
legislation they wish to see enacted. 12 Power and influence in the leg-
islature may include obtaining a assignment, or even a chair position, 
on a powerful or important committee. The chances of obtaining the 
goals of power and influence and "good" public policy are tied to the 
status of the legislator's party. Majority party legislators will have a 
greater opportunity to attain their goals. 
The goal structure of the legislative leadership is likely to be more 
complex because their goals encompass collective party goals as well 
as individual goals. Leaders, like all legislators, are likely to pursue 
the individual goal of reelection to the legislature. In addition, be-
cause of their party leadership positions, they may also pursue a 
number of other goals such as, reelection to their leadership posts, 
majority status for their parties, large personal coalitions, and party 
cohesion. Leaders are likely to value majority status for their parties 
because of the benefits they derive from being the majority leader or 
Speaker: power over committee appointments, scheduling of legisla-
tion, and the ability to enact desired policies, to name a few. Benefits 
derived from being the minority leader are significantly less. Leaders 
are also likely to pursue large personal coalitions to provide them-
selves with the power base needed to retain their leadership posi-
tions. Leaders should value party cohesion because it enhances their 
power within the legislature as well as their power within the party. 
Party cohesion makes leaders' jobs easier. 
Two goals held by those in leadership positions-majority party 
status and party cohesion-are shared by the political party and thus 
may be considered more collective in nature than the personal or in-
dividual goals of reelection (to the legislature and to the leadership 
post) and building a personal coalition. The relative emphasis placed 
upon the goals shared with the party as compared with the more in-
dividual goals should depend in part upon the level of party compe-
tition within the state. High levels of party competition mean a 
greater uncertainty about what the partisan makeup of the legislature 
will be after an election. Such uncertainty should prompt leaders to 
devote a great deal of energy and resources to electing a majority of 
their party, after they insure their own reelection, of course. After 
leaders devote the resources deemed necessary to win majority sta-
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tus, then they may use whatever additional resources are needed to 
pursue the goals of a large personal coalition, party cohesion, and 
policy enactment. Under low levels of party competition, the uncer-
tainty regarding the party's status in the legislature is reduced, allow-
ing leaders to pursue more personal goals. 
When determining the likely goals of the legislative party, care 
must be taken regarding the assumption of rationality for a collective 
body. Rational choice theory deals with individual preferences and 
choices and argues that collective action is deduced from these indi-
vidual processes. A collective rational calculus cannot be assumed be-
cause a collective utility function cannot be determined because of 
intrasitivities that occur when aggregeting individuals' preferences. 13 
Thus, a collective body is expected to be no more than the summation 
of the goals and choices of the individuals who constitute it. Downs's 
definition of a political party as a coalition of individuals who have 
certain ends in common and who cooperate to achieve them conforms 
to this rational perspective of collective action. 14 Thus, under the as-
sumptions of rational choice theory, the legislative party goal struc-
ture should reflect the goals and choices of its members, and a 
legislative party campaign committee should not be construed to be 
an individual entity with goals and purposes of its own. 15 
In contrast to this rational choice view is the notion found in or-
ganizational theory that bureaucratic organizations can, and most of-
ten do, become separate entities distinct from the individuals who 
comprise them. 16 Furthermore, organizational theorists argue that 
bureaucratic organizations do have goals and purposes of their own 
that are distinct from those of the individuals who make up the or-
ganizations. However, the rational choice assumption that a separate 
"collective rationality" does not exist is not likely to be contradicted in 
this analysis because legislative party campaign committees are un-
likely to be considered full-blown bureaucratic organizations. That is, 
they do not have the hierarchical structure, specialization of tasks, 
technically trained personnel, and standardized operating procedures 
characteristic of bureaucratic organizations. Organizational factors ob-
viously have an impact on legislative party campaign committee be-
havior, but the underlying assumption for the purpose of this 
research remains individual rationality. 
Because it is assumed that the legislative party's goals stem from 
the goals of its individual members, the goals of the legislative party 
must reflect those of the legislators and the legislative leaders. This 
is easier to demonstrate in the case of leaders than in the case of 
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individual legislators. I posit that the goals of the legislative party are 
(1) majority party status and a maximum number of seats, (2) party 
cohesion, and (3) the enactment of party policies. 
The extent to which the goals of those who occupy leadership po-
sitions are entangled with the legislative party goals has already been 
discussed. Leaders value majority party status highly because being 
majority leader results in much greater benefits than being minority 
leader. Leaders also value party cohesion because it enhances their 
power within the legislature and within the party and because it 
makes their jobs easier. Thus, the legislative party's goals presented 
above easily reflect the goals of the leaders. 
It is a little harder to show how the legislative party's goals reflect 
the goals of individual legislators. The difficulty arises from the classic 
dilemma between collective and individual goals. By pursuing a strat-
egy of maximizing seats, the legislative party cannot guarantee that 
each individual legislator will be reelected-legislators' primary and 
dominant goal. In fact, the most efficient distribution of resources to 
maximize seats will concentrate on races perceived to be dose, a strat-
egy that leaves many incumbent legislators without assistance. 
Though they may have won by large margins in past elections and 
may be perceived to have safe seats, legislators always worry about 
reelection17 and thus prefer that they receive the legislative party's 
money. 18 However, the party's goal of maximizing seats to gain ma-
jority status does reflect the goals of some of its members, specifically 
those legislators in competitive races who would receive assistance. 
Furthermore, legislators in "safe" seats may consider the future value 
that a party that pursues seat-maximizing goals might bring them if 
they were ever in a dose race. They may support it as a type of "in-
surance" policy that they can collect from if they run into electoral 
trouble. 19 Thus, in certain instances the party's goals do reflect the 
reelection goal of legislators. 
Individual legislators' goals of power and influence in the legis-
lature and of "good" public policy are easily reflected in the party 
goals of majority status, party cohesion, and policy enactment. Ma-
jority party status enhances the legislators' power in terms of com-
mittee assignments and increases the likelihood that legislation 
legislators favor will be enacted. This leads us to a conclusion about 
party goals that fits closely with the literature. 
In summary, the goal structures of those involved in legislative 
party campaign committees differ mainly in regard to the difference 
between collective and individual goals. Nonetheless, the proposed 
goal structures are quite similar since a number of the individual 
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goals depend upon the attainment of many of the collective goals; for 
example, the majority leader's status depends upon the party's ability 
to meet its goal of a majority of seats. This tie between collective and 
individual goals is greatest when the collective goals are threatened, 
which occurs under high levels of interparty competition. High levels 
of interparty competition increase the likelihood that legislators may 
end up in the minority, depriving the legislators of the committee as-
signments and policy outcomes they desire. The similarities and dif-
ferences between the goals of the various actors will play a key part in 
the explanation and prediction of legislative party campaign commit-
tee behavior. 
Organizational Factors. The organizational structure and resources 
of legislative party campaign committees determine whose goals the 
committees pursue as well as which goals they can pursue. The 
decision-making structure of the committees-who makes the deci-
sions-will affect the committees' behavior by determining whose 
goals will be pursued. For instance, if a leader controls the committee, 
the committee will pursue the leader's goals-majority party status, a 
personal coalition, and so on. Committees controlled by incumbent 
legislators will pursue the goals of the incumbents, mainly helping 
them get reelected. If pure party interests are in control-in other 
words, if no candidate has a voice-then the party goals of majority 
party status and party cohesion will be pursued. 20 The effect of the 
decision-making structure on legislative party campaign committee 
behavior is likely to be the most obvious when comparing legislative 
caucus campaign committees and leadership campaign committees. 
The former is controlled by the caucus members or the leadership, the 
latter by a single legislator. 
The second organizational factor that is believed to shape legisla-
tive party campaign committee decisions is the amount of resources 
available. Legislative party campaign committees have limited re-
sources for legislative campaigns, especially when compared to the 
contributions from individuals and from political action committees. 
California legislative party campaign committees, the wealthiest in 
the nation, make up about a quarter of the funds raised by can-
didates in legislative elections; other states are far behind (see chapter 
3). Because resources are limited, a widespread distribution of re-
sources would result in only token payments to individuals. Such a 
distribution would have limited utility for both the recipient and the 
contributor. Thus, the limited amount of funds possessed by the com-
mittees means they are restricted in which goals they can effectively 
22 Legislative Party Campaign Committees 
pursue; they cannot effectively pursue goals that require a broad dis-
tribution of resources. 
Finally, legislative party campaign committees' actions may be 
limited by campaign finance laws. States vary greatly in how they 
treat campaign committees, ranging from a total prohibition of such 
committees-in California, caucus and leadership campaign commit-
tees have now been banned as the result of a voter initiative, Propo-
sition 73-to simply requiring that the committees file reports of 
revenues and expenditures. Some states have public financing and ac-
companying limits on contributions. Whatever the state provisions 
are, they can have major impact on how the committees operate by 
limiting how effectively the committees can pursue the goals of those 
involved. 
In summary, the theoretical framework assumes that the actors 
involved are rational, argues that the actors have particular sets of 
goals, and contends that organizational factors play a role in deter-
mining which goals will be pursued by the committees. Goals predict 
the behavior of rational decision makers, and the organizational fac-
tors determine or limit which goals will be pursued. So, for example, 
if legislators control the campaign committee, the committee can be 
expected to exhibit behavior that is most effective at attaining the 
goals of reelecting the legislators, enhancing their power, and enact-
ing desired legislation, all within the limits of the resources available 
to the committee. This framework now allows us to develop some 
more specific a priori expectations regarding legislative party cam-
paign committees. 
Hypotheses 
Given the theoretical framework and the previous research on legis-
lative party campaign committees, what results can be expected in an 
analysis of legislative party campaign committees? That is, what are 
the committees expected to be like? How should they be allocating 
their resources? And what differences should there be in the practices 
between legislative caucus campaign committees and leadership cam-
paign committees? 
Close Races, Non incumbents, and the Difference Between Commit-
tees. A key component of the theory previously outlined is that the 
goals that legislative party campaign committees pursue are strongly 
related to their behavior. Legislative party campaign committees may 
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pursue the goals of individual legislators, legislative leaders, or the 
collective goals of the party. Which they pursue depends upon the 
level of influence that legislators and leaders have over committee de-
cision making and what their resources will allow them to do. That is, 
the goals that are pursued by the legislative party campaign commit-
tee will be determined in part by the organizational structure. 
If the legislative party campaign committees pursue the legisla-
tors' goals, how will they distribute their resources? Conventional wis-
dom, as well as rational choice research on distributional politics, 21 
leads us to believe that where reelection-valuable resources are con-
cerned, incumbent legislators will fight for and win their fair share of 
whatever the committees distribute. In fact, according to Shepsle and 
Weingast, the fear of being in the minority and losing out on re-
sources valuable for reelection should lead to a norm of universalism 
among legislators, a situation where every legislator receives a share. 22 
However, the fact that legislative party campaign committees have 
limited resources narrows their options. As a result, they may either 
distribute token amounts to all caucus members or target close 
races-including nonincumbent candidates-in order to build or 
maintain a legislative majority. 
Because the game of legislative elections is one of repetition, at 
least for most players, legislators should opt for the second strategy of 
targeting resources. There are two reasons to expect this. First, safe 
incumbents should be willing to pay the cost of forgoing the token 
benefit at the present time in exchange for the greater benefit they 
would accrue if they were ever to face a strong challenger. In other 
words, with the legislative party campaign committee targeting races, 
the potential payoff-a concentration of campaign assistance when it 
is needed-is greater than the cost-the loss of a token benefit every 
election in which it is not needed. 
Second, legislators should opt for a strategic distribution of cam-
paign resources because the benefits derived from being in the ma-
jority party, namely, favorable committee assignments and favorable 
outcomes on public policy, should be greater than the benefit derived 
from the token amount that an equal distribution of legislative party 
resources would bring. In cases where the legislature is dominated by 
one party and the hopes or fears of a change in status are remote, this 
calculus would obviously be very different. Majority party status 
would no longer be an important goal because there is no fear of los-
ing a majority or because attaining a majority is no longer a realistic 
goal. This makes the individual goal of reelection the dominant one. 
24 Legislative Party Campaign Committees 
Under these conditions legislative party campaign committees should 
be found to support only incumbents. 
When analyzing the role of the legislative leaders in committee 
decisions, it is important to distinguish between the two types of 
committees: caucus campaign committees and leadership campaign 
committees or leadership PACs. The distributional decisions of legis-
lative caucus campaign committees under the control of party leaders 
may be very different from the distributional decisions of leaders di-
recting their own campaign committee funds. In the first capacity, 
leaders are in charge of the legislative party's money and thus must 
heed some of the demands of other party members. In the other ca-
pacity, leaders are in charge of their own funds and are therefore less 
constrained when making distributional decisions. 
If leaders exercise control over caucus committees' decisions, it is 
expected that the committees will concentrate their resources on dose 
races, whether these involve incumbents or nonincumbents. Legisla-
tive leaders have to balance the particular demands of the rank-and-
file legislators of their own party and the needs of the party as a 
whole, because leaders' ability to reach their own goals depends upon 
both. Leaders' goal of maintaining or advancing their leadership po-
sition depends upon the vote of the legislators within their party and 
on the status of their party within the legislature. To the extent that 
legislators see the benefit of a concentrated allocation of resources, no 
conflict exists between the individual and collective goals, and the 
leaders are free to pursue collective party goals through a strategic al-
location of the caucus committee's resources. This is most likely to oc-
cur under conditions of high party competition for control of the 
legislature. Also, under these conditions the need to be responsive to 
the party members precludes legislative party leaders from favoring 
their loyal followers at the expense of others. 
When party competition is low, this pattern is likely to break 
down, causing leaders to sacrifice collective party goals in order to 
meet the demands of their party's legislators. Consequently, the com-
mittee's resources would be distributed equally, or only to caucus 
members, i.e., incumbent legislators. Low levels of party competition 
may also make it necessary for leaders of the majority party to defend 
their position if factionalism threatens it, encouraging them to distrib-
ute resources based upon personal loyalties rather than need and par-
tisanship-a practice that would unquestionably lead to a high level 
of divisiveness among the party caucus members. 
Since leadership PACs involve the distribution of an individual 
legislative leader's personal campaign funds to other candidates, the 
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distribution of these funds should be directed at attaining the leader's 
goals. To a certain extent, leaders can be expected to act in a manner 
similar to Welch's quid pro quo contributors.23 That is, leaders should 
be expected to contribute to candidates in return for the candidates' 
support in leadership battles. Leaders' goals, however, are tied to the 
fortunes of their party. If their party is constantly battling for control 
of the legislature, leaders' decisions about whom to support can be 
expected to be based upon the same criteria used by the party-i.e., 
the competitiveness of the race-in order to advance the goal of ma-
jority status. It is likely, though, that troubled candidates who are 
friends of the leader would constitute a higher priority. Under this 
scenario funding would go first to incumbents in trouble. 
If, on the other hand, control of the legislature is unlikely to 
change hands, leaders' funding decisions should be based strictly on 
loyalty or friendship, meaning that incumbents would receive an 
even greater share of the available funds. This pattern is expected 
since, as in the logic of quid pro quo contributors, incumbents are a 
better investment-they are a known quantity, and they will more 
than likely be there following the election. To the extent that the lead-
ers are rational, in the sense that they want to maximize the return 
from their expenditures, their efforts should also be expected to be 
devoted to those incumbents in close races where the impact per dol-
lar will be the greatest. Whereas competitiveness should be the dom-
inant criteria for the party, loyalty and friendship should be the 
dominant factor in leaders' decisions regarding their own campaign 
committees. This difference should result in a pattern in which lead-
ership PACs give a greater emphasis than caucus committees to in-
cumbent candidates. 
If the legislative party campaign committees pursue the collective 
goals of the party, a strategic distribution of resources should also be 
discovered. Parties' overriding goal is to gain control of government 
by winning the most votes, and they do this in legislative elections by 
trying to win a majority of seats.24 The most effective use of their re-
sources to attain this goal is to concentrate the resources on races 
where they will make the most difference, namely, close races. Fur-
thermore, if they are trying to build a majority, they will need to fund 
caucus outsiders-nonincumbent candidates-to increase the size of 
their party's legislative contingent. If they hold a large majority, they 
should be found to concentrate their resources on defending weak 
incumbents. 
Thus, where party competition is high and resources limited, the 
goals of individual legislators, leaders, and the party should converge, 
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giving priority to the shared goal of majority party status. This prem-
ise is overwhelmingly supported by the interviews conducted as part 
of this research. When asked, "What is the campaign committee try-
ing to accomplish by providing assistance to candidates?" every com-
mittee representative answered that the number one goal was to gain 
or maintain a majority of seats in the legislature. The goals leaders 
pursue in distributing their own committee funds are expected to be 
slightly different, with a priority on supporting friends and loyal sup-
porters. Given these goals, it is possible to devise hypotheses regard-
ing the expected behavior of the committees and how they will differ. 
To gain or maintain majority party status, legislative party caucus 
campaign committees should be found to distribute their resources 
strategically, concentrating them on close races and supporting non-
incumbent candidates as well as incumbents.25 Leadership PACs also 
should be found to concentrate their giving to close races, but with a 
higher priority on incumbents, a priority that is expected to be even 
more distinguished if no change in the status of the leader's party is 
expected. Figure 2-1 depicts the expected behavior of the committees 
under varying conditions of party competition. 
These expectations differ significantly from what one would ex-
pect following the rational choice literature on distributional politics 
or from conventional wisdom. 26 Both of these approaches would lead 
one to expect an equal distribution of campaign committee resources. 
The rational choice approach would lead one to expect an equal dis-
tribution because rational choice fails to take into account the organi-
zational or environmental context of decisions-the limited resources 
possessed by the committees-which, to a great extent, determines 
which goals the committees will pursue. And conventional wisdom, 
assuming the complete dominance of the goal of reelection, leads to 
the expectation that where reelection-valuable resources are con-
cerned, such as pork-barrel projects, legislators will fight to get their 
fair share, resulting in an equal distribution of committee funds lim-
ited to caucus members. 
Variations in Distributional Strategies. The use of legislative party 
campaign committee funds to pursue the goal of majority status un-
doubtedly involves more than concentrating resources on close races 
and funding nonincumbent candidates. It is possible that the decision 
makers in control of legislative party campaign committees consider 
or make use of additional decision-making rules. Two that seem to 
have been in evidence in some of the literature on legislative party 
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Campaign Committee 
Caucus Committees Leadership PACe 
high close races close races 
non incumbents incumbents 
party competition 
incumbents incumbents 
low 
Figure 2-1. Expected Distribution Patterns of Campaign Committees 
committees are the status of the party within the legislature-
whether the party holds a majority or a minority of seats-and trends 
in the popularity of the party. 
An efficient use of resources to attain the goal of majority party 
status may require more than a simple strategy of supporting candi-
dates in competitive races. A minority party must actively recruit and 
support new candidates-nonincumbents-in order to increase the 
number of seats they hold in the legislature. This type of "offensive" 
strategy is the only way that they can attain majority status. Members 
of the legislative party caucus, according to the theoretical proposi-
tions developed above, are willing to forgo the contributions that they 
would receive from the committee in order to attain the goal of ma-
jority party status. Members of a minority legislative party caucus 
campaign committee should be even more willing to do so, because 
the change from minority to majority status would mean a greater 
payoff in terms of committee assignments and success of favored leg-
islation. Thus, minority party legislative party campaign committees 
should exhibit a greater willingness to fund nonincumbent candi-
dates. Once again, this calculus will be different for legislatures dom-
inated by one party. Where the chances of a change in the party's 
status are small, the goal of majority party status is not a priority, and 
the willingness to allow committee funds to go to outsiders would 
not exist. 
All a majority legislative party campaign committee has to do is to 
make sure that the party retains all of its legislative seats. That is, the 
majority party must insure that its incumbents are reelected and that 
the party wins any open seats created by a retirement of one of their 
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incumbents. Since legislative incumbents are almost unbeatable at the 
national and state level, the most efficient way to distribute the com-
mittee's resources in order to attain the goal of majority status would 
be to use the resources to reinforce the incumbency advantage. Thus, 
majority legislative party campaign committees should follow a "de-
fensive" strategy that puts a top priority on defending vulnerable in-
cumbents. Unlike the minority party committees, this strategy is 
likely to be more prevalent as the size of the majority increases. 
In attempting to gain or maintain a majority, it might also be ex-
pected that the legislative party campaign committees would take ad-
vantage of swings in party popularity to increase the number of seats 
the party holds. When the public's perception of the party is positive 
(for such reasons as having a popular candidate at the top of the 
ticket) campaign committees may try to "cash in" on that popularity 
by supporting nonincumbent candidates, and in that way increase 
their seats in the legislature. High popularity, it is assumed, will trans-
late into votes. In this way a legislative party is using trends in parti-
san support among the public to counter the incumbency advantage. 
If public perceptions of the party are negative because of such oc-
currences as scandal or economic downturns, campaign committees 
may try to counteract these trends in order to avoid losing what they 
already have. In other words, legislative party campaign committees 
whose state or national party's popularity is low should be found to 
focus their efforts on defending weak incumbents. In this way they 
make use of the incumbency advantage to try to reduce the effects of 
the negative changes in partisan support among the electorate.27 
Alternatively, it is quite possible that decision makers ignore na-
tional and statewide trends when making their decisions and instead 
focus mainly on district-level forces such as the closeness of the pre-
vious race, the strength of the candidates, and trends in local politics. 
Summary. From the findings of previous studies and the theoretical 
propositions developed, a number of specific a priori expectations 
have been generated regarding the allocation of legislative party cam-
paign committee resources. These expectations can be summarized in 
a series of hypotheses. 
1. Legislative party campaign committees should be found to 
concentrate their resources on dose races. 
2. Legislative party campaign committees should be just as 
likely to fund nonincumbent candidates as incumbent candi-
dates, all other factors being equal. 
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3. Campaign committees existing in states with low levels of 
interparty competition will not meet the expectations of hypoth-
esis 2. In other words, they will not necessarily be more likely to 
fund nonincumbents. 
4. Legislative leadership PACs should be as efficient at concen-
trating their resources on close races as are caucus campaign com-
mittees in states with a high degree of interparty competition. 
5. Leadership PACs should be less likely than caucus campaign 
committees to fund nonincumbents. 
6. Minority legislative party campaign committees that have a 
reasonable chance of winning a majority of seats should be 
found to concentrate a greater proportion of their resources 
on nonincumbent candidates than their majority party counter-
parts. 
7. Legislative party caucus campaign committees whose parties 
are enjoying a surge of popularity nationally should be more 
likely to fund nonincumbent candidates than legislative party 
caucus campaign committees of the opposition. 
8. Legislative party caucus campaign committees whose party is 
enjoying a surge of popularity at the state level should be more 
likely to fund nonincumbent candidates than legislative party 
caucus campaign committees of the opposition. 
The tests of these hypotheses constitute the core of the research pre-
sented in the following chapters. 
Data and Methods 
The data for this research was collected from two sources. Data on the 
distribution of legislative party campaign committees came from var-
ious state agencies that maintain such records, and information about 
the organization and practices of the committees came from inter-
views of legislative leaders and caucus committee staff. 
Most states now require that campaign finance information, in-
cluding itemized revenues and expenditures for candidates, PACs and 
party committees, be filed with a state agency. 28 Data on legislative 
caucus campaign contributions were collected from ten states: Cali-
fornia, Illinois, Indiana, Minnesota, Missouri, New York, Oregon, 
Tennessee, Washington, and Wisconsin. 29 Selection was based upon 
a number of criteria. The first criterion was the level of legislative 
party campaign committee activity that existed in the state. States 
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with varying levels of legislative party campaign committee activity, 
either legislative party caucus campaign committees or leadership 
PACs, were selected. States were also selected to provide variation in 
types of legislative party campaign committees, namely, to include 
legislative caucus campaign committees and leadership campaign 
committees. 
The campaign finance data consist of cash and in-kind contribu-
tions from caucus campaign committees and leadership PACs to in-
dividual candidates running for seats in the state house and senate 
for the elections of 1982, 1984, and 1986. A contribution from a lead-
ership PAC was included if it was from a current member of the cham-
ber for which the candidate was running. These figures are available 
because the states require that the candidate and party committees 
itemize their revenues and expenditures. Data on leadership PACs 
was impossible to obtain from some of the states. 
A cautionary note: two potential problems exist in any study 
looking at state campaign finance data. First, there are differences be-
tween the states in recording campaign finances. Second, factors that 
vary for each state affect the level of campaign spending. States record 
contributions for different time periods, require revenues be itemized 
at different minimum levels, and have varying levels of enforcement 
of reporting. 30 Levels of spending can be affected by the size of the 
district, the availability and cost of media, the wealth of the state, 
campaign finance laws, and the level of competition, that is, whether 
or not candidates are involved in a "campaign spending arms race." 
This research avoids these problems in two ways. First, the very 
nature of the research renders many of the differences irrelevant. We 
are not concerned with the relative value of campaign finance dollars 
from state to state, for which these problems would be very difficult 
to manage. Instead our interest lies in how the particular campaign 
committees operate in terms of the distribution of their funds. Sec-
ond, any comparative analysis conducted for this research is done us-
ing the proportion of the legislative party campaign committee funds 
received by candidates. This provides an indication of how the com-
mittees divide their resources among candidates. Comparisons are fa-
cilitated because the analysis is not in terms of dollars. 
In addition to the campaign finance data, interviews were con-
ducted with legislative leaders or top legislative caucus staff in each of 
the states and the state of Maine.31 The interviews were conducted 
via telephone, following the interview schedule reproducep in the 
appendix. Every attempt was made to reach a legislative leader or 
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staff person on each of the four caucus committees in all of the states 
from which data was obtained. Some interviews were impossible, 
however, when both the legislator and staff refused to talk, and thus 
there are some gaps in the tables that report the results of inter-
views. 32 In total, thirty-one interviews were conducted, thirteen with 
legislative leaders and eighteen with top staffers, including executive 
directors of party caucuses, chiefs of staff, or directors of the cam-
paign committees. The focus of the interviews was the legislative 
party caucus committees, though some questions were asked regard-
ing the leadership campaign committees. 
These interviews provide qualitative support for the inferences 
derived from analysis of campaign finance data, insure that the con-
clusions drawn from the data are not in error, and provide explana-
tions for unexpected findings. They are also the sources of the 
information on the practices of legislative party campaign committees 
presented in chapter 4. 
3 
Finances 
Legislative party campaign committees included in this analysis vary 
in the amount of resources they have to use to assist candidates and in 
how they use those resources. This chapter takes an initial look at the 
finances of the thirty-eight caucus committees and the twenty-four 
leadership PACs to provide an indication of the size of these commit-
tees and how they differ in size from state to state, and to examine, at 
the aggregate level, how these committees spend their money. 
Legislative Caucus Committees 
Aggregate statistics-total funds allocated by the committee to candi-
dates, the percentage of all of the revenues raised by the party's can-
didates that came from the committees, the mean level of support, 
and the types of candidates receiving assistance are presented in ta-
bles 3-1 through 3-4. Note that these are figures aggregated from can-
didate receipts and thus will not accurately reflect all of the 
committees' expenditures. They do not include expenditures for fund-
raising, overhead, and candidate services that cannot be attributed to 
individual candidates. 
Table 3-1 describes the house party caucus campaign committees 
and table 3-2 the Senate caucus campaign committees. Large differ-
ences in the total funds allocated are obvious, especially when com-
paring states such as California and New York to Washington and 
Oregon. 1 In 1986 the Assembly Democrats in California allocated 
$2,518,068 to candidates for the state assembly, while the House Dem-
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ocratic Caucus in Oregon allocated about one-fiftieth of that, or 
$40,111, to its party candidates. Similar differences exist among the 
senate committees, with senate Republicans in New York as the top 
spenders in 1986 at $1,617,789, and the Indiana Senate Democrats at 
the bottom, spending $22,650. 
Of all funds raised by a party's candidates, the percentage that 
comes from the caucus committee (also presented in tables 3-1 and 3-2 
where possible) demonstrates that the enormous differences between 
the committees in the sample are not just a matter of the differences 
in the cost of campaigns in these states. 2 Not only do California and 
New York legislative party campaign committees out spend their 
counterparts in the other states in absolute dollars, but they also ac-
count for larger proportions of all of the funds raised. In 1986, for ex-
ample, the New York Republican Caucus Committee's expenditures 
accounted for 35.5 percent of all of the funds raised by Republican 
candidates for the assembly, while the funds allocated by the 
Independent-Republican Caucus Committee in Minnesota consti-
tuted only 1.3 percent of the funds raised by Republican candidates. 
Thus, the level of campaign financing varies greatly among the states 
included in the sample. 
The size of the standard deviations in relation to the means indi-
cates that most of the committees concentrate their resources on a se-
lective number of legislative candidates, with many candidates 
receiving no assistance. This too varies from state to state, with the 
committees in California and the Illinois House Republican Campaign 
Committee, the only committees whose ratio of the standard devia-
tion to the mean reaches 3 to 1, the most efficient at concentrating 
their resources. The committees in Tennessee, the Illinois Committee 
to Re-elect a Democratic Senate (until1986), and the Wisconsin State 
Senate Democratic Committee and Senate Republican Campaign 
Committee were the least efficient in concentrating their resources (al-
most a 1 to 1 ratio). In fact, the Illinois Committee to Re-elect aDem-
ocratic Senate funded almost all Democratic candidates to the senate 
in 1982 and all of the candidates in 1984. All of the rest of the com-
mittees tend to have a standard-deviation-to-mean ratio of about 2 
to 1, indicating a degree of concentration of resources. 
To illustrate what a concentration of resources means for the role 
of legislative caucus campaign committees, one only need look at 
some of the most hotly contested seats in these states. For example, in 
California in 1986 the Assembly Democrats contributed $589,171 to 
the campaign of Jack Dugan, their candidate for the open seat in the 
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Table 3-1. House Caucus Campaign Committee Funds for 1982, 1984, 
and 1986 
1982 
California Democrats (Assembly Democrats) 
total funds allocated 
\ of Dem. funds raised 
mean level of support 
standard deviation 
\ incumbents funded 
\ non-incumbents funded 
none 
California Republicans (Assembly Republican 
total funds allocated $363,263 
\ of Rep. funds raised 5.2\ 
mean level of support 4,844 
standard deviation 11,035 
\ incumbents funded 13.0\ 
\ non-incumbents funded 42.3\ 
1984 
none 
PAC) 
$329,054 
4.3\ 
4,635 
14,994 
6.5\ 
22.5\ 
Illinois Democrats (Illinois Democratic Majority Committee) 
total funds allocated $371,728 
mean level ·of support 3,410 
standard deviation 6,089 
\ incumbents funded 46.7\ 
\ nonincumbents funded 37.5\ 
$391,733 
3,497 
6,261 
63.0\ 
Illinois Republicans (House Republican Campaign 
54.5\ 
Committee) 
total funds allocated $189,544 
mean level of support 1,954 
standard deviation 3,692 NA 
\ incumbents funded 33.3\ 
\ nonincumbents funded 32.8\ 
Indiana Democrats (Indiana House Democratic 
total funds allocated $18,400 
mean level of support 195 
standard deviation 238 
\ incumbents funded 46.2\ 
\ non-incumbents funded 44.1\ 
Caucus) 
$37,065 
441 
731 
46.2\ 
35.6\ 
Committee) Indiana Republicans (House Republican Campaign 
total funds allocated $52,750 
mean level of support 593 
standard deviation 966 
\ incumbents funded 79.2\ 
\ non-incumbents funded 58.3\ 
Minnesota Democrats (DFL Caucus Committee) 
total funds allocated $35,921 
\ of Dem. funds raised 2.5\ 
mean level of support 268 
standard deviation 240 
\ incumbents funded 32.0\ 
\ non-incumbents funded 95.0\ 
Minnesota Republicans (IR Caucus Committee) 
total funds allocated $29,450 
\ of Rep. funds raised 2.1\ 
mean level of support 241 
standard deviation 275 
\ incumbents funded 40.9\ 
\ non-incumbents funded 68.4\ 
Missouri Democrats (House Democratic Campaign 
total funds allocated 
\ of Dem. funds raised 
mean level of support 
standard deviation 
\ incumbents funded 
\ nonincumbents funded 
did 
not 
exist 
$56,750 
591 
869 
88.5\ 
34.3\ 
$78,050 
3. 7\ 
596 
733 
21.2\ 
90.8\ 
$27,100 
1.3\ 
210 
249 
37.3\ 
53.8\ 
Committee) 
$28,365 
3.7\ 
188 
Missouri Republicans (Missourians Organized for 
277 
51.6\ 
47.5\ 
Republican 
total funds allocated 
\ of Rep. funds raised 
mean level of support 
standard deviation 
\ incumbents funded 
\ nonincumbents funded 
did 
not 
exist 
$4,400 
1.0\ 
36 
186 
14.6\ 
4.5\ 
1986 
$2,518,068 
22.3\ 
33,574 
103,347 
7.5\ 
22.9\ 
$1,256,873 
13.5\ 
15,910 
47,169 
3.7\ 
37.3\ 
$444,474 
4,154 
7,327 
62.1\ 
29.3\ 
$551,509 
4,758 
12,899 
17.1\ 
27.8\ 
$76,950 
905 
1,667 
20.0\ 
34.0\ 
$74,500 
847 
1,180 
78.6\ 
40.6\ 
$45,000 
2.2\ 
363 
723 
15.1\ 
65.1\ 
$28,300 
1.3\ 
232 
348 
26.7\ 
48.4\ 
$78,078 
6.3\ 
550 
787 
43.3\ 
40.0\ 
Equality--MORE) 
$12,500 
1.8\ 
159 
290 
19.1\ 
40.7\ 
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Table 3-1-Continued 
1982 
New York Democrats (Assembly Democrats) 
total funds allocated 
\ of Dem. funds raised 
mean level of support NA 
standard deviation 
\ incumbents funded 
\ non-incumbents funded 
1984 
$758,868 
18.8% 
5,539 
11,166 
28.6% 
47.8% 
New York Republicans (Assembly Republicans) 
total funds allocated $377.029 
17.0% 
2,655 
6,054 
16.3% 
23.7% 
\ of Rep. funds raised 
mean level of support NA 
standard deviation 
\ incumbents funded 
\ non-incumbents funded 
Oregon Democrats (House Democratic Caucus) 
total funds allocated $6,837 
\ of Dem. funds raised 1.3% 
mean level of support 120 
standard deviation 291 
\ incumbents funded 4.3% 
\ non-incumbents funded 23.5% 
Oregon Republicans (Project 86) 
total funds allocated $18,031 
% of Rep. funds raised 3.2% 
mean level of support 306 
standard deviation 506 
% incumbents funded 9.5% 
% non-incumbents funded 52.6% 
$15,734 
2.0% 
286 
548 
4.2% 
51.6% 
$60,825 
6.7% 
1,148 
2,322 
0.0% 
74.3% 
Tennessee Democrats (House Democratic Caucus) 
total funds allocated $118,400 
mean level of support 1,600 
standard deviation 2,096 
% incumbents funded 53.8\ 
% non-incumbents funded 86.4% 
Tennessee Republicans (House Republican 
total funds allocated $86,046 
mean level of support 1,564 
standard deviation 1,537 
% incumbents funded 75.0% 
\ non-incumbents funded 82.6% 
$129,385 
1,659 
2,053 
50.0\ 
78.6% 
Caucus) 
$94,692 
1,690 
1, 725 
82.8% 
Washington Democrats (House Democratic Caucus 
70.4\ 
Committee) 
$94,818 
4.8% 
total funds allocated $47,040 
%of Dem. funds raised 2.7% 
mean level of support 480 
standard deviation 783 
\ incumbents funded 42.9% 
\ non-incumbents funded 41.4% 
Washington Republicans (House Republican 
total funds allocated $82,999 
\ of Rep. funds raised 4.0% 
mean level of support 883 
standard deviation 1,399 
\ incumbents funded 40.0% 
% non-incumbents funded 44.4% 
Wisconsin Democrats (Assembly Democratic 
total funds allocated $87,330 
\ of Dem. funds raised 8.8% 
mean level of support 891 
standard deviation 991 
% incumbents funded 40.0\ 
% non-incumbents funded 65.5% 
977 
1,702 
12.5% 
44.8\ 
Caucus Committee) 
$58,262 
2.6% 
620 
1,409 
10.8\ 
36.8% 
Committee) 
$74,383 
6.3% 
767 
1,126 
43.5% 
51.0% 
Wisconsin Republicans (Assembly Republican Committee) 
$29,427 
2.8% 
342 
378 
46.9% 
total funds allocated $41,619 
\ of Rep. funds raised 4.8% 
mean level of support 478 
standard deviation 573 
% incumbents funded 66.7% 
\ non-incumbents funded 75.4% 77.8% 
1986 
$944,042 
28.9% 
6,891 
13,746 
29.9\ 
46.0% 
$632,984 
35.5% 
4,620 
9,056 
26.9% 
23.5% 
$40,111 
3.7% 
692 
1,560 
24.1\ 
51.7% 
$102,152 
7.9% 
1,792 
3,326 
4.3\ 
58.8% 
$129,250 
1,701 
1,990 
48.1% 
87.5% 
$83,919 
1,399 
1,502 
75.7% 
56.5% 
$46,207 
1. 7% 
481 
1,018 
17.6% 
33.3\ 
$39,145 
2.0% 
425 
959 
12.1% 
40.7% 
$56,680 
5.1\ 
683 
1,087 
23.9% 
67.6% 
$41,415 
3. 7% 
441 
713 
32.6% 
74.5% 
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Table 3-2. Senate Caucus Campaign Committee Funds for 1982, 1984, 
and 1986 
1982 1984 
California Democrats (Senate Democratic Caucus) 
total funds allocated 
% of Dem. funds raised 
mean level of support 
standard deviation 
% incumbents funded 
% non-incumbents funded 
none 
California Republicans (Senate Republican 
total funds allocated $77,019 
% of Rep. funds raised 2.8\ 
mean level of support 4,054 
standard deviation 11,752 
% incumbents funded 40.0% 
% non-incumbents funded 14.3% 
none 
PAC) 
$358,500 
9.9\ 
17,926 
40,612 
12.5\ 
33.3% 
Illinois Democrats (Committee to Re-elect a Democratic 
$73,109 
3,481 
3,900 
100.0% 
100.0% 
Campaign 
total funds allocated $58,852 
mean level of support 1,015 
standard deviation 977 
% incumbents funded 91.7% 
% nonincumbents funded 100.0% 
Illinois Republicans (Republican State Senate 
total funds allocated $345,697 
mean level of support 7,202 
standard deviation 13,752 
% incumbents funded 25.0% 
% nonincumbents funded 50.0% 
Indiana Democrats (Indiana Senate Democrats) 
total funds allocated $13,250 
mean level of support 552 
standard deviation 737 
% incumbents funded 62.5\ 
\ non-incumbents funded 56.3\ 
Indiana Republicans (Senate Majority 86) 
total funds allocated $43,400 
mean level of support 1,887 
standard deviation 2,276 
\ incumbents funded 90.9\ 
\ non-incumbents funded 75.0\ 
$327,000 
20,438 
31,202 
75.0\ 
75.0\ 
$11,410 
519 
1,326 
40.0\ 
12.5\ 
$46,150 
1,846 
1,666 
100.0% 
71.4\ 
Minnesota Democrats (DFL senate Caucus Committee) 
total funds allocated $39,728 
% of Dem. funds raised 3.0\ 
mean level of support 611 
1986 
$91,374 
1.4% 
4,828 
11,201 
21.4\ 
23.8\ 
$819,489 
19.5\ 
43,131 
103,667 
0.0% 
40.0\ 
Senate) 
$240,878 
7,299 
11,532 
80.0\ 
75.0% 
Committee) 
$806,640 
22,407 
48,972 
36.4\ 
35.3\ 
22,650 
985 
2,451 
9.1\ 
25.0\ 
$70,750 
3, 724 
3,394 
87.5\ 
63.6\ 
$79,108 
standard deviation 845 no election 
3.5\ 
1,217 
2,156 
27.0% 
46.4\ 
\ incumbents funded 26.5\ 
\ non-incumbents funded 93.1% 
Minnesota Republicans (IR Senate Caucus Committee) 
total funds allocated $43,700 
\ of Rep. funds raised 3.6\ 
mean level of support 694 
$83,417 
4.3\ 
1,390 
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Table 3-2-Continued 
1982 
(Minnesota Republicans--continued) 
standard deviation 
\ incumbents funded 
\ non-incumbents funded 
New York Democrats 
total funds allocated 
\ of Dem. funds raised 
mean level of support 
standard deviation 
\ incumbents funded 
\ non-incumbents funded 
New York Republicans 
total funds allocated 
\ of Rep. funds raised 
mean level of support 
standard deviation 
\ incumbents funded 
\ non-incumbents funded 
758 
41.2% 
95.5% 
NA 
NA 
1984 
no election 
$346,049 
18.9\ 
6,179 
22,678 
12.0\ 
22.6\ 
$690,337 
20.1% 
12,327 
41.911 
30.3\ 
26.1% 
Oregon Democrats (Senate Democratic Caucus) 
total funds allocated $7,515 
\ of Dem. funds raised 2.6% 
mean level of support 537 
standard deviation 466 
\ incumbents funded 100.0\ 
\ non-incumbents funded 40.0\ 
Oregon Republicans (Operation 86) 
total funds allocated $11,900 
\of Rep. funds raised 3.7% 
mean level of support 793 
standard deviation 1,317 
\ incumbents funded 66.7% 
\non-incumbents funded 66.7% 
$4,200 
1.5% 
280 
579 
16.7% 
33.3\ 
$35,054 
11.2% 
2,921 
4,385 
100.0\ 
50.0\ 
Tennessee Democrats (Senate Democratic Caucus) 
total funds allocated $45,000 
mean level of support 3,500 
standard deviation 3,246 
\ incumbents funded 83.3\ 
\ non-incumbents funded 85.7% 
Tennessee Republicans (Senate 
total funds allocated 
mean level of support 
standard deviation 
\ incumbents funded 
% non-incumbents funded 
Washington Democrats (Senate 
total funds allocated 
\ of Dem. funds raised 
mean level of support 
standard deviation 
\ incumbents funded 
\ non-incumbents funded 
Republican 
$33,000 
2,750 
2,768 
37.5% 
100.0\ 
Democratic 
$56,207 
6. 7% 
2,555 
3,132 
33.3\ 
42.9\ 
$77,000 
5,133 
6,031 
62.5\ 
57.1\ 
Caucus) 
$47,500 
6,786 
7,734 
33.3\ 
75.0\ 
Caucus Committee) 
$79.711 
9.6% 
3,188 
2,848 
75.0\ 
Washington Republicans (Senate 
total funds allocated 
Republican 
$36,808 
94.1% 
Caucus Committee) 
$52,430 
\ of Rep. funds raised 
mean level of support 
standard deviation 
\ incumbents funded 
\ non-incumbents funded 
Wisconsin Democrats (State 
total funds allocated 
\ of Dem. funds raised 
mean level of support 
standard deviation 
\ incumbents funded 
\ non-incumbents funded 
5.5% 
1,840 
2,666 
85.7% 
76.9\ 
Senate Democratic 
$56,750 
14.5\ 
3,547 
2,555 
60.0\ 
42.9% 
5.2% 
2,017 
3,298 
50.0\ 
57.1% 
Committee) 
$46,640 
8.5% 
2,744 
2,680 
42.9\ 
36.4\ 
1986 
1,913 
35.0\ 
52.5% 
$665,108 
49.2\ 
12,549 
37,677 
11.5% 
18.5% 
$1,617,789 
70.8\ 
30,524 
79,908 
43.8% 
38.1\ 
$24,845 
5.1\ 
1,775 
2,700 
50.0\ 
66.7% 
$53,217 
9.0% 
3,801 
6,218 
25.0\ 
70.0\ 
$55,000 
3,929 
3,025 
70.0\ 
100.0\ 
$72.000 
6,545 
4,204 
0.0% 
88.9% 
$75,076 
2.7% 
3,128 
4,591 
41.7% 
91.7% 
$123,427 
4.0% 
5,610 
10,206 
12.5\ 
42.9\ 
$48,415 
7.8% 
2,848 
2,564 
50.0\ 
100.0\ 
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Table 3-2-Continued 
1982 1984 
Wisconsin Republicans (Senate Republican Campaign Committee) 
total funds allocated $24,742 $20,096 
% of Rep. funds raised 6.1% 4.9% 
mean level of support 1,767 1,435 
standard deviation 1,482 1,426 
% incumbents funded 85.7% 60.0% 
% non-incumbents funded 85.7% 88.9% 
1986 
$49,840 
8.9% 
3,115 
2,930 
85.7% 
88.9% 
Sources: State of California Fair Political Practices Commiuion, General Election: Campaign Recciptl and Exoenditurc1 and 
1982 Legislative Winners. Dlinoia State Board of Election~, "Annual Report of Campaign Contributions and Expenditures," 
Lcaialative Party Committee reportl. Indiana State Election Board, "Report of Reccipta and Expendicu.rea of a Political 
Committee." Minnesota Ethical Practices Board, Campaign Finance Summarv. Oregon Secretary of State, Elections Division, 
Summarv Report of Camoaign Contributions and Emenditures. Tenneuee Secretary of State, "Carnpairn Financial DiiCIOIUre 
Statement: For Contributionaand Expenditures of State and Local Political Campaigns in Tenneuee." Waahington Public 
Disclosure Commi11ion, Election Financing Fact Book. Wisconsin State Board of Elections, Biennial Rcoort of Wiaeonsin State 
Elections Board, vol. 2, Statistical Report. 
fifth district, while the Assembly Republican PAC contributed 
$146,000 on their candidate Tim Leslie, who won the race with 57.6 
percent of the vote. The Illinois Senate race for the thirty-eighth dis-
trict attracted a total of $157,227 from the two senate caucus campaign 
committees-$28,840 going to the incumbent, Democrat Patrick 
Welch, and $128,387 going to the challenger, Republican Thomas 
Setchell. Welch won with 51.6 percent of the vote. 
Also evident in the distribution of resources is the fact that a rel-
atively large percent of nonincumbents received assistance. The data 
show that not just a few nonincumbents received assistance, but that 
in most cases, a greater proportion of nonincumbents than incum-
bents received help. The percent of Republican incumbents running 
for the Oregon House in 1982 who received support from Project 82 
was 9.5 percent, while 52.6 percent of nonincumbent candidates re-
ceived support. This pattern was maintained in 1984 (when no incum-
bents received support from Project 84) and in 1986. Indiana 
Republican House and Senate committees, and the Illinois Demo-
cratic Majority Committee are the only three committees that consis-
tently assist more incumbents than nonincumbents, which might be 
the result of their desire to protect the large number of seats they al-
ready hold. 
Though records are available for only three years, some interest-
ing trends over time can be seen in the caucus committees' levels of 
activity. Four trends are apparent. Most of the house and senate cau-
cus committees have grown in terms of resources allocated over the 
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three year period. Project 86 (the Oregon House Republican caucus 
committee), for example, in 1986 allocated nearly six times the 
amount it allocated in 1982. In Missouri, neither party had any sig-
nificant caucus committee activity in 1982, and they both nearly 
tripled their expenditures from 1984 to 1986. The senate caucus 
campaign committees demonstrated the most consistent pattern of 
growth, with all committees increasing their output with the excep-
tion of the Tennessee and Wisconsin Democrats. A number of 
committees demonstrated a level pattern of expenditures, perhaps 
demonstrating that they have reached a level of stability, or have 
tapped all of the resources they can from their state. 
Some committees fluctuated from year to year, such as the 
Democratic-Farmer-Labor House Caucus Committee, which distrib-
uted more resources in 1984 than it did in 1986 or 1982. The same pat-
tern was evident for the Washington House Democrats and the 
Tennessee Senate Democrats. This pattern might represent an effort 
on the part of these committees to reduce the losses that they might 
have incurred from having a popular president of the opposition 
party at the top of the ticket. And, finally, two committees' expendi-
tures on candidates declined from 1982 to 1986-the House Republi-
can Caucus Committee in Washington, and the Assembly Democrats 
in Wisconsin. An examination of the records of the Assembly Demo-
crats in Wisconsin indicates that their overall spending has not de-
creased, only the expenditures directly attributable to candidates have 
declined. This finding reflects a change in this particular committee 
from functioning as a provider of cash and a purchaser of services for 
candidates to being a more service-oriented organization. The leader 
of the Wisconsin Assembly Democrats indicated that this indeed was 
the trend. 
Leadership Campaign Committees 
Tables 3-3 and 3-4 present the aggregate data on the leadership cam-
paign committees (or leadership PACs). These figures represent the 
transfers from legislators' campaign committees to other candidates 
for a seat in their chamber. Just as the legislative caucus committees 
do, these leadership committees vary greatly in the amount of money 
they distribute. For example, California Democrats in 1986 transferred 
160 times more than their counterparts in Wisconsin ($722,708 com-
pared to $4,451). The low level of activity of Wisconsin legislators in 
40 Legislative Party Campaign Committees 
Table 3-3. Finances of House Leadership Political Action Committees 
in 1982, 1984, 1986 
California Democrats 
total funds allocated 
% of Dem. funds raised 
mean level of support 
standard deviation 
% incumbents funded 
% non-incumbents funded 
California Republicans 
total funds allocated 
% of Rep. funds raised 
mean level of support 
standard deviation 
% incumbents funded 
\ non-incumbents funded 
Minnesota Democrats 
total funds allocated 
% of Dem. funds raised 
mean level of support 
standard deviation 
% incumbents funded 
% non-incumbents funded 
Minnesota Republicans 
total funds allocated 
% of Rep. funds raised 
mean level of support 
standard deviation 
% incumbents funded 
% non-incumbents funded 
Missouri Democrats 
total funds allocated 
% of Dem. funds raised 
mean level of support 
standard deviation 
% incumbents funded 
% non-incumbents funded 
Missouri Republicans 
total funds allocated 
% of Dem. funds raised 
mean level of support 
standard deviation 
% incumbents funded 
% non-incumbents funded 
oregon Democrats 
total funds allocated 
% of Dem. funds raised 
mean level of support 
standard deviation 
\ incumbents funded 
% non-incumbents funded 
Oregon Republicans 
total funds allocated 
% of Rep. funds raised 
mean level of support 
standard deviation 
\ incumbents funded 
\ non-incumbents funded 
washington Democrats 
total funds allocated 
% of Dem. funds raised 
mean level of support 
standard deviation 
% incumbents funded 
% non-incumbents funded 
1982 
$2,974,909 
27.2% 
39,665 
86,592 
44.1% 
61.0% 
$225,990 
3.2% 
3,013 
6,348 
26.1% 
40.0% 
$26,032 
1.8% 
196 
293 
30.6% 
63.8% 
$9,310 
.6% 
77 
157 
22.7% 
42.7% 
NA 
NA 
$4,025 
.7% 
71 
161 
13.0\ 
26.5% 
$6,727 
1.2% 
114 
275 
9.5% 
31.6\ 
$22,070 
1.3% 
225 
412 
21.4% 
32.9% 
1984 
$2,475,985 
24.2% 
32,156 
98,090 
32.6\ 
32.3% 
$654,751 
8.6\ 
9,222 
25,510 
29.0% 
27.5\ 
$65,151 
3.1% 
497 
712 
57.6% 
67.7% 
$25,966 
1.3% 
203 
448 
39.2\ 
35.1% 
$27,353 
3.6% 
181 
376 
31.6\ 
57.5% 
$10,747 
2.3\ 
88 
651 
19.5% 
15.9% 
$17,850 
2.3\ 
325 
536 
25.0\ 
48.4\ 
$5,912 
.7\ 
112 
230 
0.0\ 
40.0\ 
$40,004 
2.0\ 
408 
845 
15.0% 
39.7\ 
1986 
$722,708 
6.4% 
9,636 
22,044 
27.5\ 
40.0\ 
$200,095 
2.2% 
2,533 
6,932 
1.4\ 
29.4\ 
$38,492 
1.8% 
310 
612 
28.3\ 
49.3% 
$60,775 
2.8% 
498 
1,230 
25.0% 
35.5% 
$39,933 
3.2% 
281 
1,192 
26.8% 
62.2\ 
$7,318 
1.0% 
72 
228 
14.9% 
20.5\ 
$57,275 
5.3% 
988 
2,017 
27.6% 
41.4% 
$18,872 
1.5% 
331 
793 
21.7\ 
32.4\ 
$101,231 
3.7\ 
1,054 
1,775 
25.5\ 
46.7\ 
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Table 3-3-Continued 
Washington Republicans 
total funds allocated 
\ of Rep. funds raised 
mean level of support 
standard deviation 
\ incumbents funded 
\ non-incumbents funded 
Wisconsin Democrats 
total funds allocated 
\ of Dem. funds raised 
mean level of support 
standard deviation 
\ incumbents funded 
\ non-incumbents funded 
Wisconsin Republicans 
total funds allocated 
\ of Rep. funds raised 
mean level of support 
standard deviation 
\ incumbents funded 
\ non-incumbents funded 
1982 
$6,150 
.3\ 
65 
287 
2.5\ 
11.1\ 
$4,527 
.5\ 
46 
136 
50.0\ 
15.5\ 
$2,678 
.3% 
31 
97 
23.3\ 
29.8\ 
1984 
$11,786 
.5\ 
125 
425 
8.1\ 
21.1\ 
$1,345 
.4\ 
16 
69 
15.6\ 
9.3\ 
$4305 
.1\ 
44 
107 
47.8\ 
23.5\ 
1986 
$49,323 
2.5\ 
536 
1,231 
15.2\ 
39.0\ 
$4,451 
.4\ 
54 
164 
47.8\ 
13.5\ 
$4,000 
.4\ 
43 
192 
25.6\ 
29.4\ 
Sources: State of California Fair Political Practices Commission, General Election: Campaign Receipts and Expenditure• and 
1982 Legislative Winnen. Minnesota Ethical Practices Board, Campaign Finance Summary. Miuouri Secretary of State, 
Campaign Reporting Division, Missouri Annual Campaign Finance Reoort. Oregon Secretary of State, Elections Division, 
Summary Reoort of Campaign Contributions and Expenditures. Washington Public Disclosure Commission, Election Financing 
Fact Book. Wisconsin State Board of Elections, Biennial Reoort of Wisconsin State Elections Board, vol. 2, Statistical Report. 
Table 3-4. Finances of Senate Leadership Political Action Committees 
in 1982, 1984, 1986 
California Democrats 
total funds allocated 
\ Dem. funds raised 
mean level of support 
standard deviation 
\ incumbents funded 
\ non-incumbents funded 
California Republicans 
total funds allocated 
\ Rep. funds raised 
mean level of support 
standard deviation 
\ incumbents funded 
\ non-incumbents funded 
Minnesota Democrats 
total funds allocated 
\ Dem. funds raised 
mean level of support 
standard deviation 
\ incumbents funded 
\ non-incumbents funded 
1982 
$830,626 
25.0\ 
46,146 
63,422 
62.5\ 
60.0\ 
$280,720 
10.2\ 
14,775 
30,403 
60.0\ 
42.9\ 
$19,917 
1. 5\ 
311 
507 
39.4\ 
62.1\ 
1984 
$197,595 
5.5\ 
9,880 
18,766 
66.7\ 
27.3\ 
$129,500 
3.6\ 
6,475 
15,789 
25.0\ 
25.0\ 
no election 
1986 
$2,420,936 
36.8\ 
127,418 
228,651 
35.7\ 
60.0\ 
$449,603 
10.7\ 
23,663 
52,554 
25.0\ 
40.0\ 
$93,962 
4.2\ 
1,446 
2,279 
40.5\ 
67.9\ 
Continued on next page 
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Table 3-4-Continued 
1982 1984 1986 
Minnesota Reeublicans 
total funds allocated $6,528 $43,150 
% Rep. funds raised .5% 2.2% 
mean level of support 107 719 
standard deviation 283 no election 1,386 
' 
incumbents funded 17.6% 20.0% 
% non-incumbents funded 35.7% 40.0% 
Oregon Democrats 
total funds allocated $2,400 $5,785 $1,700 
% Dem. funds raised .8% 2.0% .4% 
mean level of support 171 386 121 
standard deviation 350 726 176 
' 
incumbents funded 0.0% 16.7% 37.5% 
% non-incumbents funded 44.4% 44.4% 50.0% 
oregon Reeubli~ans 
total funds allocated $475 $1,350 $5,023 
% Rep. funds raised .1% .4% .9% 
mean level of support 32 113 359 
standard deviation 76 390 612 
' 
incumbents funded 33.3% 0.0% 0.0% 
% non-incumbents funded 16.7% 12.5% 70.0% 
Washington Democrats 
total funds allocated $9,528 $6,925 $45,295 
'II Dem. funds raised 1.1% .8% 1.3% 
mean level of support 433 277 1,887 
standard deviation 661 446 3,422 
"' 
incumbents funded 11.1% 25.0% 16. 7'11 
'II non-incumbents funded 61.5% 41.2% 66.7% 
Washin~on Reeublicans 
total funds allocated $1,250 $2,800 $30,550 
% Rep. funds raised .2% .3% .3% 
mean level of support 63 108 1,389 
standard deviation 197 184 3,277 
% incumbents funded 0.0% 33.3% 0.0% 
% non-incumbents funded 15.4% 28.6% 35.7% 
Wisconsin Democrats 
total funds allocated $1,850 $151 $609 
% Dem. funds raised .5% .02% .09% 
mean level of support 116 9 36 
standard deviation 298 28 74 
' 
incumbents funded 60.0% 0.0'11 62.5% 
% non-incumbents funded 36.4% 20.0% 0.0% 
Wisconsin Reeublicans 
total funds allocated $2,930 $298 $515 
'II Rep. funds raised .7% .07% .09% 
mean level of support 209 21 32 
standard deviation 336 60 125 
% incumbents funded 57.1% 40.0% 0.0% 
% non-incumbents funded 42.9% 22.2% 22.2% 
Source1: State of California Fair Political Practices Conuniuion, General Election: Campaign Receiptl and Emenditurea and 
1982 Legislative Winners. Minneaota Elhical Practice• Board, Canwaign Firumcc Summary. Orcaon Secretary of State, 
Elcctiona Diviaion, Summary Rcoort of Canmaign Contributions and Expenditures. WuhiQ~ton Public OiiCIOIUre Commillion, 
Election Financing Fact Book. Wisconsin State Board of Elections, Biennial Report of Wisconsin State Election~ Board, vol. 2, 
Statistical Report. 
Finances 43 
this area is undoubtedly due to the fact that such transfers are con-
sidered political action committee transfers, which are strictly regu-
lated by state campaign finance laws. 
The proportion of house candidates' funds coming from these 
transfers, however, does not reach the levels that the caucus commit-
tees do, nor is there much difference between states when this figure 
is examined. The case of California Democrats in 1982 and 1984 is a 
special one. In those years Speaker Willie Brown's campaign com-
mittee acted as the legislative party's central contributor with no 
significant activity on the part of the caucus committee. Thus, the 
leadership figures for these years in California are inflated. They are 
kept in the analysis as leadership funds because they are distinct from 
caucus committee funds; the Speaker, not the party caucus, exercised 
complete control over them. The senate leadership PACs follow the 
same pattern as the house leadership PACs, with the exception of 
California, where transfers from Democratic state senators accounted 
for 36.8 percent of all funds raised by Democratic candidates for the 
senate. 
The resources transferred from these committees are concen-
trated in a few races. By comparing the standard deviation to the 
mean contribution level this becomes evident. For almost all of the 
leadership groups, this is a ratio of about two to one. All but six out 
of the thirty-four sets of party leaders followed the pattern of the cau-
cus committees in funding a greater proportion of nonincumbents 
than incumbents. 
The spending by legislators has risen over the period represented 
in this study for about half of the groups of legislators. The other half 
have fluctuated over the period, and two, the Wisconsin Democratic 
representatives and senators, have reduced this activity to the point 
of making it insignificant. The decline in Wisconsin, once again, can 
be attributed to the campaign finance laws classifying such candi-
date committees as PACs, which severely restricts their activity un-
derstate law. 
Conclusion 
Examination of the aggregate levels of funding of both legislative cau-
cus campaign committees and legislative leadership PACs uncovers 
some interesting patterns: both concentrate their funds, and most 
fund a large proportion of nonincumbent candidates. The first pat-
tern is important in light of the fact that many committees, while 
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distributing substantial amounts of money and services, still repre-
sent a small proportion of all of the funds raised in legislative elec-
tions. If they failed to concentrate their resources, the contribution 
they could make to any particular race would be, at best, minor and 
most likely insignificant. The fact that these committees are willing to 
support nonincumbent candidates, and even support more nonin-
cumbents than incumbents, also has important implications for leg-
islative party campaign committees. By supporting nonincumbents 
the campaign committees act in ways that are more similar to political 
parties than to PACs. 
Knowing that legislative party campaign committees concentrate 
their resources and fund nonincumbents is important, but it is more 
important to know how the resources are concentrated and how 
much of them are used to assist nonincumbent candidates. This can 
only be done by analyzing the actual distribution of legislative party 
campaign resources from the perspective of individual candidates. 
Such analysis was conducted and is presented in chapters 5, 6, and 7. 
4 
Legislative Party Campaign 
Committees: Structures 
and Practices 
That legislative party campaign committees exist in the American 
states and provide electoral assistance to legislative candidates is 
about all that is known of these organizations. How they are orga-
nized, what types of activities they are involved in, what types of as-
sistance they provide candidates, how they make their decisions, and 
how they differ from state to state are all mysteries to most political 
scientists and political observers. The purpose of this chapter is to un-
ravel these mysteries using information obtained in interviews with 
legislative leaders and caucus staff in the eleven states. 
Unraveling these mysteries will make it possible to determine just 
what these campaign committees are. Are they merely legislative 
party PACs distributing financial resources? Are they party organiza-
tions the purposes of which are to provide party services to candi-
dates, recruit candidates, and pursue party goals? Or are they unique 
organizations that are neither PACs nor parties? The information 
culled from the surveys and presented in this chapter suggests that 
legislative caucus campaign committees are very much like political 
parties, and not at all like PACs, a conclusion with extremely impor-
tant implications for our understanding of political party organization 
at the state level. Leadership campaign committees, on the other 
hand, more closely resemble PACs, but as the later chapters will dem-
onstrate, the way the allocate their resources makes them unique. 
Organization 
One of the great things about studying state politics is the rich variety 
one finds in the way things are done. Legislative caucus campaign 
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committees, with their diversity of organizational forms, are no ex-
ception. Some of the caucus campaign committees are composed of 
all of the members of the caucus, some are actual committees ap-
pointed by the party's leaders or elected by the caucus, and some in-
clude only the party's leaders. Instead of discussing each caucus 
campaign committee's organization separately, I will take a compar-
ative approach. One way of looking at caucus campaign committee or-
ganization is to arrange the caucus campaign committees on a 
continuum according to the level of participation afforded caucus 
members. Figure 4-1 shows where the various caucus campaign com-
mittees fall on such a continuum. Each campaign committee is labeled 
by state, party, and chamber; the first two initials are the state, the 
last two are the chamber and party. 
No interparty differences are evident in the way the committees 
are organized, but senate committees have a greater tendency to en-
tail more participation from caucus members. Nine out of eleven cau-
cus committees that include all members or that allow the caucus 
members to select the committee are senate caucus committees. This 
is not surprising considering the smaller size of the senate chambers. 
Figure 4-1 does, however, mask the great number of variations in 
organization that the interviews uncovered. Three senate committees, 
the Oregon Republican's and Democrat's, and the Indiana Democrat's 
are comprised of senators who are not up for reelection. This has in-
teresting implications for how these committees operate because it in-
sulates the committee from the demands of incumbent legislators 
involved in their own reelection battles. 1 It means that these caucus 
committees have more freedom to pursue party goals as opposed to 
individual goals, making it easier for them to support more nonin-
cumbent candidates to build a legislative majority. The level of par-
ticipation, though, is not necessarily a reflection of power over 
decision making. To illustrate, the Dlinois Democratic Majority Com-
mittee in theory includes all legislators, but is in fact run by the 
speaker who makes the bulk. of the decisions in consultation with 
other Democratic leaders in the house. 
Some caucus campaign committees include individuals who are 
not legislators. The House Republican Campaign Committee in Illi-
nois is comprised of four legislators, the minority leader, and "mem-
bers of the public," which include corporate heads, interest group 
representatives, and old "party warhorses," or former party organi-
zation members. The House Democratic Campaign Committee in 
Maine is "a fairly autonomous group" that includes the constitutional 
High 
All 
All senators 
caucus not 
members running 
Committee 
selected 
by caucus 
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Committee 
selected 
by leader 
Committee 
composed 
of leaders 
Low 
Leader 
~X X X --------~x--------~x------------~ 
IL SO OR SR ME SO 
WI AR OR SO ME SR 
TN SR IN SO 
WA SR 
WI SR 
IL HD 
S=senate, H=house, A=assembly, D=Democrat, R=Republican 
The first two letters indicate the state. 
IL HR 
CA AD 
MO HO 
MO HR 
NY SR 
NY AD 
IN HO 
MN HD 
WA HR 
MN SO 
MN SR 
WA SO 
ME HO 
WA HO 
IN SR 
OR HR 
OR HO 
WI AD 
CA SO 
WI SO 
Figure 4-1. Participation of Caucus Members in Campaign 
Committees 
officers elected by the house--the state treasurer and state auditor--
in addition to the legislative party leaders--the speaker, minority 
leader, and whip. The Indiana House Republicans include one county 
chair on their committee and the party's finance chairman. 
A few caucus committees have special subcommittees. The Wash-
ington Senate Caucus Committee and the DFL Senate Caucus Com-
mittee in Minnesota have separate committees concerned with 
recruiting candidates for senate contests. And in 1987, the chair of the 
now defunct California Assembly Democratic Campaign Committee 
formed a separate committee for voter registration. 
Caucus campaign committees also vary greatly in size, ranging 
from one member to fifteen or greater, and in the involvement of the 
leaders. Most committees included the leaders, although some, such 
as the Assembly Democrats in California and the New York Senate 
Republicans did not include the legislative party's leader. 2 Whether or 
not the party leaders actually serve on the committee is unrelated to 
their influence over decisions. In the California case, Speaker Brown 
exercised enormous control over decisions. 
Committee Staff. All of the caucus campaign committees contacted 
have staff support for their operation with the exception of the Min-
nesota and Oregon Senate Republicans. It was frequently and 
strongly emphasized that, though the staff used for the operation of 
the caucus campaign committees often came from regular legislative 
staff, they were hired separately on their own free time. This free time 
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often comes in the form of release time from their regular positions, 
which is the result of leaves of absence or a reduction to part-time sta-
tus. Legislative staff did not work on campaigns while on the payroll 
of the state. Exceptions to the use of part-time staff were found in 
New York and California. In New York, the Senate Republican Cam-
paign Committee has begun to build and pay for a full-time indepen-
dent staff-four staff and two consultants in 1988-to handle caucus 
campaign committee operations. The Assembly Democrats in Califor-
nia had just begun to assemble such a full-time staff before Proposi-
tion 73 was passed, effectively banning caucus committees. 
Interesting arrangements were found in other states. The Minne-
sota DFL Caucus Committee hired one staff person to supervise op-
erations and field workers assigned to assist groups of candidates. 3 
Indiana House Republicans have part-time staff who were paid for in 
1990 by the Republican National Committee. They also have a former 
chair of the RNC acting as an adviser. In Missouri, the secretaries and 
staff of the Democratic legislators in the house have formed a separate 
committee called the House Capitol Democrats Inner-Circle (HCDIC), 
that staff use to provide services to their bosses campaigns. The type 
of work they do includes sending out mailings and campaigning door 
to door on their own time. The HCDIC also meets monthly and even 
holds fund-raisers. 
Leadership and Party Control. The amount of control that the lead-
ership exercises over the committees' decisions has important impli-
cations for the operation of the committees. Figure 4-2 shows where 
the caucus campaign committees fall in terms of leadership control. 
The figure was constructed from responses to the question, "how 
much control would you say the leadership (the speaker, the minority 
leader, or the majority leader) has over the committee's decisions?" 
Fifteen out of thirty-one responded that the leadership "makes the 
decisions." Among this group were the Assembly Democrats in Cal-
ifornia, a group described as "a board of directors and a CEO, where 
the CEO [Speaker Willie Brown] controlled 51 percent." Twenty-
nine out of thirty-one indicated that either the leaders make the de-
cisions or that they exercise a great deal of control over the committee. 
Most responses, however, were accompanied by the statement that 
the leaders take the caucus members' wishes into account by build-
ing a consensus or by staying within the boundaries of an implicit 
understanding of what the resources will be used for. Thus, it ap-
pears that most caucus campaign committees are largely run by the 
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party's legislative leaders, with input from the rank-and-file members 
of the caucus. This is especially clear if one compares figure 4-1 and 
figure 4-2. 
The amount of input or control exercised by the state party orga-
nization over legislative party caucus campaign activities has impor-
tant implications for the strength of political parties in the American 
states. If the legislative and state parties work together, achieving 
some level of integration, the party as a whole may function better as 
a link between officeholders, and consequently strengthen the party 
organization within the state. Lack of cooperation limits the effect leg-
islative party campaign committees may have on strengthening the 
party system. 
Practically all representatives of the caucus campaign committees 
indicated that the state party organization exercised no control over 
their committee's operation (the exception being the Tennessee House 
Republicans: the respondent indicated that the state party has "some 
control" over the operations of the caucus committee). The Senate Re-
publican Campaign Committee in New York, for example, operates 
completely independent of the state central committee despite being, 
legally, an arm of it. 
Though the state central committees were reported to have "no 
influence" over caucus committee decisions, a great deal of coordina-
tion or cooperation exists between the two. Sources in a number of 
states indicated that their committee cooperated with the state and 
national parties and that the legislative party committees used state 
party resources such as mail privileges or phone banks. The Illinois 
Committee to Re-Elect a Democratic Senate has a unique arrangement 
because the state chair of the Democratic party is a state senator and 
serves on the committee. Wisconsin Democrats seem to have reached 
the highest level of cooperation between the legislative party and the 
state and national party. In the words of Speaker Thomas Loftus, a 
"partnership has developed with the state and national organiza-
tions" in which the national and state organizations recognize the leg-
islative party as a legitimate party entity. 
The situation has recently changed in California, where Proposi-
tion 73 has banned the caucus campaign committee practices. Previ-
ously the Democratic state party and the Assembly and Senate 
Democratic Caucus Campaign Committees had little to do with each 
other. Now, because of ban on caucus committee activity in Proposi-
tion 73, the caucus campaign committees have been forced to reassess 
their relationship with the state party organizations. 
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Figure 4-2. Leadership Control in Legislative Party Caucus 
Committees 
Types of Candidate Support Provided 
Almost all legislative caucus campaign committees provide both cash 
and in-kind assistance to candidates. The Tennessee Republican com-
mittees and the Maine Senate Republican Committee provide only 
cash (though the house Republican committee in Tennessee assists 
candidates with fund-raising and encourages legislators to make per-
sonal appearances on behalf of party candidates). Tables 4-1 and 4-2 
illustrate the types of services provided by the campaign committees. 
Services include polling, either from another source or conducted by 
the committees; campaign consultants; mailing lists; assistance with 
advertising; campaign seminars; assistance with fund-raising; lists of 
contributors; assistance with issue papers and positions; research on 
opposition candidates; demographics research; registration drives; 
and get-out-the-vote drives. 
Some caucus campaign committees provide campaign workers or 
assistants for the candidates in their districts, a practice usually re-
served for the political parties. The Wisconsin House Democrats as-
sign incumbent legislators to specific districts where they can help 
with advice. According to Betty Jo Nelson, former minority leader, the 
Wisconsin Republicans have a "buddy system," in which incumbents 
Table 4-1. In-kind Assistance Provided by Senate Caucus Campaign Committees 
Democrats 
California 
Illinois 
Indiana 
Maine 
Minnesota 
oregon 
Washington 
Wisconsin 
Re:eublicans 
Indiana 
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New York 
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Washington 
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X 
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X 
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Mailing 
lists 
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X 
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X 
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X 
X 
X 
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Note: Table <epreaentathe campaign committees before Proposition 73. 
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for public funding and petitions to get on ballot. 
4. Conducts fund raiaer for candidates. 
S. Arrangea penonal appearances at candidate's fund raiaers. 
6. Provides demographics reaearch, speech writing, pre11 relations. 
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Table 4-2. In-kind Assistance Provided by House Caucus Campaign Committees 
Lists 
Con- Mailing Adver- Fund of con- Direct 
Polling sultants lists tieing Seminars raising stituents mail 
Democrats 
California X X X X X X X X 
Illinois X X X X X X X X 
Indiana X X X X X X X 
Maine X X X X 
Minnesota X X X X X X 
Missouri X X X X X 
Oregon X X X X X X X 
Washington X X X X X X X 
Wisconsin X X X X X X X 
ReQublicans 
Illinois X X X X X X 
Indiana X X X X X X X 
Missouri X X X 
Oregon X X X X X X X 
Tennessee X 
Washington X X X X X X X 
Wisconsin X X X X 
I. Provides staff. 
2. Establishes a "buddy system" for incumbents to assist freshmen legislators in running for reelection. 
3. Helps candidates organize their committees, helps with campaign literature, and "exercise[ s] a great deal of control in candidates' campaigns." 
4. Provides field workers to specific candidates. 
5. Arranges personal appearances. 
6. Recruits precinct workers, assists with issue development, provides research, sets up speaking appearances by national and state political figures. 
7. Coordinates phone banks (local, central, and spanish), acts as liaison to other campaigns, helps with campaign finance reporting. 
8. Helps candidates develop campaign plans. 
9. Provides layout service for printed material, develops brochures, helps cut radio advertisements, arranges literature drops. 
10. Coordinates phone banks, maintains computer voter files. 
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assist freshmen legislators in learning how to run as incumbents. The 
Minnesota House and Senate DFL Committees recently revived an 
old state party practice of hiring field workers to assist groups of can-
didates and to conduct voter registration and get-out-the-vote drives. 
The services provided by the Assembly and Senate Democratic Cam-
paign Committees in California before Proposition 73 also included a 
field organization to conduct get-out-the-vote drives. Since Lee Daniels 
has become the minority leader in the Illinois House (1984), the 
HRCC has emphasized the development of a grassroots organiza-
tion with the goal of recruiting campaign workers in every targeted 
precinct. The New York Senate Republican Campaign Committee 
maintains a computerized voter identification file and conducts voter 
registration and election day activities. 
Because of the emphasis on services, most committees distribute 
their resources over the whole general election cycle. All but onere-
spondent indicated that their committee makes adjustments in terms 
of which candidates receive support over the course of the election. 
Polling, subjective assessments of the candidate's effort, the resources 
the opposition is putting into the race, and the viability and need 
of the candidate are the types of information used to make the 
adjustments. 
Much of what the committees provide is candidate-specific; that 
is, it benefits the candidate only. Activities such as helping candidates 
cut television or radio commercials, providing them with campaign 
consultants and poll results, and assisting them with fund-raising, 
unlike voter mobilization activities, benefit only individual candidates 
and fail to strengthen the party as a whole. The provision of these ser-
vices is a reflection of the change in the role played by political parties 
in the 1980s. Party organizations, especially those at the national 
level, have adapted to the cash economy of candidate-centered cam-
paigns by becoming "broker" organizations, providing services that 
for all but the wealthiest candidates are too expensive for them to ob-
tain on their own. 4 
Finally, some committees provided unique services. The Oregon 
Senate Democrats, for example, hire a photographer to take pictures 
of legislators for campaign literature. The senate Democrats in Maine 
follow a similar practice. They provide raw film footage to incum-
bents, featuring them in action, and to nonincumbents, featuring 
them in the capital with prominent leaders. This film footage can 
then be used in the candidate's television advertisements. The Cali-
fornia Assembly Democrats had a large phone bank system set up, 
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including centralized and local phone banks, and a spanish language 
phone bank. And the Wisconsin Senate Democratic Caucus helps 
candidates reach the threshold necessary to obtain public funds. 
It is important to note that, because party organizations obtain 
services at a discount and provide them at a discount to candidates, 
the financial data reported by the committees may underestimate the 
real level of support. In other words, the significance of legislative 
party campaign committee activity may be even greater than their fi-
nancial records indicate. This was illustrated by Speaker Miller of 
New York who stated that "We [the Assembly Democrats] can do 
things a lot cheaper. We can mail cheaper because of the permit. . . . 
We have our own printing press, so we can print cheaper. And we can 
buy in bulk services which you can't do locally. So if you buy a poll-
ster to do fifteen polls, it is cheaper than fifteen candidates each going 
and hiring their own."5 In addition, the committees also may not ac-
curately assess the monetary value of a service when filling out a cam-
paign expenditure report because of the difficulty of assigning a 
monetary value to such things. The undervaluation of services also 
occurs with the congressional committees. One such practice is to 
hold onto poll data until its monetary value is significantly decreased 
(according to FEC laws). The congressional committees then give the 
poll to a candidate's organization which reports the in-kind contribu-
tion at its reduced cost. 6 
That the committees provide so many services in addition to cash 
contributions is significant for the caucus campaign committees. It 
means that the legislative parties are functioning not merely as loose 
organizations distributing cash, but as service organizations closely 
resembling party organizations. This point is especially clear when 
the campaign committees provide campaign workers to candidates 
and get involved in voter mobilization activities, namely, voter regis-
tration drives and get-out-the-vote campaigns. Furthermore, five re-
spondents volunteered the fact that their campaign committee places 
an emphasis on services over cash contributions. By emphasizing in-
kind contributions, the caucus campaign committees will not only 
have a great deal of control over the use of their resources, but they 
will also have a great deal of influence over what type of campaigns 
the supported candidates run. If, for example, the committee pro-
vides mostly media assistance, the candidate would be forced to lead 
a media-oriented campaign. 
Instead of providing cash to a candidates who have made un-
wise use of contributions in the past, the Indiana Senate Democrats 
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buy what the candidates need for their campaign. To illustrate the 
type of expenditures they considered unwise, Indiana Senate Minor-
ity Leader Dennis Neary told of one candidate who used the caucus 
campaign committee's money to purchase a cow at a county fair. 
Fund-Raising. In addition to providing contributions of cash and 
services, caucus campaign committees have an effect on other sources 
of revenue for candidates. Sixteen of the campaign committees actu-
ally direct PAC, individual, and corporate contributions either by ac-
tively soliciting these contributions for candidates or by referring 
friendly contributors to candidates. The Indiana House Democratic 
Caucus "sits down with interest groups to discuss which races to tar-
get," resulting in a situation in which, according to William Schreiber 
(the Democratic Speaker's executive assistant), "for every one dollar 
we [the caucus committee] raise, we direct two dollars of interest 
group money." Charles Pray, president of the Maine Senate, indicated 
that the senate Democratic caucus campaign committee provides a 
"matchmaking service" for PACs and candidates by "identifying a can-
didate's philosophy with PACs and connecting them." The majority 
leader of the New York Senate holds cocktail parties and invites friendly 
Republican contributors so they can be introduced to candidates. 
Since Proposition 73 has been passed in California, this matchmaking 
function of the party caucus is the only thing caucus members are still 
legally allowed to do to assist fellow candidates for the legislature. 
Of the fifteen committees that do not direct other contributors, 
seven indicated that the assistance their caucus campaign committee 
gives to candidates helps candidates raise money from other sources. 
Contributors see assistance from the caucus campaign committees as 
a mark of candidate legitimacy. Kathleen Hamilton, staff director for 
the Senate Democratic Caucus in California, said, "the first thing that 
PACs ask candidates is, 'Is the SDCC supporting you, and how 
much?' " Rick Heffley, the executive director of the HRCC in Illinois 
said that "if you're not targeted by the HRCC, most givers will not be 
willing to contribute." And a source in the Oregon House Democratic 
caucus said, "if the leadership says they [candidates] are on the list of 
'friends,' PACs and other contributors know it is a good investment 
and will contribute." Conversely, caucus committees in Wisconsin do 
not help candidates raise PAC money because of the role of public 
funding in legislative campaigns. 
Because caucus campaign committees direct or influence the 
giving patterns of other contributors, their influence in legislative 
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politics goes well beyond what they spend on their candidates. This 
was clearly illustrated in an interview with Jeff Estich, Indiana's 
speaker pro tempore. He said the House Republican Campaign Com-
mittee was stronger than the Indiana House Democratic Caucus, but 
that the Democrats' alliance with the Indiana State Teachers Associ-
ation made their caucus campaign committee more effective. 
Some of the caucus campaign committees also have a hand in di-
recting leadership campaign committee funds (i.e., the transfer of 
legislators' personal campaign funds to other candidates). The House 
Democrats in Oregon and Washington have an arrangement under 
which the legislative caucus campaign committee actually directs the 
transfer of funds from legislators' committees. This similarity between 
adjacent states is no accident. It is reportedly the result of a friendship 
between the Washington Speaker and the Oregon Majority Leader. 
The Oregon House Republicans also coordinate the transfer of candi-
dates' funds. 
Recruiting. Not only do the legislative caucus campaign committees 
provide services, but they are also actively involved in recruiting can-
didates-another traditional party organization role. All of the com-
mittees contacted, with the exception of the Tennessee House 
Republicans and Maine Senate Republicans, were involved in recruit-
ing candidates. In fact, six of the respondents indicated that the re-
cruitment role was a "very important" function of the legislative 
caucus campaign committee. All of these six respondents were legis-
lators or staff involved in senate caucus campaign committee opera-
tions. According to Gail Gonzales, executive director of the State 
Senate Democratic Committee in Wisconsin, recruiting is a ''big re-
sponsibility [of the SSDC, which] feels it is their role to have a Dem-
ocratic candidate in every district." The California Assembly 
Democratic Committee also wanted a Democrat running in every as-
sembly district. They accomplished this in the 1988 election. The im-
portance of recruiting is reflected in the fact that the Minnesota 
Senate Democrats and the Washington Senate Republicans actually 
have subcommittees of their caucus campaign committees for the pur-
pose of recruiting candidates. 
Twenty-four of the caucus campaign committees also use the as-
sistance available from the caucus to induce candidates to run, three 
committees "discuss the availability" of help from the caucus cam-
paign committee, and one said that the committee uses the availabil-
ity of help to "encourage" candidates to run; the respondent thought 
"induced" was too strong a word. This practice is not universally ap-
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plied to all candidates, however. "We only use the availability of re-
sources from the DFL Caucus Committee as an inducement in dis-
tricts where there is a good chance of winning. . . . We are honest 
with the candidates," said Ann Wynia, the majority leader of the Min-
nesota House. Anne Kalich, the Speaker's executive assistant in 
Washington stated that, "they [the candidates] have to show us more 
than we show them. . . . They have to prove they can raise money 
first. It is an incentive program. Assistance comes when they prove 
they are viable candidates." 
The fact that legislative party caucus campaign committees recruit 
candidates adds another piece of evidence in support of the impor-
tance of these committees. In affecting the pool of candidates, the 
committees affect the competitiveness of races and ultimately improve 
the choices available to the voter in legislative elections. In perform-
ing this role, the legislative party, and the party in general, increases 
its influence in an area of party politics that they had lost to primary 
elections: selecting party candidates. This influence could be even 
greater if the legislative caucus campaign committees backed their re-
cruited candidates in contested primary elections. 
Sources in fifteen of the committees indicated that their caucus 
campaign committee supported candidates before primary contests. 
But for six of those committees, providing support during primary 
elections was mainly to get an early start on the general election cam-
paign. This happens often in states in which the general election sea-
son is shortened by a late primary, namely Washington, Wisconsin, 
and Minnesota. According to Anne Kalich, the Washington Speaker's 
executive assistant, "it [providing assistance in primaries] is done to 
get a jump on the general election. If two candidates are running in a 
primary, neither will get any assistance." The House Republicans in 
Washington will assist both candidates equally in a contested primary 
so that the best candidate will win. In New York, the parties, includ-
ing the caucus campaign committees, are banned by state law from 
supporting candidates in contested primaries. 
Some respondents, however, indicated that caucus campaign 
committee assistance was provided for candidates in contested prima-
ries. This happened mainly in the case of an incumbent facing a chal-
lenger, or sometimes when the campaign committee recruited a 
candidate. The Indiana Senate Democrats "work behind the scenes" 
to help a recruited candidate. In Minnesota, where the parties have a 
preprimary endorsing system, the DFL House Caucus supports en-
dorsed candidates in contested primaries. The DFL House Caucus 
has also supported incumbents that were not endorsed by the party 
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convention against their endorsed opponents. One of the caucus 
campaign committees in Oregon supports incumbent candidates with 
primary opponents. The Washington Senate Republicans provide as-
sistance in primary races for both purposes-getting an early jump 
on the general election and winning a contested primary. The Wis-
consin Assembly Democrats have supported candidates in contested 
primaries but no longer do so because of past failures. And in Cali-
fornia, the tradition of carrying leadership battles over to primary 
contests continued up to 1988.7 In the primary of that year, the As-
sembly Democratic Campaign Committee fended off a challenge from 
the "gang of five," a group of Democrats opposed to Brown's speak-
ership, in a primary battle over assembly district 63. 
In summary, legislative party caucus campaign committees pro-
vide a wide variety of services, some traditional party services, others 
more in line with today's candidate-centered campaigns. Caucus cam-
paign committees provide cash contributions. They have an effect on 
contributions candidates receive from other sources. They actively re-
cruit candidates and sometimes get involved in primary battles. 
Thus, these legislative caucus campaign committees are candidate 
service organizations that appear to be very similar to the typical po-
litical party organization. Such a finding has major implications for 
political parties and legislative elections. For instance, it means that 
Sorauf's distinction between the party-in-government and the party 
organization is becoming less rigid because the legislative parties-
in-government are now involved in campaigning in addition to 
governing. 8 
Caucus Campaign Committee Revenues 
The services provided by the caucus campaign committees have im-
portant implications for legislative elections and the way that legisla-
tive parties are perceived. Where these committees get their funds 
has implications for legislative behavior and public policy. Help from 
caucus campaign committees might provide candidates with insula-
tion from special interests by removing or lessening the debt candi-
dates owe as a result of accepting campaign contributions. On the 
other hand, caucus campaign committees might also provide an eas-
ier, more centralized way for interest groups to have an influence if 
the caucus is in debt to a contributing group. I asked respondents 
from where the caucus campaign committees received their money. 9 
Tables 4-3 and 4-4 present the sources of funding for the caucus 
Table 4-3. Sources of Funds for Senate Caucus Campaign Committees 
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Democrats 
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committees. The information was drawn from interviews and from 
the financial records of the committees. 
Caucus campaign committees receive contributions from individ-
uals, PACs, caucus members, the state party organization, the national 
party organization, local parties, and corporations. Every campaign 
committee received some contributions from individuals and some 
from political action committees. The type of PACs that contributed to 
the caucus committee varied slightly according to the party, with more 
Republican committees receiving business PAC money and more Dem-
ocratic committees receiving labor PAC money. Labor PACs, for exam-
ple, contributed to all twenty-one of the Democratic caucus campaign 
committees while only contributing to nine Republican committees. 
Legislators were another source of funds for a large number of the 
caucus campaign committees. Most committees contacted received 
contributions from their own caucus members. This means that indi-
vidual legislators have input into the committees that they contribute 
to: if they do not like what the committee is doing, they can stop sup-
porting it. It also increases the insulation between beneficiaries of 
caucus campaign committee support and special interests by putting 
an extra step between the interest group contribution and the candi-
date who receives caucus committee support. Finally, if the campaign 
committees give to close races, the contributions will have an inter-
esting redistributional effect. Most campaign contributors-PACs and 
individuals-will give money to candidates who are most likely to 
win (incumbents). This results in a system in which the rich candi-
dates get richer and the poor candidates cannot attract the resources 
necessary to win. With "wealthy" legislators donating their money to 
the caucus committees, which in turn distribute it to needy candi-
dates-i.e., those in close races-the effects of the system are re-
versed. The result is an ultimate distribution of campaign resources 
that concentrates the resources in closely contested districts. By in-
creasing the competitiveness of a number of marginal seats, this re-
distribution of resources by legislative party campaign committees 
has some interesting normative implications for the democratic na-
ture of legislative elections. Specifically, the caucus committees may 
be responsible for enhancing competition for legislative seats. 
Only eleven of the caucus campaign committees receive contribu-
tions from state party organizations, while sixteen receive contribu-
tions from the national committees. Apparently, the wealth of the 
national parties is having an impact on the legislative parties. Sources 
indicate that the contributions from the Democratic National Commit-
tee and the Republican National Committee will increase as time for 
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reapportionment draws near. The involvement of the national and 
state parties in legislative elections through the caucus committees 
and on their own raises some interesting questions, namely: How do 
the national, state, and legislative parties differ in targeting races? Do 
they work together, or do they cooperate to cover as many races as 
possible? One indication comes from Wisconsin. Speaker Loftus said 
that the Assembly Democrats cooperate closely with the state and na-
tional parties. The former head of the Wisconsin Assembly Republi-
cans, Betty Jo Nelson, indicated that the Republican caucus campaign 
committee coordinates activities with the state party to "avoid dupli-
cation." The House Republican Campaign Committee in Illinois re-
ceives some contributions from congressional candidates and 
candidates for statewide offices. 
Some caucus campaign committees, such as the Indiana House 
Republicans, the Washington Senate Republicans, and the Wisconsin 
Senate Republicans, raise money through direct mail campaigns. A 
particularly interesting case in fund-raising is the Washington Senate 
Republicans. They have established a major donor program in which 
individuals can purchase membership for five hundred dollars a year 
or one thousand dollars per corporation. The benefits of membership 
include invitations to meetings with the Republican Senators every 
two to three months to discuss issues. The Tennessee Senate Repub-
licans raise all of their funds from an annual fund-raiser that is held 
while the legislature is not in session. Thus, legislative party caucus 
campaign committees have cultivated a variety of sources to fund 
their campaign activities. Each committee depends on no less than 
four different sources for their funds. This diversity of supporters 
makes the committees broad-based organizations, not organizations 
representing narrow interests, and they are, in this way, similar to 
political party organizations. The fact that the caucus committees re-
ceive contributions from a variety of sources might mean that there 
is little danger of interest groups gaining centralized influence over 
policy through the caucus committees. Such an assertion, however, 
assumes that the universe of contributors provides adequate repre-
sentation of all interests in society on the issues that come before the 
legislature, and that is a dubious assumption. 
Trends 
State legislative party campaign committees have been around since 
the late 1970s, though many of them did not become very active until 
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the 1980s. Among the older caucus campaign committees are those in 
Illinois, New York, Minnesota, Washington, Wisconsin, and Califor-
nia. The younger committees are those in Tennessee, Indiana, Maine, 
Missouri, and Oregon. During the interviews legislators and staff 
were asked whether or not they were cognizant of any changes that 
have occurred in the operation of their caucus committee. Most 
respondents indicated that their committee had undergone some 
change in the past ten to fifteen years. Not surprisingly, the changes 
most often mentioned were in the size and sophistication of the op-
eration and in the types of assistance provided candidates. 
It appears that most of the legislative caucus campaign commit-
tees started out as organizations that simply distributed, or redistrib-
uted, money. When asked if they were aware of any changes in their 
caucus committee, eleven legislators or staff members volunteered 
that a change had occurred in the form of the assistance they pro-
vided candidates and that they had moved from providing cash to-
ward providing services. The Committee to Re-Elect a Democratic 
Senate in Illinois, for example, has "moved from providing mostly 
money to providing a whole array of services," according to Bill Hol-
land, Senate President Rock's chief of staff. According to Speaker 
Thomas Loftus of Wisconsin, the Assembly Democratic Committee 
began as a money distributing organization, evolved into a campaign 
headquarters, and now, with the variety of activities they perform, 
has developed into a party organization. More recently, a change is 
occurring in the Indiana Senate Republican's committee, according to 
President Pro Tempore Robert Garton, who indicated that the com-
mittee is just beginning to expand its services for the 1990 elections. 
The fact that all of the older caucus campaign committee organiza-
tions have evolved into service providers, and the fact that the com-
mittees that provide little or no services are the more recently 
developed committees, provide strong indications that as the cam-
paign committees mature they tend to evolve into more service-
oriented party organizations. 
A few legislators or staff members indicated that a change had 
occurred in the emphasis in the types of candidates supported, from 
incumbents to nonincumbents. One staff person employed by the 
Washington House Democratic Caucus campaign committee indi-
cated that in the past the committee had given across the board con-
tributions to all incumbents. Now they concentrate their resources on 
dose races. This was also the case for the Illinois House Democratic 
Majority Committee. Sources from the Democrats in Oregon's House, 
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Republicans in Tennessee's House, and Democrats in Indiana's Sen-
ate mentioned that their campaign committees have moved away 
from a strong or sole emphasis on incumbent candidates. All but one 
of the caucus committees will fund nonincumbent candidates. Some 
of the younger caucus committees, though, are still very much "in-
cumbent protection associations." Charles Webster, the Republican 
minority leader of the Maine Senate indicated that the senate Repub-
lican's committee was "originally formed to help incumbents get re-
elected ... and that that has remained its purpose." The house 
campaign committees in Missouri, which came into existence after 
1984, are more like incumbent trust funds than caucus committees at 
this time. Incumbents are the main contributors to the campaign com-
mittees, and as an election draws near their money is returned to 
them if they need it. The house Democratic Campaign Committee 
also gives bonuses back to candidates who contributed. The house 
Republican committee (M.O.R.E.) uses the left over funds for other 
committee purposes, one of them to fund other candidates. 
The changes indicated in the interviews suggest that the caucus 
campaign committees have evolved, or are still in the process of 
evolving. Some of the committees have developed quite far, becoming 
complex service organizations resembling political party organiza-
tions. These include the Wisconsin, New York, California, Illinois, 
and Minnesota caucus committees (all among the oldest committees). 
Other committees are still at the early stages of development. Indiana 
committees are only beginning to become service oriented. Legisla-
tive party caucus campaign committees in Tennessee, Maine (Repub-
licans only), and Missouri are at the earliest stage; their operations 
consist of the party caucuses mainly raising and distributing cash 
contributions. 
If all of the caucus committees in all of the states listed in chapter 
1 continue to evolve in this manner, the party organizational structure 
at the state level may quickly come to resemble the structure of the 
national party organizations, with active legislative party organiza-
tions separate from the central committees. For the New York Senate 
Republicans this is a legal reality, and the fact that they are building a 
full-time independent staff is an indication that it is becoming an or-
ganizational reality as well. 
One state to watch is California. Proposition 73, passed by voters 
in 1988, outlawed the current form of the caucus campaign commit-
tees and placed a five thousand dollar limit on party contributions to 
candidates. Caucus campaign committees cannot operate under the 
Structure and Practices 65 
terms of the proposition because it prohibits a candidate from control-
ling more than one committee. Thus, no California legislator can run 
a caucus campaign committee in addition to his own campaign com-
mittee, as had been done previously. Transfers of funds between can-
didate committees were also banned. 
According to Michael Galizio, Speaker Brown's chief of staff, 
Proposition 73 puts the Democrats in California at a particular disad-
vantage because they relied heavily on the caucus campaign commit-
tees and candidate transfers to support legislative candidates. 
Republicans had relied on the state party organization and "Lincoln 
Clubs" -Republican clubs that raise large sums of money from indi-
viduals by bundling the money for candidates-and therefore will not 
suffer under the proposition. In fact, the parties vigorously cam-
paigned on opposite sides of the proposition. 
The legislative parties are in the process of adjusting to the new 
law. Galizio reported that the caucus members are now limited to 
making appearances at fund-raisers for other candidates and direct-
ing "good campaign people" to campaigns that need them. They can-
not, however, pay their salaries. The caucus is also looking into 
increasing the participation of the state party organization and the 
use of independent committees. Kathleen Hamilton, director of the 
Senate Democratic Caucus, indicated that the caucuses were looking 
into two possible options. One option being considered, is coopera-
tion for the first time with the state party organization and having the 
party take over some of the functions that were previously the re-
sponsibility of the caucus campaign committee. The other option is to 
set up a nonprofit organization to provide electoral services for can-
didates. The latter option sounds suspiciously like a political party-
an inference that was not lost on Hamilton. 
Perceptions of the Impact of the Committees 
An attempt was made during the interviews to get the legislator's or 
the staff person's perceptions regarding the effect of caucus campaign 
committee activity. This involved asking questions about the per-
ceived effectiveness of the caucus campaign committee activity and 
the impact they felt the committee's activity had on legislative behav-
ior and elections. 
All respondents indicated that the purpose of the caucus commit-
tee was to gain or maintain a majority of seats. When asked how ef-
fective the committee was at achieving that goal about half stated 
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emphatically that it was very effective, while the rest believed that the 
committee was somewhat effective or not very effective. No respon-
dent indicated that they thought the caucus committee was ineffective 
at achieving the goal of majority party status. Charles Webster, mi-
nority leader of the Maine Senate, however, did state that the senate 
Republican's caucus committee was "not a major factor in Maine 
politics." 
Twenty-seven respondents indicated that they believed that their 
caucus campaign committee had "some impact" or a "significant im-
pact" on the outcome of legislative elections. Senator Houck of Ore-
gon, the minority leader, went so far as to say that the Republican 
caucus campaign committee played a "critical" role in legislative elec-
tions. Bob Haggerty, the executive director of the New York Senate 
Republican Campaign Committee stated that "in the campaign cycle 
we believe that we provide that edge of support a candidate needs, 
making up for some of the weaknesses of the state party." And in Il-
linois, according to Rich Heffley, the executive director of the House 
Republican Campaign Committee, the HRCC has a "major impact [on 
elections] because some seats are up to around one hundred thou-
sand dollars [in campaign costs] and the districts do not have the abil-
ity to raise that kind of money." Only four respondents believed that 
the committee played a minor role in elections, including the Tennes-
see Senate Republicans and the Maine senate Republicans. 
As for the effect legislative party caucus campaign committee ac-
tivity has on legislative behavior, ten respondents indicated that they 
believed that it increased party cohesiveness. It appears that this in-
creased cohesion comes more from working together than from any 
ideological screening of candidates based on voting records or general 
philosophy. Betty Jo Nelson, the Wisconsin Assembly Minority 
Leader, stated that the caucus campaign committee has made candi-
dates "feel that they have a friend in the legislature ... a change from 
past years." Thomas Loftus, the Wisconsin Speaker, indicated that the 
participatory nature of the campaign activities of the Democratic cau-
cus campaign committee have created a collegial atmosphere, increas-
ing party cohesion. Furthermore, a couple of legislators and staff 
made it very clear that political philosophy was not a factor in decid-
ing which candidates to support. Senator Pray of Maine, for example, 
asserted that the committee does not pay any attention to voting 
record, he believes that the committee does however, help bring the 
caucus together. And though Bill Holland of the Committee to Re-
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Elect a Democratic Senate feels that the committee has increased co-
hesion to a certain degree, he noted that "Senator Rock focuses on 
electing Democrats, [and] not particular types of Democrats." Seven 
respondents indicated that the caucus campaign committees activities 
made it easier for the leaders to run the legislature. 
One example of the committees having an effect on the relation-
ship between the parties was found in Illinois. Rich Heffley of the 
HRCC observed that "the 1988 election was very bitter, and it in-
creased the partisanship in the legislature," so much so that for the 
first time in recent years partisanship "overrode regional divisions 
[city, suburban, and downstate] within the legislature." 
Five respondents indicated that the campaign activity of caucuses 
causes some divisiveness among caucus members. Dennis Neary, 
Democratic minority leader in the Indiana Senate, said that some of 
the safe incumbents became angry when they did not receive any of 
the benefits of the caucus campaign committee. "Some incumbents 
are unhappy; they don't see the advantage of majority status, though 
they are only one less than half, [they] have been in the minority too 
long." In California, legislative campaign committees (leadership 
PACs and caucus committees) became significant actors in state leg-
islative elections as part of internal party battles for speaker. 
Ten respondents indicated that they believed that the caucus com-
mittee activity had no effect on the behavior of legislators within the 
legislature. This viewpoint was stated best by Ann Wynia, the major-
ity leader of the Minnesota House, who said, "Coming from one who 
just finished a session trying to twist arms, it has no impact. . . . Can-
didates assume they will get help no matter what they do." 
The responses to the surveys on these perceptual items provide 
an initial glimpse at the effects that legislative party caucus commit-
tees have on legislative politics. Asking about the effect of the caucus 
committees is obviously not the most rigorous way to determine if 
the committees do have an impact on elections and legislative be-
havior. Legislators and staff are not likely to openly answer all ques-
tions, some of which may be perceived as sensitive. The fact that 
some legislators and staff willingly stated that the campaign commit-
tee's activity did have a significant impact on legislative elections 
and on legislative behavior is thus significant. It adds to the evidence 
indicating the importance of the development of caucus commit-
tees, and it also means that this may be a worthwhile area for future 
research. 
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Leadership Campaign Committee Funds 
Finally, a few questions were asked regarding leadership campaign 
committees. The first thing to note is that the practice of transferring 
personal campaign funds to another candidate occurs in all of the 
states in the sample. 10 All but two of the interviewees indicated that 
the transfer of leadership campaign committee funds was done with 
some coordination with the legislative caucus campaign committee. 
Thus, the leadership PACs in many cases augment the work of the 
caucus campaign committees. For example, in Missouri, the House 
Democratic Campaign Committee maintains a list of candidates to tar-
get that it supplies to legislators who want to contribute to other cam-
paigns. This practice "adds twenty-five thousand dollars to the 
HDCC's influence," according to Mark Ausmus, the Speaker's gen-
eral counsel. 
One reason often given for the transfer of funds from leaders' 
campaign committees to other candidates was to gain or maintain 
party control of the legislature. Washington Senate Republican Major-
ity Leader, Jeannette Hayner, emphatically stated this position: "It has 
nothing to do with promoting our [legislators'] own careers. It has ev-
erything to do with electing more Republicans!" Though it would 
make sense that these legislators would use their funds to further 
their career in the legislature, several legislators went out of their 
way to deny that this was the purpose, including Jeannette Hayner 
(above) and James Talent, the Missouri minority leader, who stated 
that leadership campaign committees are "not used to affect leader-
ship races." Instead, it was "a question of me trying to help others 
who need it." 
The situation is different in New York and California where the 
transference of funds has been used to promote individual legislators' 
candidacies for leadership positions. In California it had become part 
of the Speaker's duties to raise and distribute money. 11 And in New 
York, leadership candidates contribute funds to candidates who sup-
port them, according to Bob Haggerty, the executive director of the 
Senate Republican Campaign Committee. 
Legislators also have much more discretion in what they do with 
their funds. This is illustrated by comments made about leadership 
PACs in Maine. Ken Allen, the executive assistant to the speaker, said 
that the speaker "sticks with the same kind of priorities as the HDCC 
but is more willing to take a risk and make on-the-spot decisions." 
Charles Webster, Republican senate minority leader, indicated that he 
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uses his own funds to help candidates in primary contests in order to 
help win a majority. 
The legislators tended to distribute their funds based upon need, 
i.e., the closeness of the race. This finding should lead to the expec-
tation that there would be no difference between caucus campaign 
committees and leadership PACs. As the following chapters demon-
strate, this is not the case. 
One interesting development was mentioned by Representative 
Wynia, DFL majority leader in Minnesota. A number of women, in-
cluding herself, have formed a DFL women's caucus which provides 
campaign money to women candidates. Recently the Independent-
Republican (IR) women formed a similar committee of their own. 
Such a development provides some indication that caucus committees 
may be effective at more than just promoting members of a political 
party. 
Conclusion 
Several conclusions about legislative party campaign committees 
should be evident from this chapter. First, legislative party campaign 
committees in the American states display a rich variety of forms and 
practices. Second, most of the legislative caucus campaign commit-
tees have become very much like political party organizations and 
have an impact that goes well beyond what their financial records in-
dicate. Some committees have already attained a status of institution-
alization that approximates the status of party organizations. Other 
committees are still in the process of evolving into party-like organi-
zations. The perceptions of those who were interviewed regarding 
the effect of these committees on legislative elections and legislative 
behavior indicate that it is likely that they are playing an important 
role in both of these areas. As they continue to grow, legislative party 
caucus committees' effect can only grow greater. 
The finding that the committees vary in the level of institutional-
ization demands some explanation. It may be due to a number of dif-
ferent factors. The fact that the oldest committees are the most 
developed indicates that time plays an important role. Factors such as 
strong party leadership, party competition, and the practices of the 
other party caucuses, or party caucuses in neighboring states may 
also effect the speed of development. 
In addition to providing some basic information about the commit-
tees, this chapter has shown that the development of the legislative 
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party campaign committees is extremely significant. This develop-
ment has the potential to change the shape of legislative politics and 
the nature of party organizations at the state level. How effectively 
these committees distribute the resources they have amassed is cru-
cial to determining the importance of the development of legislative 
party campaign committees. The distribution of legislative campaign 
committee resources and the differences between the committees in 
their campaign behavior is the subject of the empirical analysis that 
constitutes the remainder of this book. 
5 
The Allocation 
of Resources: 
Competitiveness 
and Incumbency 
We have determined how legislative party campaign committees op-
erate, the activities they are involved in, and the type of assistance 
they provide to candidates. The next task is to examine how they dis-
tribute their resources. In the next three chapters the question of re-
source distribution will be analyzed using campaign finance data 
from the ten states. This chapter tests the propositions that the cam-
paign committees concentrate their resources in competitive races and 
are willing to fund caucus outsiders, in other words, nonincumbent 
candidates. 
A major underlying theme of this research is that the extent of the 
impact that legislative party campaign committees have on legislative 
politics is dependent upon the way these campaign committees op-
erate. It was demonstrated in the previous chapter that legislative 
party caucus campaign committees follow practices that maximize the 
role of these committees in legislative elections. What remains to be 
seen, however, is how the legislative party campaign committees ac-
tually allocate their resources, which is an integral part of determin-
ing the effect these committees have. If legislative party campaign 
committees concentrate their resources on competitive races, and if 
these committees are willing to fund nonincumbent candidates, they 
will play an important role in legislative elections. The propositions 
developed within the theoretical framework of chapter 2 suggest that, 
contrary to conventional wisdom regarding the distribution of re-
sources valuable to reelection, we should expect to find that legisla-
tive party campaign committees do just that. 
The purpose of the analysis presented in this chapter is to test the 
relationship between the level of assistance received by candidates, 
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the nature of the race they are in, and their incumbency status. More 
specifically, this chapter provides an empirical test of the first three 
hypotheses developed in chapter 2. The hypotheses to be tested are: 
1. Legislative party campaign committees should be found to 
concentrate their resources in close races. 
2. Legislative party campaign committees should be just as 
likely to fund nonincumbent candidates in competitive races as 
incumbent candidates, all other factors being equal. 
3. Campaign committees existing in states with low levels of in-
terparty competition will not meet the expectations of hypothe-
sis 2; in other words, they will not necessarily be more likely to 
fund nonincumbents. 
Tests of these hypotheses involve an analysis of contributions, cash 
and in-kind, received by state house and senate candidates from leg-
islative caucus campaign committees and leadership PACs. Data 
derived from the interviews with legislative leaders provide supple-
mental evidence to corroborate and explain the statistical analysis of 
the campaign finance data. 
Close Races, Candidate Status, and Resource Distribution 
To determine how legislative party campaign committees allocate 
their resources, the contributions received by state senate and house 
candidates were analyzed and compared to the expectations spelled 
out in the hypotheses. Analysis of campaign committee contributions 
to house candidates was done using ordinary least squares regres-
sion. One set of analyses was conducted for each party committee in 
each state, regressing the level of assistance provided each candidate 
on a measure of the closeness of the race and incumbency status. Be-
cause most state senate elections included too few cases to obtain 
meaningful regression results, the campaign committees' contribu-
tions to senate candidates were examined using categorical analysis. 
Analysis of state party contributions, from states where such figures 
were available, was included for the sake of comparison. 
The margin of defeat or victory for the party's candidate in the 
previous election was used as an indicator of the closeness of the race 
for the 1984 and 1986 data. This was done for two reasons. First, using 
the previous margin avoids the causality problem associated with us-
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ing the final outcome of a race as the measure of closeness. This is 
especially critical when dealing with money in campaigns where the 
question arises as to whether or not the money was given to races 
that were close, or whether the contributions made the race close. 
Second, this type of information is part of what is available to decision 
makers in the legislative party campaign committees when they pre-
pare to make their allocations. In fact, results from the telephone sur-
veys indicated that a variation of the previous margin was among the 
factors many party committees used to determine which candidates 
to support. 1 
The specific measure for the previous margin is a folded scale us-
ing the candidate's party percentage in the previous election,2 sub-
tracting the absolute value of fifty minus the vote percentage from 
fifty: previous margin = 50- I 50 - previous vote percentage I . For 
the 1982 analysis, an average vote margin, calculated for the district 
using all three years was used as the measure of competitiveness of 
the district. Because Wisconsin was redistricted in 1982 and 1984, nei-
ther previous margins nor average margins could be used for those 
years, thus the only available measure of competition was the final 
outcome of the race. For this reason, caution in interpreting there-
sults from Wisconsin is advised. 
The use of the previous margin of victory is, at best, an imperfect 
surrogate for the closeness of the race. 3 Decision makers on the com-
mittees have additional information on which to base their decisions: 
polling, subjective impressions regarding the quality of their party's 
candidate and the quality of the opponent, and demographics re-
search. 4 Such information is obviously unavailable to researchers and 
consequently is impossible to incorporate into the model. The inabil-
ity to fully specify the model means the amount of variance explained 
will be relatively low. The conclusions derived from the analysis re-
garding the impact of the closeness of the race, and the willingness to 
fund nonincumbents should not, however, be affected by this prob-
lem because the error is on the conservative side. That is, if a rela-
tionship is found between a less-than-perfect indicator of the 
closeness of the race and the distribution of resources, a better mea-
sure would certainly produce a stronger relationship. 5 
Incumbency status was included in the regression in the form of a 
dummy variable that equaled 1 if the candidate was not an incumbent, 
and 0 if the candidate was an incumbent. This nonincumbent dummy 
variable allows for a test of the campaign committees' willingness to 
fund caucus outsiders. The actual regression model is as follows: 
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CONTRIBUTION= b0 + b1(COMPETITION) + b2(NONINC) + e 
where CONTRIBUTION is the level of assistance provided to a can-
didate from the legislative party campaign committee, in dollars, 
COMPETITION is the measure of competitiveness, and NONINC is 
the dummy variable for incumbency status. A second model was also 
run to take into consideration the fact that the relationship between 
the previous margin and contributions may not be linear, to examine 
the possibility that the levels of assistance increase at a greater rate as 
the perception of the competitiveness of the race reaches its highest 
levels. This analysis involved including the square of the measure of 
competitiveness in the equation. 
If legislative party campaign committees' decisions are strategic, 
that is, if, as hypothesized, they concentrate resources on close races 
and are willing to fund nonincumbents, b1 should be greater than 
zero and b2 should be greater than or equal to zero. In other words, it 
is expected that the analysis will find a positive relationship between 
the closeness of the race and the level of assistance provided, and a 
positive relationship between the status as a nonincumbent and the 
level of assistance provided. If, on the other hand, the legislative 
party campaign committees follow conventional wisdom and restrict 
assistance to current members of the legislature, b1 should be approx-
imately zero and b2 should be negative. 
The limited number of cases in senate elections ruled out regres-
sion analysis. Instead, mean contributions were broken down by com-
petitiveness and incumbency status. Because of the nature of senate 
races-running every four years, at the most-using previous vote 
margins or average votes as measures of competitiveness were not 
reasonable alternatives, leaving the final outcome as the only mea-
sure of closeness. This should be kept in mind while interpreting the 
results from the senate races. 
House Legislative Party Campaign Committees 
Table 5-1 presents the results of each of the regression analyses for 
all of the lower chamber campaign committees. Each line presents the 
results of a separate OLS regression analysis of model 5-1. Also in-
cluded in the table are the mean contributions for each party com-
mittee-to provide a base of comparison between states-and the 
percent of the legislative seats held by the party prior to the election. 
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Legislative Caucus Campaign Committees. By studying the coeffi-
cients for the measure of competitiveness, we see that legislative 
party caucus campaign committees concentrate their resources on 
close races. Though the size of the coefficients vary, reflecting the 
varying levels of resources available to the caucus campaign commit-
tees, with one exception, every committee in every year provided a 
higher level of assistance as the competitiveness of the election 
increased. 6 That is, in fifty-three out of fifty-four cases the caucus 
campaign committees concentrated their resources on close races. The 
DFL caucus campaign committee in Minnesota in 1982, for example, 
gave, on average, an extra $8.40 for each tenth of a percent increase in 
the competitiveness of the district ($84.00 more for each 1 percent in-
crease}, while theIR caucus campaign committee provided $13.18 for 
each tenth of a percent increase in the competitiveness of the district 
(or $131.80 for each one percent increase). In California in 1986, for 
each tenth of a percent increase in the closeness of the previous mar-
gin, the California Assembly Democrats were likely to give an extra 
$2,371.16, the figure for the Republicans was $832.65. 
This concentration of resources translates into high levels of as-
sistance from the caucus campaign committees for some candidates. 
Jack Dugan, the Democratic candidate for the open California Assem-
bly seat in District Five in the 1986 election received $589,171 from the 
Assembly Democrats (caucus committee}, which was 67.4 percent of 
his total revenues! In the same year, challenger Johanna Willmann re-
ceived $375,665, or 69 percent, of her total revenues from the Assem-
bly Democrats in her bid for the seat of Assembly District Nine. In the 
1986 contest for District Fifty-Six in Indiana-a contest that was de-
cided by 5 votes-the Indiana House Democratic Caucus contributed 
$4,500 to the winning campaign of challenger Richard Bodiker, a 
small sum when compared to California contributions, but it consti-
tuted 43 percent of his total revenues. The House Republican Cam-
paign Committee contributed $4,000 to the campaign of the district's 
incumbent Janet Hibner, which constituted 43 percent of her total 
revenues. 
Because it is believed that the relationship between the competi-
tiveness of the race and the amount of resources a caucus committee 
is willing to put into a race may increase at a greater rate as the races 
reach the highest levels of competitiveness, a nonlinear form of the 
regression model was tested. The results are presented in table 5-2 for 
the caucus campaign committees whose resource allocation pattern 
fits the nonlinear model. 7 Each of these cases represents a committee 
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Table 5-1. House Legislative Caucus Campaign Committee 
Expenditures Regressed upon Previous Margin and Incumbency 
Competi- Non-
' 
Mean 
tiveness• incumbent Constant R' H seats cont. 
Cali,fo[nia 
D 1986 2371.16 48289.81 -55211.34 .18 76 59\ $33574 
(804.45)**(22236.19) (25676.40) 
R 1982 456.28 4012.24 -12301.34 .18 75 40\ $4844 
(138.12) (2575.06) (4590.88) 
R 1984 322.29 7984.81 -9935.24 .13 69 40\ $4635 
(124.56) (3405.40) (4735.62) 
R 1986 832.65 23968.72 -22356.06 .12 78 41\ $16323 
(367.82) (10554.20) (13198.36) 
Illinois 
D 1982 190.20 -2250.31 -931.96 .16 109 49\ $3410 
(43.40) (1116.07) (1433.73) 
D 1984 195.50 -1143.39 -1266.88 .24 112 59\ $3498 
(37.15) (1196.70) (1285.95) 
D 1986 122.97 -1378.09 1775.93 .10 107 57\ $4154 
(40.46) (1475.33) (1471.63) 
R 1982 125.01 -310.87 -1557.57 .21 97 5U $1954 
(25.44) (690.56) (958.93) 
R 1984 41\ 
R 1986 215.69 4109.23 -2936.07 .13 116 43\ $4754 
(63.55) (2425.03) (2340.16) 
Indiana 
D 1982 7.24 17.90 -97.52 .10 94 36\ $196 
(2.62) (56. 58) (97.79) 
D 1984 14.59 -143.75 -17.47 .06 85 43\ $441 
(6.27) (166.81) (230.14) 
D 1986 36.62 925.11 -941.91 .17 86 39\ $1026 
(11.44) (338.36) (488.03) 
R 1982 27.68 -379.06 -323.93 .14 89 64\ $593 
(8.31) (197.31) (336.66) 
R 1984 12.93 -513.78 288.60 .16 97 57\ $591 
(5.72) (174.91) (252.35) 
R 1986 23.59 -159.50 74.60 .10 89 61\ $918 
(7.76) (254.89) (289.61) 
Minnesota 
D 1982 8.40 181.35 -143.72 .40 134 52% $268 
(1.75) (37.81) (60.08) 
D 1984 18.64 518.95 -330.34 .31 128 57\ $596 
(4.08) (110.99) (152.43) 
D 1986 22.44 145.14 -543.42 .16 125 49\ $381 
(5.36) (125.19) (201.80) 
R 1982 13.18 114.98 -332.05 .20 121 48\ $241 
(2.57) (47.33) (108.52) 
R 1984 8.22 105.60 -154.51 .20 130 43\ $210 
( 1. 54) (41.60) (69.35) 
R 1986 9.81 150.16 -202.11 .14 123 5U $242 
(2.50) (59.82) (105 .02) 
Missouri 
D 1984 5.27 -52.00 117.44 .13 151 67\ $187 
(1.12) (50.66) (37.22) 
D 1986 12.44 -249.30 462.21 .10 142 66% $550 
(3.38) (137.14) (85.24) 
R 1984 2.12 -64.23 :u. 84 .05 122 33\ $36 
(1.29) (48.05) (48.20) 
R 1986 3.49 41.35 79.17 .06 101 34\ $158 
(1.47) (57.03) (48.30) 
New York 
D 1984 328.47 8475.60 -3913.46 .20 138 65% $5539 
(63.95) (3305.05) (1933.26) 
D 1986 487.73 3132.12 -7070.18 .28 138 63% $6890 
(71.25) (2098.14) (2202.76) 
Continued on next page 
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Table 5-1-Continued 
Competi- Non-
' 
Mean 
tiveness* incumbent Constant R2 !!: seats cont. 
R 1984 165.22 4492.32 -2219.23 .19 143 35\ $2655 
(33.26) ( 1802 .83) (1037.19) 
R 1986 333.91 1091.08 -481.02 .29 138 37% $4620 
(45.48) (1353.14) (1572.77) 
Oregon 
D 1982 5.81 125.07 -174.39 .08 58 55\ $120 
(4.45) (77.31) (174.02) 
D 1984 -4.85 480.26 200.19 .21 56 60\ $286 
(8.48) (137.87) (354.18) 
D 1986 19.61 532.19 -210.01 .07 59 57\ $692 
(11.89) (402.64) (488.89) 
R 1982 17.02 394.89 -573.29 .28 59 45\ $306 
(5.71) (119.15) (223.64) 
R 1984 8.67 1711.29 -284.41 .13 54 40\ $1148 
(24.97) (645.20) (970.84) 
R 1986 5.80 2975.78 -176.49 .21 58 43\ $824 
(24.57) (794 .18) (986.79) 
Tennessee 
D 1982 79.91 -554.45 477.65 .32 74 58\ $1600 
(14.50) (502.44) (294.42) 
0 1984 28.14 884.79 953.40 .12 79 62% $1659 
(12.17) (464.17) (312.38) 
D 1986 21.41 1231.40 1037.82 .13 77 63\ $3101 
(11.86) (465.40) (295.18) 
R 1982 63.78 -1491.28 765.27 .36 55 40'11 $1564 
(12.01) (377.57) (294.92) 
R 1984 19.07 -1393.25 2056.07 .20 57 38'11 $1690 
(10.90) (423.62) (331.24) 
R 1986 13.64 -536.91 1374.55 .06 61 37'11 $1757 
(9.63) (392.42) (292.69) 
Washington 
0 1982 19.72 61.53 -291.06 .07 98 43\ $480 
(8.67) (184.01) (306.92) 
D 1984 8.82 1111.52 -30.47 .10 99 55\ $977 
(16.21) (356.30) (645.77) 
0 1986 24.83 372.57 -612.27 .11 97 54\ $513 
(9.84) (200.37) (377.45) 
R 1982 63.98 586.59 -1890.64 .12 94 57\ $883 
(18.87) (290.93) (798.40) 
R 1984 29.56 1092.59 -1199.43 .15 95 45\ $620 
(13.33) (287.21) (606.85) 
R 1986 16.13 453.67 -480.27 .oa 93 46\ $425 
(11.11) (203.11) (422.21) 
Wisconsin 
D 1982 40.81 58.58 -525.35 .42 98 60\ $891 
(5.61) (171.10) (189.42) 
D 1984 43.02 194.84 -674.13 .32 97 60\ $767 
(6.69) (191.75) (244.87) 
0 1986 28.27 346.81 -333.95 .24 84 53\ $709 
(7.22) (226.42) (233.28) 
R 1982 20.80 39.35 -338.58 .14 87 40, $478 
(5.65) (123.73) (251.21) 
R 1984 17.64 31.17 -295.34 .22 86 40\ $342 
(4.10) (81.44) (137.78) 
R 1986 17.76 276.88 -259.72 .13 95 47\ $512 
(5.03) (146.59) (207.70) 
• The 1982 equations used average margin (calculated from the party'a margin in 1982, 1984, and 1986) in lieu ofprcvioua 
margin. The 1982 and 1984 Wisconsin equation~ uaed the margin of victory in that ye~~r because of rcdillrictina in the early 
1980s. 
•• Figures in parentheses are the .U.ndard crron. 
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that concentrates its resources at a greater rate as the perceived com-
petitiveness of the race increases. The coefficients are not as easily in-
terpreted because their interpretation is tied to the level of the 
independent variable.8 For example, for Illinois Democrats in 1986 an 
increase in the previous margin from 45 to 46 percent meant an ad-
ditional $639.01 from the Illinois Democratic Majority Committee, 
while an increase from 49 to 50 percent meant an increase of $789.25.9 
Because the nonlinear form of the model is a better fit for these 
committees in these years-as indicated in part by the increased 
R-squares-this form of the model will be used throughout the rest 
of the book for these cases. 
These results demonstrate a nearly universal pattern of concen-
tration of resources in close races, providing overwhelming support 
of the first hypothesis among house legislative party caucus commit-
tees. The information gathered in the interviews corroborates these 
findings. When asked what criteria the committee uses in deciding 
which candidates to support, all of the responses, in one form of an-
other, indicated that the competitiveness of the race was the main de-
termining factor in deciding which candidates would receive support. 
In addition to concentrating their resources in close races, it was 
posited that the goals pursued by caucus committees would lead 
them to support caucus outsiders, namely, nonincumbent candidates 
(hypothesis 2). Are legislative caucus campaign committees as willing 
to fund nonincumbents as incumbents? The answer to this question is 
found in tables 5-1 and 5-2. Counting the positive coefficients for non-
incumbents (using the results from table 5-2 for those committees 
and the results from 5-1 for the others) forty-two of the fifty-seven 
committees (or 73.7 percent) were more likely to fund nonincum-
bent candidates, as reflected in the positive coefficients. In 1986 in 
Minnesota, for example, the mean contribution from the Democratic-
Farmer-Labor House Caucus Committee was $93.05 (table 5-2) higher 
for nonincumbents (controlling for the closeness of the race). For 
Independent-Republican nonincumbent candidates, the mean contri-
bution from their House Caucus Committee was $157.60 higher than 
for incumbents (also using table 5-2). 
Of the fifteen negative results, eleven are found in states that 
have been traditionally dominated by one party-Indiana, Missouri, 
and Tennessee. These results are explained nicely by the hypothe-
sized role played by party competition-hypothesis 3. In these states, 
the houses have long been dominated by one party-Republicans 
have dominated Indiana's house, and Democrats have dominated 
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Table 5-2. House Legislative Caucus Campaign Committee 
Expenditures Regressed upon Previous Margin, Previous Margin 
Squared, and Incumbency 
Competi- Compet. Non-
tivenessw squared incumbent Constant R2 
California 
D 1986 -6364.94 193.34 58101.35 -3423.09 .34 
(2230.22)** (46.67) (20233.71) (26356.40) 
R 1984 -843.29 24.19 10373.50 -2749.30 .24 
(378.13) (7. 65) (3306.50) (484860) 
Illinois 
D 1984 -467.72 15.12 -541.57 981.06 .43 
(118.25) (2.59) (1036.34) (1173.33) 
D 1986 -389.69 12.03 -1882.91 3271.38 .19 
( 163 .12) (3.72) (1416.21) (1473.07) 
R 1982 -167.05 5.75 104.02 789.25 .28 
(100.11) (1.91) (676.97) (1206.91) 
R 1986 -277.04 11.79 4139.00 -1894.08 .16 
(259.70) (6.03) (2394.54) (2371.35) 
Indiana 
D 1984 -71.86 1.88 -372.54 416.42 .23 
(21.24) (.44) (161.14) (233.21) 
D 1986 -106.94 3.13 901.55 -449.29 .29 
(41.46) (. 87) (316.35) (476.43) 
R 1986 -30.75 1.13 -106.25 281.56 .14 
(27.78) (.56) (251.68) (310.40) 
Minnesota 
D 1984 -29.47 .93 529.31 21.32 .38 
(13.65) ( .25) (105.97) (174.09) 
D 1986 -47.41 1.27 93.05 170.14 .27 
R 1984 -6.38 .28 91.97 -33.80 .24 
(5.33) (.10) (40.74) (79 .60) 
R 1986 -17.26 .so 157.60 39.30 .22 
Missouri 
D 1984 -8.54 .33 -71.71 148.09 .18 
(5.14) ( .12) (49.94) (37.98) 
R 1984 -8.67 .25 -60.90 52.83 .10 
(5.22) ( .12) (47 .06) (48.40) 
New York 
D 1984 -713.69 20.64 8858.94 5424.07 .31 
(232.06) (4.44) (3078.20) (2697.98) 
D 1986 -987.31 32.42 1033.31 3551.44 .so 
(200.42) (4.21) (1772.06) (2297.57) 
R 1984 -170.32 6.74 5175.84 640.93 .23 
(126.60) (2.45) (1763.17) ( 1453.77) 
R 1986 -791.95 24.79 1863.91 2023.93 .61 
( 113. 29) (2.38) (1010.77) (1342.93) 
Oregon 
D 1986 -80.89 2.14 615.17 144.02 .16 
(43.89) ( .90) (388.30) (492.72) 
Washington 
D 1986 -47.58 1.28 473.97 129.32 .16 
(32.36) (.55) (200.42) (485.88) 
R 1984 -119.00 2.50 1090.76 507.89 .24 
(43 .64) (. 70) (270.44) (746 .51) 
Wisconsin 
D 1982 -50.18 1.85 -68.98 -82.83 .57 
(16.15) ( .31) (151.04) (192.51) 
D 1984 -73.09 2.46 515.38 -120.04 .53 
(18.82) ( .38) (167.68) (221.80) 
D 1986 -50.81 1.72 364.66 54.28 .36 
(21.51) (.44) (208.98) (237.52) 
R 1984 -14.03 .53 25.81 123.97 .27 
(13.93) ( .22) (79.29) (221. 98) 
R 1986 -16.35 .73 256.44 -41.30 .18 
(15.25) (.31) (143.29) (222.75) 
• The 1982 equations used average margin (calculated from the party's vote margin in the 1982, 1984, and 1986 election&) and 
average margin squared in lieu of previous margin. 
•• Figures in parentheses arc the standard errors. 
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Tennessee's and Missouri's. Under conditions such as low levels of 
party competition, majority party status is no longer a top priority 
goal (mainly because it is less plausible), so a policy of contributing to 
nonincumbents would receive little or no support among caucus 
members. Furthermore, competition over districts is likely to be min-
imal, reducing the effectiveness of a strategy of supporting nonin-
cumbents. Interparty competition cannot, however, explain the fact 
that the Illinois Democrats are less likely to fund nonincumbents; the 
level of competition is not as low as it is in Tennessee, Indiana, and 
Missouri. The one thing Illinois does share with the other three states 
is a large number of lopsided districts-the Chicago districts are 
strongholds of the Democrats and the suburban districts the strong-
hold of the Republicans, both with little real party competition. This 
type of apportionment means that in only a few cases will support-
ing a challenger, or even an open seat candidate, be a worthwhile 
endeavor. Though this is a seemingly plausible argument, it is con-
tradicted by the fact that the Republicans in Illinois give greater 
emphasis to nonincumbent candidates and by the fact that caucus 
committees in New York, another state with many lopsided districts, 
are also more likely to fund nonincumbents. Consequently, the Illi-
nois Democratic Majority Committee's emphasis on incumbents must 
be due to some other factor. 
Thus, the regression results from the house legislative caucus 
campaign committees provides solid support for the argument that 
legislative party campaign committees strategically distribute their 
campaign resources. The notion that the caucus campaign committees 
focus their efforts on close races was overwhelmingly supported, and 
the notion that the caucus committees are willing to extend help to 
caucus outsiders because of the priority of the goal of majority status 
was also strongly supported. 
A note of caution regarding conclusions about the funding of 
nonincumbents is, however, in order. The greater willingness to fund 
nonincumbents does not necessarily give us an indication of the pri-
ority given to such candidates by the campaign committees; it may be 
that few incumbents need help. In response to a question about sup-
porting nonincumbents versus incumbents, the house caucus com-
mittees split roughly into two groups. A majority of the respondents 
indicated the caucus committee's number one priority was to protect 
incumbent candidates. The fact that the analysis does not reveal this 
priority is undoubtedly due to the simple fact that very few incum-
bents need help, because they have little trouble raising funds from 
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other sources and benefit from the advantages of incumbency. The 
rest of the respondents indicated that the campaign committees sup-
ported candidates in dose races regardless of whether they were in-
cumbents. Some legislators and staff indicated that their senate 
caucus campaign committees actually avoided funding incumbent 
candidates. Thus, though a number of legislative party campaign 
committees' official policy is to protect incumbents first, the results of 
the analysis indicate that a substantial amount of their resources go to 
nonincumbent candidates. 
Leadership PACs. The regression results for the lower chamber leg-
islative party leadership campaign committees (leadership PACs) are 
presented in table 5-3, with a format similar to the previous tables. As 
with the caucus campaign committees, considerable support is pro-
vided for the hypothesis that the committees concentrate their re-
sources in dose races. 10 In thirty-two out of the thirty-four cases the 
relationship between the closeness measure and the level of assis-
tance is positive. Washington Democratic leadership PACs in 1986 
were likely, on average, to give $52.77 more for each tenth of a percent 
increase in the previous margin (or $527.70 for each 1 percent in-
crease), the figure for Washington Republicans was $30.15. The re-
sults from Wisconsin even when they are in the right direction are not 
very impressive. This is undoubtedly the result of the low level of this 
activity, a condition due to the state's strict campaign finance laws. In 
Wisconsin, leadership PACs are considered political action commit-
tees, and candidates who accept public funding are not allowed to ac-
cept contributions from PACs. 11 
Though leadership PAC contributions are usually less than those 
made by caucus campaign committees, this tendency to concentrate 
resources in dose races can still result in substantial levels of assis-
tance for particular candidates. For example, California incumbent 
Democrat Steve Clute from Assembly District Fifty-four received 
$62,000 in contributions from fifteen other legislators in 1986, a sum 
which constituted 25 percent of his total revenues. High levels of as-
sistance can also be found in the states with smaller total contribu-
tions. An election in Washington illustrates this point. Brad Fisher, 
the Republican candidate for the second seat of District Sixteen re-
ceived $7,563, or 12 percent of his total revenues, from fourteen other 
legislators. 
The possibility that contributions from LPACs increase at a 
greater rate as the competitiveness of the race increases was tested in 
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Table 5-3. House Leadership PAC Expenditures Regressed upon 
Competitiveness and Incumbency 
Competi- Non- Mean 
tiveness* incumbent Constant R' H cont. 
California 
D 1982 1746.17 2886.08 -17605.66 .03 75 $41844 
(1153.86)**(20217.43) (38728.52) 
D 1984 969.82 -24069.88 11057.59 .03 77 $34873 
(836.09) (22721.77) (30421. 67) 
D 1986 638.01 5458.62 -10737.26 .19 76 $9636 
(170.27) (4706.42) (5434.56) 
R 1982 262.93 2311.39 -6866.05 .18 75 $3288 
(79 .43) (1480.92) (2640.22) 
R 1984 523.57 10904.05 -13146.90 .12 71 $9335 
(213.48) (5836.54) (8116.42) 
R 1986 189.40 2690.08 -4386.32 .18 79 $2599 
(52.24) (1499.03) (1874.59) 
Minnesota 
D 1982 7.43 82.05 -124.87 .12 129 $210 
(2.62) (56.01) (90.99) 
D 1984 15.71 80.69 -106.44 .10 131 $513 
(4.51) (122.73) (168.55) 
D 1986 17.22 147.13 -405.54 .14 124 $325 
(4.58) (106.88) (172.29) 
R 1982 2.23 32.66 -27.71 .02 121 $78 
( 1. 63) (30.19) (69.05) 
R 1984 11.72 169.25 -328.72 .13 128 $208 
(2.88) (77.84) (129.80) 
R 1986 28.66 288.87 -693.79 .08 122 $491 
(9.12) (218.35) (383.32) 
Missouri 
D 1984 3.44 102.69 101.89 .04 151 $181 
(1. 75) (73.10) (53.71) 
D 1986 1. 69 36.20 247.05 .oo 142 $281 
(5.41) (219.31) (136.31) 
R 1984 6.12 143.06 -115.37 .03 122 $88 
(4.55) (170.21) (170. 74) 
R 1986 1.12 -40.64 73.98 .02 102 $72 
(1.17) (45.67) (38.68) 
Oregon 
D 1982 4.91 69.18 -156.45 .12 58 $71 
(2.40) (41.74) (93.95) 
D 1984 2.29 224.92 110.27 .04 55 $343 
(9.14) (148.57) (381.67) 
D 1986 24.83 11.65 176.87 .04 59 $988 
(15.63) (528.22) (641.36) 
R 1982 6.27 83.56 -169.75 .08 59 $114 
(3.51) (73.26) (137.50) 
R 1984 .68 166.83 -22.31 .12 53 $121 
(2.48) (64.00) (96.29) 
R 1986 7.66 141.64 -9.12 .03 57 $337 
(6.66) (215.13) (267.30) 
washington 
D 1982 10.40 34.45 -183.08 .07 98 $232 
(4.46) (96.75) (161.37) 
D 1984 2.53 393.16 77.74 .06 98 $421 
(7.88) (173.29) (314.07) 
D 1986 52.77 730.86 -1241.50 .15 96 $1054 
(16.75) (340.99) (642.37) 
R 1982 4.19 112.17 -158.43 .04 95 $65 
(4.05) (62.43) (171.31) 
R 1984 7.25 200.93 -280.20 .06 95 $125 
(4.21) (90.82) (191.90) 
R 1986 30.15 438.16 -893.94 .08 92 $536 
(14.24) (260.31) (566.75) 
Wisconsin 
D 1982 -.84 -20.45 86.80 .02 98 $46 
(1.00) (31.02) (33.75) 
Continued on next page 
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Table 5-3-Continued 
Competi- Non- Mean 
tiveness* incumbent Constant Rz N cont. 
D 1984 -.40 -16.77 65.76 .01 97 $38 
(. 76) (21.83) (27.87) 
D 1986 .40 1.87 40.68 .00 83 $53 
(1.25) (39. 08) (40.27) 
R 1982 1.90 12.31 -49.59 .04 87 $97 
( 1.01) (22.10) (44.86) 
R 1984 .83 -4.47 -10.62 .01 86 $16 
(. 84) (16.67) (28.20) 
R 1986 .75 -81.57 63.64 .06 94 $47 
(1.41) (41.00) (58.09) 
• The 1982 equations used average margin (calculated from the party's margin in 1982. 1984. and 1986) in lieu of previous 
margin. The 1982 and 1984 Wisconsin equations used the margin of victory in that year because of redistricting in the early 
1980s. 
•• Figures in parentheses are the standard eiTOrs. 
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the same manner as was done for the caucus campaign committees, 
by squaring the competitiveness measure and adding it to the equa-
tion. The results of this nonlinear regression are presented in table 5-4 
for those groups of leadership PACs that fit the model. 12 For the cases 
appearing in this table, the nonlinear form of the regression model 
constitutes the best fit and therefore will be used throughout the rest 
of the book. 
According to the OLS coefficients, leadership PACs were also 
more likely to contribute to the campaigns of nonincumbents. In 
twenty-eight out of the thirty-four cases the coefficient for the nonin-
cumbent variable is positive. A DFL nonincumbent candidate in the 
1986 elections in Minnesota was likely to receive an average $103.44 
more than incumbent candidates from leadership PACs, controlling 
for the closeness of the race (table 5-4). Independent-Republican lead-
ers were likely to give on average $307.07 more to nonincum-
bents, controlling for the closeness of the race (also from table 5-4). 
Wisconsin accounts for four of the five negative results, a finding that 
is once again undoubtedly due to the small amount of money in-
volved in Wisconsin. 
Missouri Democratic leadership PACs were more likely to fund 
nonincumbents than their caucus committee (see table 5-1). This 
anomaly contradicts expectations-the leaders' behavior suggests 
greater concern with party interests than the House Democratic Cam-
paign Committee-and thus demands explanation. The reason can be 
found in the discussion of the operation of the House Democratic 
Campaign Committee in chapter 4. The HDCC collects contributions 
from incumbents and returns the contributions to them at election 
time. In this way it has acted much like an incumbent trust fund, es-
pecially in its earliest years-1984 and 1986. The lack of a strong chal-
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Table 5-4. House leadership PAC Expenditures Regressed upon 
Competitiveness, Competitiveness Squared, and Incumbency 
Competi- Compet. Non-
tiveness* squared incumbent Constant R' 
California 
D 1984 -4882.11 123.0S -32214.9S S4327.96 .10 
(2642.36)** (S2.87) (22348.9S) 
D 1986 -1209.62 40.89 7S33.94 216.88 .3S 
(472.11) (9.88) (4283.26) 
R 1982 -563.16 13.61 2776.33 4326.71 .22 
(410.59) (6.64) (1466.74) 
R 1984 -1394.35 40.79 15342.29 -2879.19 .23 
(649.62) (13.14) (5680.50) 
R 1986 -295.96 11.26 1380.76 -815.63 .29 
(151.43) (3.33) (1457.53) 
Minnesota 
D 1984 -3S.48 .99 91.71 267.79 .18 
(1S.1S) ( .28) (117.63) 
D 1986 -41.37 1.07 103.44 192.94 .2S 
(14.63) ( .2S) (100.79) 
R 1984 -15.91 .53 141.74 -102.62 .18 
(10.00) (.18) (76.27) 
R 1986 -37.66 1.23 307.07 -102.34 .12 
(30.56) (.54) (214. 79) 
Oregon 
D 1986 -124.27 3.18 134.76 702.13 .16 
(S6.74) (1.17) (S01.93) (636.93) 
Washington 
D 1986 -96.36 2.64 939.71 28S.99 .22 
(S4.31) ( .92) (336.33) (81S.34) 
Wisconsin 
D 1984 -S.22 .10 -3.46 88.7S .OS 
(2.S3) (.OS) (22.SO) (29.76) 
•ne 1982 equatioru used avcraae margin (calculated from the party's vote margin in the 1982, 1984, and 1986 elections) and 
averaac margin squared in lieu of previous margin. 
•• Figures in parenlhcaca are undard erron. 
lenge by Republicans in the state probably had a role in the way that 
this practice developed, that is, the goal of majority party status was 
secure, so there was little need to fund caucus outsiders. So, while 
the HDCC was run like an incumbent trust fund, its emphasis was 
on incumbents. Why leadership PACs emphasize nonincumbents in 
this state lacking in party competition must be related to the prac-
tices of the HDCC. With the HDCC funding incumbents, leadership 
PACs must see a greater opportunity to have an effect by funding 
nonincumbents. 
Thus, both types of house legislative party campaign committees 
have been found to concentrate their resources in close races and to 
provide greater assistance to nonincumbent candidates. For compar-
ison, the results for a number of the state party organizations are 
shown in table 5-5. These results illustrate a considerably poorer 
showing on the part of some of the state party organizations in the 
utilization of their campaign resources in legislative elections. This is 
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Table 5-5. State Central Committee Expenditures Regressed upon 
Previous Margin and Incumbency 
Previous 
margin* Non incumbent Constant R' 
California 
Democrats 1982 -8.61 -2087.78 2559.73 .02 
Democrats 1984 -12.52 802.97 510.22 .07 
Democrats 1986 26.12 613.00 -317.31 .03 
Republicans 1982 579.11 9774.64 -16764.27 .21 
Republicans 1984 203.42 8366.55 -5049.07 .11 
Republicans 1986 183.37 4206.33 -4674.65 .10 
Minnesota 
Democrats 1982 -1.02 7.28 52.19 .00 
Democrats 1984 .17 1.22 -4.20 .01 
Democrats 1986 none 
Republicans 1982 25.81 201.65 -563.61 .19 
Republicans 1984 20.35 233.29 -160.02 .16 
Republicans 1986 6.18 205.04 -192.68 .12 
oregon 
Democrats 1982 1.49 36.16 -54.92 .03 
Democrats 1984 2.15 145.19 -87.43 .07 
Democrats 1986 1.50 -49.47 2.50 .03 
Republicans 1982 -2.07 -58.74 148.71 .03 
Republicans 1984 3.12 646.14 -124.14 .13 
Republican• 1986 -7.34 981.89 242.08 .09 
Washington 
Democrats 1982 35.53 -148.73 -620.82 .06 
Democrats 1984 20.94 202.72 -144.71 .02 
Democrats 1986 19.86 904.16 -462.81 .08 
Republicans 1982 64.20 85.66 -1304.97 .04 
Republicans 1984 105.78 3051.85 -4462.05 .22 
Republicans 1986 24.69 967.37 -856.85 .09 
Wisconsin 
Democrats 1982 6.84 -11.19 -166.89 .12 
Democrats 1984 2.04 -19.53 -32.21 .06 
Democrats 1986 4.33 -51.85 -40.05 .02 
Republicans 1982 .27 .74 17.19 .oo 
Republicans 1984 38.83 -87.08 -976.31 .28 
Republicans 1986 11.27 142.78 -103.69 .08 
• The 1982 equations used average margin (calculated from the party's margin in 1982, 1984, and 1986) in lieu ofpreviou• 
margin. The 1982 and 1984 Wisconsin equations used the margin of victory in that year because of redistricting in the early 
1980s. 
especially the case for the state Democratic parties, which showed lit-
tle evidence of concentrating their resources on close races and did 
not give any preference to nonincumbent candidates. The Democratic 
legislative parties turn out to be much more efficient than their state 
organizations. The poor showing of the state parties may be explained 
by the low levels of assistance most of them provide, a finding signif-
icant in and of itself, because it demonstrates that in these cases the 
dominant party actor in legislative elections has become the legisla-
tive party, probably formed to fill a void left by the party, as argued in 
chapter 1. The stronger showing by Republican state parties is un-
doubtedly related to the superior organizational strength and re-
sources of the Republican parties at the state level. 13 
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Senate Legislative Party Campaign Committees 
Analysis of the senate party campaign committees was conducted us-
ing a simple breakdown of the assistance provided by the committees 
in lieu of regression because of the small number of cases in most sen-
ate elections. Though this form of analysis may lack the sophistication 
of regression, it still provides ample means to test the hypotheses re-
garding the distributional strategy of legislative party campaign com-
mittees. The limited availability of the previous margin for senate 
districts (because senate races are held every four years and redistrict-
ing occurred after the 1980 election) means that the final outcome of 
the race had to be used as the measure of closeness. Because of this, 
special caution must be taken in the interpretation of the senate cam-
paign committee results. 
Senate Caucus Campaign Committees. The mean contributions re-
ceived by incumbents and nonincumbents in competitive and non-
competitive races from senate caucus campaign committees for 1982 
through 1986 are shown in table 5-6. The table includes the means 
broken down by incumbency and competitiveness, the number of 
candidates fitting into each category (in parentheses), and the ratios 
of the mean contributions of candidates in competitive races to those 
in noncompetitive races, and of nonincumbents in competitive races 
to incumbents in competitive races. A race was considered competi-
tive if the winning candidate received less than 60 percent of the vote 
and the losing candidate received more than 40 percent of the vote. 
Just as their house counterparts, most of the senate caucus cam-
paign committees concentrate their resources on close races. Looking 
at the means and the ratio of the mean contributions received by 
candidates in competitive races to those in noncompetitive races, it is 
evident that candidates in competitive races receive, on average, a 
larger contribution from the senate caucus campaign committees. Cal-
ifornia Republicans in 1982, for example, spent all of their resources 
on candidates that received between 40 and 60 percent of the vote. 
Washington Democrats in 1984 spent an average of $5,640 on nonin-
cumbents in competitive races and $4,905 on incumbents in close 
races, while spending an average of $1,016 and $296 on nonincum-
bents and incumbents in races where the winning candidate received 
sixty percent or more of the vote-a ratio of 7.64 to 1. Minnesota Dem-
ocrats in 1986 spent an average of $3,163 and $3,153 on nonincum-
bents and incumbents in close races, while spending an average of 
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only $463 and $198 on nonincumbents and incumbents in races that 
were not close-a ratio of 10.73 to 1. The Illinois Republicans' average 
contribution to competitive candidates was 333 times greater than 
their average contribution to candidates in noncompetitive races. In 
total, in forty out of forty-eight cases the ratio of the average contri-
butions to candidates in competitive races was at least two times 
greater than those in noncompetitive races. 
As with house races, the targeting of resources by the caucus 
committees means that selected candidates will receive rather large 
sums from the legislative party. The 1986 open seat race for the Thirty-
fifth Senate District in New York provides a good illustration. The 
Republican candidate, Nicholas Spano, received $313,216 from the 
senate Republican caucus committee, while the Democrat, Andrew 
MacDonald, received $185,785 from the Democratic caucus! MacDon-
ald won with 46.9 percent of the vote. Of the $1,058,074 raised by 
challenger Tom Legan in the race for the Twelfth Senate District in 
California, $372,192 came from the Senate Republican PAC; that is, he 
received 35.2 percent of his total revenues from the senate Republican 
caucus campaign committee. 
A few senate caucus campaign committees did not appear to be 
very efficient in terms of focusing on close races-the Tennessee 
Democratic and Wisconsin Republican committees. In Tennessee, this 
is, in large part, because of the lack of candidates in close races, which 
is a result of the low party competition in that state. This finding pro-
vides further evidence in support for hypothesis 3. 
Are senate caucus campaign committees willing to fund nonin-
cumbent candidates as their house counterparts do? The answer is 
yes-every committee that had nonincumbent candidates in close 
races devoted some of their resources to those races. Almost all of the 
committees were also willing to contribute their resources to nonin-
cumbent candidates in races that ended up being not so close. And, 
finally, twenty-eight of the forty-two cases for which a ratio could be 
calculated, the ratio of the mean for nonincumbents in competitive 
races to the mean of nonincumbents in close races was greater than 
one, indicating that these caucus committees actually gave greater 
emphasis to nonincumbent candidates. 14 In five of the six cases where 
no incumbents were in close races-the California Republicans in 
1984 and 1986, the Tennessee Democrats in 1982, and the Tennessee 
Republicans in 1984 and 1986-the mean contributions for nonincum-
bents in both competitive and noncompetitive races is clearly greater 
than the average contribution received by the incumbents, a result 
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Table 5-6. Distribution of Senate Caucus Campaign Committee 
Contributions in 1982-1986 with Means, and Number of Cases Broken 
Down by Incumbency and Competitiveness* 
Non incumbents Incumbents 
Camp/ Noninc/ 
camp Noncomp camp Noncomp Ncomp* Inc 
California 
D 1986 12500( 2) 0( 0) 20867( 2) 2083(12) 8.01 0.60 
R 1982 4330( 5) 0( 9) 27684( 2) 0( 2) +** 0.16 
R 1984 105333 ( 3) 278( 9) 0( 0) 5000( 8) 42.13 
R 1986 213124( 3) 15009(12) 0( 0) 0( 4) 18.93 
Illinois 
D 1982 1875( 4) 838(16) 2150( 5) 550(19) 2.97 0.87 
D 1984 3500( 1) 2458( 6) 10083( 3) 694( 7) 5.59 0.35 
D 1986 33459( 2) 250( 2) 27943( 3) 1728(17) 19.17 1.20 
R 1982 19356 ( 6) 174(10) 12708( 4) 3644(16) 7.23 1.52 
R 1984 59489( 3) 0( 1) 9193( 1) 3446( 7) 15.56 6.47 
R 1986 153013 ( 3) 287 ( 14) 73938( 2) 485 ( 9) 333.03 2.07 
Indiana 
D 1982 432 ( 11) 313( 4) 2250( 2) 550( 5) 1.60 0.19 
D 1984 957 ( 2) 0(10) 0( 0) 942( 5) 3.05 
D 1986 3275( 6) 0( 6) 1500( 2) 0( 5) + 2.18 
R 1982 1083( 6) 458( 6) 4393( 7) 1133( 3) 4.20 0.25 
R 1984 3500( 1) 180( 5) 4083( 6) 1475(10) 3.83 0.86 
R 1986 6375( 4) 542( 6) 6833( 3) 5375( 4) 2.65 0.93 
Minnesota 
D 1982 1451(22) 381 ( 9) 499(10) 96(24) 6.64 2.91 
D 1986 3163(12) 463(16) 3153( 9) 198(28) 10.73 1.00 
R 1982 606(20) 189 ( 9) 420(10) 79(23) 4.95 1.44 
R 1986 2777(14) 814(26) 2340( 7) 437(13) 3.82 1.19 
New York 
D 1984 58562( 5) 627 (32) 11063 ( 3) 0( 3) 71.08 5.29 
D 1986 137211 ( 3) 1987(24) 68596( 3) 0(23) 101.42 2.00 
R 1984 143578( 3) 4384(19) 11204(12) 1993(21) 12.04 12.81 
R 1986 228747 ( 3) 10914(18) 67639(10) 1845(18) 16.43 3.38 
Oregon 
D 1982 774( 7) 50( 2) 800( 2) 133( 3) 7.81 0.97 
D 1984 488( 4) 200( 5) 417( 3) 0( 3) 3.66 1.17 
D 1986 3848( 3) 417( 3) 1188( 4) 1825( 4) 1.91 3.24 
R 1982 1483( 6) 217( 6) 567( 3) 0( 0) 5.43 2.62 
R 1984 774( 7) 50( 2) BOO( 2) 133( 3) 7.81 0.97 
R 1986 5219( 5) 5256( 5) 420( 2) 0( 2) 1.02 12.43 
Tennessee 
D 1982 5125( 4) 2667( 4) 0( 0) 2833( 6) 1.85 
D 1984 5500( 2) 2000( 5) 8000( 1) 6857( 7) 1. 31 0.69 
D 1986 2000( 4) 0( 0) 7250( 4) 3000( 6) 1.54 0.28 
R 1982 6333( 3) 3000( 1) 5000( 1) 857 ( 7) 5.33 1.27 
R 1984 12500( 3) 0( 1) 0( 0) 3333( 3) s.oo 
R 1986 9000( 8) 0( 1) 0( 0) 0( 2) + 
washington 
D 1982 4640(10) 481( 3) 6819( 1) 257( 6) 14.59 0.68 
D 1984 5640(10) 1016( 7) 4905( 3) 296( 5) 7.64 1.15 
D 1986 7191( 7) 1650( 5) 6444( 2) 450( 8) 7. 71 1.12 
Continued on next page 
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Table 5-6-Continued 
Non incumbents Incumbents 
Comp/ Nonincf 
Com:e NoncomJ2 com:e: Noncom12 Ncom:e Inc 
R 1982 3726( 5) 702( 8) 2094( 6) 0( 1) 4.54 1. 78 
R 1984 5617 ( 6) 1137 ( 7) 1304( 7) 329( 5) 4.12 4.12 
R 1986 19523( 5) 1854( 9) 819( 4) 1463( 4) 6.47 6.47 
Wisconsin 
D 1982 5321( 7) 875( 4) 5900( 1) 2525( 4) 3.17 3.17 
D 1984 5615( 5) 1092( 5) 2473( 3) 6000( 1) 2.32 2.32 
D 1986 6489( 2) 3104( 7) 3325( 2) 1177( 6) 2.22 2.22 
R 1982 1516 ( 3) 1386( 4) 2500( 5) 1075( 2) 1.66 1.66 
R 1984 2599( 3) 1464( 6) 850( 4) 100( 1) 1.26 1.26 
R 1986 7105( 3) 1936( 6) 3220( 1) 2281( 6) 2.91 2.91 
• Competitive is defined as being within the 40-60% vote range. 
•• A + represents cases with a division by zero but with an N greater than 0; - represents case• with a division by zero and 
with a zero ,!!. 
that also suggests that a greater emphasis is given to nonincumbents 
by these committees. 
The results of the interviews supplement the conclusions drawn 
from the data regarding the concentration of resources. All respon-
dents from senate caucus campaign committees stated that their com-
mittee tends to target its resources, giving to races that appear to be 
competitive. 
As with the house caucus campaign committees, some of there-
sponses given in the interviews contradict the second finding, that is, 
that emphasis is placed on funding nonincumbents. Eleven out of 
seventeen respondents for senate caucus campaign committees indi-
cated that incumbents were the number one priority. The reason for 
this was best stated by Indiana minority leader Dennis Neary, who 
said that Democrats in the senate "don't want to lose any seats we 
already have." Why is this preference for incumbents not reflected in 
the actual distribution of assistance? It is probably, once again, be-
cause of the fact that the dominant criteria used by all committees is 
the funding of candidates in competitive or close races, and the fact 
that most incumbents do not find themselves in that situation. This is 
supported by the fact that the contacts from all of these committees 
indicated that after all incumbents are taken care of the caucus com-
mittee focuses its attention on open seat races and challengers. As 
Bob Haggerty, executive director of the Senate Republican Campaign 
Committee (SRCC) in New York, put it, "[SRCC assistance] goes first 
to incumbents who need assistance-the number one priority is to 
maintain the majority-and then we look at other viable races." 
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Thus, the senate party caucus campaign committee results pro-
vide additional evidence that legislative party caucus campaign com-
mittees concentrate their resources on close races and are willing to 
fund nonincumbents as well as incumbents. As a consequence of this 
strategic behavior, the impact caucus campaign committees have on 
legislative elections and legislative behavior is maximized. 
Senate Leadership PACs. Table 5-7 contains the mean contributions 
for the senate leadership PACs broken down by incumbency and com-
petitiveness and the ratio of the average contribution received by can-
didates in competitive races to those in noncompetitive races. 
According to the ratio of the average contributions received by 
candidates in competitive races to those in noncompetitive races, it 
appears that senate leadership PACs concentrate their resources on 
close races. In twenty-two out of twenty-eight cases the ratio is greater 
than one. Among the groups of leaders who seemed to be concen-
trating their resources are the California Democrats, who, in 1982 con-
tributed an average of $97,962 and $109,167 to nonincumbents and 
incumbents in races that were decided by less than a 60/40 percent 
margin, compared to an average of $2,063 for nonincumbents and 
$600 for incumbents in contests that were decided by a margin greater 
than 60/40, a ratio of 76.73 to 1. The state where the leadership PACs 
appeared to be the least efficient in contributing to competitive races 
is Wisconsin. This is because of the small amounts of money involved 
as a result of strict campaign finance laws that effectively discourage 
leadership PACs. 
All leadership groups, with the exception of the Wisconsin Dem-
ocrats in 1986, contributed some money to nonincumbent candidates. 
The ratio of mean contributions indicates that in eighteen out of the 
twenty eight cases nonincumbents in close races were given a greater 
priority than incumbents in close races. In Oregon, for example, non-
incumbent Democratic candidates in close races in 1984 averaged con-
tributions of $913 from Democratic leadership PACs while incumbents 
in close races averaged $167, a ratio of 5.47 to 1. It appears that senate 
leadership PACs, like their house counterparts, target their resources, 
focusing on close races with a willingness to fund nonincumbent can-
didates. Though the cases for the senate caucus campaign committees 
and leadership PACs were much smaller than those for the house 
committees, evidence of the tendency to strategically utilize their re-
sources held across three years for most committees. 
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Table 5-7. Distribution of Leadership PAC Contributions in 1982-1986 
Senate Races with Means, and Number of Cases Broken Down by 
Incumbency and Competitiveness* 
Non incumbents Incumbents 
Comp/ Noninc/ 
Com11 Noncom~ Com11 Noncom11 NcomJ2* Ins; 
California 
D 1982 97962( 5) 2063( 5) 109167( 3) 600( 5) 76.73 0.90 
D 1984 68943( 1) 4505(10) 37500( 1) 5763( 8) 10.51 1.84 
D 1986 615000( 2) 39667( 3) 302339( 3) 38938(12) 10.94 2.03 
R 1982 28944( 5) 1278( 9) 57250( 2) 5000( 2) 18.94 0.51 
R 1984 42667 ( 3) 0( 9) 0( 0) 188( 8) 482.27 
--** 
R 1986 112641( 3) 8848(12) 0( 0) 1375( 4) 16.14 
Minnesota 
D 1982 606(20) 189( 9) 420(10) 79(23) 4.95 1.44 
D 1986 3547(12) 628(16) 3061( 9) 493(28) 6.16 1.16 
R 1982 125(19) 123(23) 133(10) 0( 7) 1.35 0.94 
R 1986 2511(14) 156(26) 564 ( 7) 0(13) 17.90 4.45 
oregon 
D 1982 343( 7) 0( 2) 0( 2) 0( 3) + + 
D 1984 913( 4) 327( 5) 167( 3) 0( 3) 2.90 5.47 
D 1986 267( 3) 100( 3) 100( 4) 50( 4) 2.40 2.67 
R 1982 63( 6) 0( 6) 33( 3) 0( 0) + 1.91 
R 1984 270( 5) 0( 3) 0( 2) 0( 3) + + 
R 1986 343( 5) 662( 5) 0( 2) 0( 2) 0.52 + 
Washington 
D 1982 846(10) 0( 3) 0( 1) 179( 6) 6.44 + 
D 1984 505(10) 143( 7) 183( 3) 65( 5) 3.90 2.76 
D 1986 4221( 7) 340( 5) 6375( 2) 163( 8) 20.34 0.66 
R 1982 250 ( 5) 0( 8) 0( 6) 0( 1) + + 
R 1984 233( 6) 0( 7) 200( 7) 0( 5) + 1.17 
R 1986 4860( 5) 694( 4) 0( 4) 0( 4) 7.78 + 
Wisconsin 
D 1982 32( 7) 361( 4) 100( 1) 20( 4) 0.21 0.32 
D 1984 8( 5) 23( 5) 0( 3) 0( 1) 0.26 + 
D 1986 0( 2) 0( 7) 220( 2) 28( 6) 8.51 0.00 
R 1982 212( 3) 22( 4) 342( 5) 250( 2) 2.99 0.62 
R 1984 21( 3) 37( 6) 4( 4) 0( 1) 0.36 5.25 
R 1986 172 ( 3) 0( 6) 0( 1) 0( 6) + + 
• Competitive is defined as being within the 40-60% vote range. 
•• A + represents cases with a division by zero but with an N greater than 0; - represents cases with a division by zero and 
with a zero r:!. 
Conclusion 
In summary, the results of the analysis of house and senate party 
caucus campaign committees and leadership PACs provide substantial 
support for the hypothesized behavior of legislative party campaign 
committees. Legislative party campaign committees concentrate their 
resources in dose races, whether or not that means supporting an 
incumbent. The extent to which they act strategically appears to be 
affected by the level of interparty competition that exists within 
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the state or the districts. In the states in the sample with low levels 
of interparty competition, the campaign committees still concen-
trated their resources in close races, but were less likely to fund 
. nonincumbents. 
By concentrating their resources on competitive races and by 
funding caucus outsiders, legislative party campaign committees are 
maximizing the effect they have on legislative elections and conse-
quently on legislative behavior. Legislative party campaign commit-
tees, especially the caucus campaign committees, are playing a role in 
legislative politics that far exceeds the picture one gets from looking 
just at their total expenditures. While these committees usually con-
stitute less than 10 percent of all the revenues raised in the state leg-
islative elections, their practices extend their influence far beyond 
their resources. They have a great deal of influence on the decisions of 
other contributors. They provide services that they can purchase at a 
bulk discount, passing on the savings to their candidates. They per-
form party-type services-recruitment and voter mobilization. They 
redistribute campaign funds and concentrate their valuable resources 
and energy in competitive races, maximizing the effect their efforts 
will have on the outcome of elections and consequently the makeup 
of state legislatures. Legislative party campaign committees have be-
come, or are in the process of becoming, major actors in state legis-
lative politics, a development with repercussions for legislative 
behavior, state party systems, public policy, and campaign finance. 
Having thus established the importance of these committees, the next 
two chapters look into the possible differences that may exist between 
the two types of legislative party campaign committees-caucus com-
mittees and leadership PACs-and into possible variations in cam-
paign committee strategies. 
6 
Caucus Campaign 
Committees 
Versus Leadership PACs 
Clearly, legislative caucus campaign committees and legislative lead-
ership PACs are two distinct types of organizations. Caucus campaign 
committees operate much like political parties, representing in the-
ory, if not in fact, all of the legislative party members. Leadership 
PACs, on the other hand, consist solely of an individual legislator's 
own campaign funds. On the surface, the differences between these 
two types of committees might lead one to expect that they would act 
very differently from each other in distributing their resources. The 
theoretical arguments made in the second chapter, however, suggest 
that under high levels of two-party competition the goals of those in 
charge of both leadership PACs and caucus committees converge, 
leading to an expectation that both committees would behave simi-
larly with one exception, namely, the level of assistance extended to 
nonincumbent candidates. The purpose of this chapter is to test the 
hypothesized similarities and differences in resource allocation be-
tween legislative party caucus campaign committees and legislative 
leadership PACs. 
Because it is assumed that those in control of leadership PACs are 
no less rational than those in control of the caucus committees, lead-
ership PACs should distribute their limited resources in such a way as 
to have the greatest impact. In legislative elections this means concen-
trating those resources on competitive races where marginal value of 
each dollar is much greater than in races that lack serious competi-
tion. Because this is the same strategy followed by caucus campaign 
committees, no difference is expected between the two types of com-
mittees in terms of concentrating resources in marginal races. 
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On the other hand, a difference is expected between leadership 
PACs and caucus campaign committees in their willingness to fund 
nonincumbent candidates, for two reasons. First, for those vying for 
leadership posts, incumbents represent a better return on a campaign 
contribution investment, that is, they have a very high reelection suc-
cess rate, so they are likely to be a member of the caucus following the 
election. Second, party control of the legislature is not as high a pri-
ority goal for legislators as it is for the party caucus: more important 
is a legislator's own career advancement, which can be enhanced by 
contributing to the campaigns of those who select the party leaders, 
that is, other caucus members. 
The hypotheses that will be tested are: 
4. Legislative leadership PACs should be as efficient at concen-
trating their resources on close races as caucus campaign com-
mittees in states with high levels of interparty competition. 
5. Leadership PACs should be less likely to fund nonincumbent 
candidates than caucus campaign committees. 
Method 
To achieve the comparability necessary to test these hypotheses, a 
new set of regressions were run on the campaign contributions data 
for the house races in each of the three years. The dependent variable 
in the previous regression model was changed from the actual dollar 
level of assistance received by a candidate to the proportion of all of 
the committee's funds that a candidate received. This provides results 
regarding the relative distribution of the committees' resources. It 
also provides results that are comparable because the coefficients rep-
resent the emphasis committees put on types of candidates regardless 
of the actual amount of money campaign committees have to distrib-
ute. The rest of the regression model is the same as used before: 
PROPLPCC = b0 + b1(COMPETITION) + b2(COMPETllON)2 + 
b3(NONINC) + e 
where PROPLPCC is the proportion of the committee funds going to 
an individual candidate, COMPETllON is the measure of the com-
petitiveness of the race (the previous margin for 1984 and 1986, and 
the average margin for 1982), COMPETITION2 is the square of the 
competitiveness measure (included only if it represented a better 
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model of the relationship-see chapter 5), and NONINC is the 
dummy variable for incumbency (equaling 0 if the candidate is an in-
cumbent, and 1 if the candidate is not an incumbent). 
In addition to separate regression runs for each caucus campaign 
committee and leadership PAC, a set of regressions were run on a 
pooled data set containing candidate records from all six states for 
which both caucus campaign committee and leadership PAC data 
were available. One regression was run for each party in each year. 
This was done to allow for an overall comparison of caucus campaign 
committees and leadership PACs. Besides the measures of competi-
tiveness and incumbency status, dummy variables for each state were 
incorporated into the model to control for any state to state variation 
in resource allocation. The exact regression model used in the analy-
sis was: 
PROPLPCC = b0 + b1(COMPET) + b2(COMPET)2 + b3(NONINC) 
+ b4(CALIFORNIA) + ... + b8(WASHINGTON) + e 
where the first three variables are the same as in equation 6-1, and 
CALIFORNIA through WASHINGTON are dummy variables for five 
of the six states used in the comparison. 1 Including dummy variables 
for each state also makes it possible to include the squared term even 
though it is important for only some committees (see Chapter 5). 2 
Results 
The results of the regressions for each committee and for the pooled 
data are presented in table 6-1. Focusing first on the individual states: 
as expected, there seems to be little evidence of a difference in the tar-
geting of competitive races between caucus campaign committees and 
leadership PACs. For most cases the coefficients for the competitive-
ness measure(s) are very similar.3 The Oregon Republicans in 1982, 
for example, had a caucus campaign committee that distributed an av-
erage of . 95 percent more of their resources to a candidate for each 
percent increase in the competitiveness of the race (.095 percent for 
each tenth of a percent increase), while their leadership PACs distrib-
uted . 93 percent more of their resources for each one percent increase 
in the competitiveness of the race. Moreover, where the committees 
do differ in concentrating on competitive races, the committee that 
targets close races better is not always the caucus campaign commit-
tee. To illustrate, in 1986 the Missouri Democrats' caucus committee 
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Table 6-1. Caucus Campaign Committees and leadership PACs 
Compared* 
1982 1984 1986 
LCC LPACS LCC LPACS LCC LPACS 
California Democrats 
competitiveness -.253 -.167 
( .089) ( .065) 
camp. squared no DO .007 .006 
( .002) ( .001) 
nonincumbent caucus caucus 2.307 1.042 
( .804) (.592) 
constant committee comaittee -.136 .030 
(1.047) (. 772) 
R-square .34 .35 
California Reeublicans 
competitiveness .126 -.249 -.256 -.213 .066 -.148 
( .038) ( .181) ( .115) ( .099) ( .029) ( .076) 
comp. squared .006 .007 .006 .006 
( .002) (. 002) (.002) ( .002) 
nonincumbent 1.104 1.229 3.152 2.343 1.907 .690 
(. 709) ( .649) (1.005) (. 868) ( .840) (. 728) 
constant -3.386 1.915 -.836 -.440 -1.779 -.408 
(1.264) (2.674) (1.474) (1.272) ( 1. 050) (1.024) 
R-square .18 .22 .24 .23 .12 .29 
Minnesota Democrats 
competitiveness .023 .028 -.038 -.054 -.105 -.107 
( .004) ( .010) (.017) ( .023) ( .038) ( .038) 
comp. squared .001 .002 .003 .003 
(.0004) ( .0004) ( .0007) ( .0007) 
non incumbent .505 .316 .678 .141 .208 .269 
( .105) ( .215) (.136) (.181) ( .261) ( .262) 
constant -.400 -.480 .027 .411 .378 .501 
( .167) (.350) (.223) (.300) (. 560) ( .560) 
R-square .39 .12 .18 .18 .27 .25 
Minnesota Reeublicans 
competitiveness .045 .024 -.024 -.061 -.061 -.062 
( .009) ( .018) ( .020) (.039) ( .029) ( .050) 
comp. squared .001 .002 .002 .002 
(.0004) ( .0007) ( .0005) ( .0009) 
non incumbent .390 .351 .339 .546 .557 .505 
(.161) (. 324) (.150) (. 294) ( .202) (.353) 
constant -1.128 -.298 -.125 -.395 .139 -.168 
(.368) (.742) (.294) (.573) (.431) (. 754) 
R-square .20 .02 .24 .18 .22 .12 
Missouri Democrats 
competitiveness -.030 .013 .016 .004 
( .018) ( .006) ( .004) ( .013) 
comp. squared .001 
(.0004) 
non incumbent no -.253 .375 -.319 .091 
( .176) (. 267) ( .176) (.549) 
constant caucus .522 .373 .592 .619 
(.134) (.196) (.109) ( .341) 
R-square committee .18 .04 .10 .001 
Missouri Reeub1icans 
competitiveness -.197 .057 .028 .015 
( .119) ( .042) ( .011) ( .016) 
comp. squared no .006 
(.0027) 
nonincumbent caucus -1.384 1.331 .331 -.555 
(1.069) (1.584) ( .456) (. 624) 
Continued on next page 
*Unstandardhed regression coefficients resulting from regressing the proportion of corrrnittee funds 
received-by a candidate upon the c~titive measures and a dunny variable for incunbency status. 
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Table 6-1-Continued 
1982 1984 1986 
LCC LPACS LCC LPACS LCC LPACS 
constant committee 1.200 -1.074 .633 1.011 
(1.100) ( 1. 589) (.386) (.529) 
R-square .10 .03 .06 .02 
Oregon Democrats 
competitiveness .085 .122 -.012 .004 -.202 -.217 
( .065) (.060) (. 021) ( .016) (.109) ( .099) 
camp. squared .005 .006 
( .002) ( .002) 
non incumbent 1. 829 1. 719 1.197 .393 1. 547 .235 
(1.130) (1.037) (.344j (.259) ( .968) ( .867) 
constant -2.551 -3.889 .499 .193 .359 1. 226 
(2.545) (2.335) (. 883) (.666) (1.228) ( 1.112) 
R-square .08 .12 .21 .04 .16 .16 
Oregon Regub1icans 
competitiveness .095 .093 .008 .004 .006 .041 
( .031) ( .052) (.024) (.013) (.024) ( .035) 
nonincumbent 2.190 1.242 1.675 .884 2.913 .751 
(.661) ( 1. 089) (.632) (.339) (. 777) (1.140) 
constant -3.179 -2.523 -.278 -.118 -.173 -.048 
(1.240) (2.044) (.950) (.510) (.966) (1.416) 
R-square .28 .08 .13 .12 .21 .03 
Washington Democrats 
competitiveness .042 .169 .009 .022 -.103 -.095 
(.018) (.074) (.017) (. 067) (.070) (.053) 
camp. squared .003 .003 
( .001) ( .0009) 
non incumbent .131 .560 1.172 3.335 1.024 .928 
( .391) (1.573) (.376) (1.470) ( .433) ( .332) 
constant -.619 -2.977 -.032 .660 .298 .283 
( .652) (2.623) (.681) (2.665) (1.050) ( .805) 
R-square .07 .07 .10 .06 .16 .22 
Washington Regub1icans 
competitiveness .077 .092 -.204 .010 .041 .061 
(.023) ( .089) ( .075) (.005) ( .028) (.029) 
camp. squared .004 
( .001) 
non incumbent .707 2.478 1.872 .266 1.159 .888 
(.351) (1.379) (.464) (.120) (. 519) (.528) 
constant -2.278 -3.500 .872 -.371 -1.227 -1.812 
(. 962) (3.784) (1.128) (.254) (1.129) ( 1.149) 
R-square .12 .04 .25 .06 .08 .08 
Wisconsin Democrats 
competitiveness -.057 -.019 -.098 -.388 -.090 .009 
(.018) ( .022) (.025) (. 188) (.038) ( .023) 
camp. squared .002 .003 .008 .003 
( .0004) (.0005) ( .004) ( .0008) 
nonincumbent -.079 -.452 .693 -.257 .643 . 042 
(.173) (. 685) (.225) (1.672) ( .369) ( .878) 
constant .095 1.917 -.161 6.599 .096 .914 
( .220) (. 745) ( .298) (2.212) (.419) ( .904) 
R-square .57 .02 .53 .os .36 .00 
Wisconsin Regub1icans 
competitiveness .050 .071 -.048 .019 -.039 .019 
( .014) ( .038) ( .047) (.019) (.037) ( .035) 
camp. squared .002 .002 
(.0008) ( .0007) 
non incumbent .095 .460 .088 -.104 .619 -2.039 
(2.970) ( .825) (.269) (. 387) (. 346) (1.025) 
constant -.814 -1.852 .421 -.247 -.010 1. 591 
(.604) (1.675) (.754) (.655) (.538) (1.452) 
R-square .14 .04 .27 .01 .18 .08 
Continued on next page 
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Table 6-1-Continued 
1982 1984 1986 
LCC LPACS LCC LPACS LCC LPACS 
All Democratic Cameaign Committees 
competitiveness -.039 -.165 -.027 -.136 -.117 -.106 
( .034) (.073) (.013) ( .048) ( .022) ( .026) 
camp. squared .001 .004 ,001 .003 .003 .003 
( .0006) ( .001) (.0003) ( .001) ( .0004) ( .001) 
non incumbent .465 .341 .557 .589 .689 .366 
( .216) ( .463) ( .111) (. 427) ( .190) . ( .230) 
constant .177 1. 569 .292 3.656 .242 .464 
R-square .13 .11 .18 .09 .19 .09 
All Reeublican cameaign committees 
competitiveness -.050 .071 -.085 -.057 -.037 -.065 
( .047) ( .021) ( .032) ( .038) ( .023) ( .033) 
camp. squared .002 .003 .002 .002 .002 
( .0007) (.0006) (.0004) ( .0005) ( .0007) 
nonincumbent .910 1.122 .743 .745 .976 -.003 
( .184) ( .392) (.261) (.306) (. 203) ( .288) 
constant -.613 -2.295 .241 -.756 .327 .553 
R-square .18 .05 .09 .07 .11 .06 
targeted their resources on dose races to a higher degree than the 
Missouri Democrats' leadership PACs, but this difference was re-
versed for the Washington Democrats in 1982 whose leadership PACs 
were better at targeting competitive races. 
The similarity in targeting marginal races between caucus cam-
paign committees and leadership PACs holds up when all of the 
states are combined for a single analysis of Democratic and Republi-
can committees. In 1984 and 1986, only marginal differences existed 
between the two types of committees for each party in terms of the 
relationship between the measures of competitiveness and the pro-
portion of campaign committee funds that a candidate receives. In 
1982, the Democratic leadership PACs appear to have been better than 
the caucus committees at concentrating their resources in close races. 4 
Support for the argument that caucus campaign committees and 
leadership PACs differ in the emphasis given to nonincumbent can-
didates-hypothesis 5-requires that the coefficients for the nonin-
cumbency variable in table 6-1 be greater in a positive direction for 
caucus campaign committees than for leadership PACs. This is the 
case in twenty-two of the thirty-two sets of committees. 1982 had the 
most cases that did not fit the relationship. Because redistricting leads 
to greater uncertainty regarding reelection for incumbents, the poor 
showing in 1982 is likely the result of the redistricting that occurred in 
most states just prior to the 1982 elections. As reported in chapter 5, 
many of the caucus committees do give priority to incumbents in 
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trouble, and in an election following a redrawing of the legislative dis-
tricts the number of incumbents in trouble is likely to be much higher 
than in other years. By 1986 all but two caucus campaign committees 
gave a greater emphasis than leadership PACs to nonincumbents. 
In Missouri, the opposite is found, that is, leadership campaign 
committees seem to be more likely than caucus campaign committees 
to fund nonincumbents, as indicated by the larger coefficient for 
nonincumbency. This finding is the result of two factors. One is the 
fact that the state is dominated by the Democrats. Under this condi-
tion, as demonstrated in chapter 5, caucus campaign committees will 
be more likely to fund incumbents to protect their majority and will 
have little incentive to support nonincumbents. The other is the 
youthful status of the these committees. Both parties' caucus cam-
paign committees did not really come into existence until 1984, and 
both parties' caucus committees began as "incumbent trust funds"; 
that is, they collected funds from incumbents and returned those 
funds at election time if needed. 
Why leadership PACs fund more nonincumbents under these 
conditions, however, is a mystery-it certainly does not conform to 
expectations. It may be that the emphasis placed on incumbents by 
caucus campaign committees creates a situation where leadership 
contributions can have more of an effect by funding nonincumbents. 
It may also be that leadership PACs in Missouri fund nonincumbents 
in order to enlarge the number of seats held by a faction within the 
Democratic legislative party. As plausible as the second argument 
seems, it is not the impression I received in my discussions with mi-
nority leader James Talent or with Mark Ausmus, the Speaker's Gen-
eral Counsel. Representative Talent indicated that his leadership PAC 
was "a question of me trying to help others who need it," and that it 
was "not used to affect leadership races." Ausmus indicated that leg-
islators who want to contribute to other campaigns often do so after 
calling the speaker or himself for information regarding candidates 
who need help. Consequently, the greater willingness of leadership 
PACs to fund nonincumbents must result from a situation where in-
cumbents receive sufficient enough attention from the caucus com-
mittees, leaving nonincumbents as the candidates which leadership 
PACs can help the most. 
When the data from all of the states are merged, the tendency for 
caucus campaign committees to place a greater emphasis than lead-
ership PACs on nonincumbent candidates is clearly evident in three 
out of the six cases-the Democratic committees in 1982 and 1986 and 
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the Republican committees in 1986. Considering the fact that the co-
efficient for leadership PACs fails to attain an acceptable level of sig-
nificance for Democrats in 1984; it cannot be said that the coefficient 
significantly differs from zero, it may be said that in four out of the six 
cases caucus campaign committees are more likely to emphasize non-
incumbent candidates than leadership PACs. 
Reflecting the findings in the separate analyses of the commit-
tees, the 1982 results for the Democratic caucus campaign committees 
are only marginally greater than the results for the Democratic lead-
ership PACs. The Republicans in 1982 represent the one case where 
the leadership PACs actually outdo the caucus committees in funding 
nonincumbent candidates. For both parties in 1982 this may be be-
cause of reapportionment. For the Republicans the findings may also 
be because 1982 was a poor year for Republicans in terms of party 
popularity, a condition that might have lead to a "defensive" strategy 
on the part of caucus committees, that is, one involving the protection 
of incumbents. Such a possibility will be more thoroughly tested in 
the following chapter. 
Conclusion 
In most cases the difference in resource allocation between legislative 
party caucus campaign committees and legislative leadership PACs 
comes in the emphasis these committees place on funding caucus out-
siders. Both types of legislative party campaign committees appear to 
concentrate their resources on close or competitive races to the same 
degree. Caucus campaign committees, however, tend to place a 
greater emphasis on funding nonincumbents. 
The reason for the difference in funding nonincumbents origi-
nates more from the slight differences in the goals held by those who 
make the decisions for these committees than from the differences in 
the nature of the committees. Individual legislators in control of their 
own campaign committees are more likely to fund incumbents be-
cause such a strategy better serves the goals of individual legislators. 
Caucuses are concerned with control of the legislature and thus cau-
cus campaign committees will actively seek to gain or maintain a ma-
jority of seats, a goal that requires a greater willingness to fund 
nonincumbent candidates. 
One important consideration regarding the differences in re-
source allocation between caucus campaign committees and leader-
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ship PACs is the fact that, as demonstrated in chapter 4, not all caucus 
committees are similarly structured. Some caucus campaign commit-
tees allow for a great deal of participation from the entire caucus, oth-
ers are more similar to leadership PACs in that they are almost 
entirely run by the party's leadership. Such structural differences 
should lead to differences among caucus campaign committees in 
their willingness to fund nonincumbents, obscuring the differences 
between caucus campaign committees and leadership PACs. Another 
condition that might obscure the differences is the level of party com-
petition in the state and in the districts. Where party competition is 
low, funding nonincumbent candidates is much less likely to result in 
positive outcomes. These two conditions point to a limitation of the 
analysis presented in this chapter-too few states. Though the num-
ber of states included in this analysis goes far beyond any other re-
search into legislative party campaign committees, more states are 
needed to disentangle the many factors shaping the decisions of those 
in charge of legislative party caucus campaign committees and lead-
ership campaign committees. Such a requirement will likely go un-
fulfilled until more states make their campaign finance records more 
accessible and more uniform. 
The future of the relationship between the two types of legislative 
party campaign committees is not completely clear at this point. Early 
on in the development of these committees, legislative caucus cam-
paign committees were very similar to leadership PACs; they func-
tioned mainly to distribute campaign contributions. Today, caucus 
campaign committees are becoming more like party organizations, in-
volved in providing traditional party services and candidate-centered 
services, recruiting candidates, and directing contributions from 
other sources. Meanwhile, leadership PACs still act only to transfer 
money from one party member to another. The development of cau-
cus campaign committees and leadership PACs has thus diverged, 
one specializing in assisting candidates through services, the other 
specializing in transferring excess campaign funds. The difference in 
the assistance each type of committee provides nonincumbents also 
suggests that caucus committees and leadership PACs perform sepa-
rate functions, one a party function, the other a career function for 
the individual legislator. These differences in caucus campaign com-
mittees and leadership PACs suggest that the reason for the existence 
of both types of committees continues to exist, making it likely that 
both will continue to operate, barring any state legislative action to 
prohibit or restrict such activity. 
7 
Strategic Variations in 
Caucus Campaign 
Committee Tactics 
The previous chapters demonstrated that legislative party campaign 
committees strategically distribute their resources to both incumbent 
and nonincumbent candidates in close races. The purpose of this 
chapter is to explore the possibility that the strategies pursued by 
these campaign committees are more complex. Specifically, this chap-
ter investigates the possibility that legislative party caucus campaign 
committees adjust their strategies according to their status within the 
legislature and according to trends in party popularity at the state and 
national level. Minority party campaign committees and campaign 
committees whose party is enjoying a surge in popularity at either 
the state or national level are expected to pursue an offensive strategy 
entailing an emphasis on nonincumbent candidates. Majority party 
campaign committees and campaign committees whose party is 
suffering in terms of popularity are expected to pursue a defensive 
strategy entailing an emphasis on protecting their party's incumbent 
legislators. The results of the analysis indicate that some but not all 
of the legislative party campaign committees appear to follow such 
strategies. 
Majority v. Minority Party Status 
An effective use of resources to attain the goal of majority party status 
may require more than a simple strategy of supporting candidates in 
competitive races. A minority party must actively recruit and support 
open seat candidates and challengers in order to increase the number 
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of seats they hold in the legislature. This "offensive" strategy is the 
only way that they can attain majority status. Members of the legis-
lative party caucus, according to the theoretical propositions devel-
oped and tested in the previous chapters are willing to forgo the 
contributions they would receive from the committee in order to at-
tain the goal of majority party status. Members of a minority legisla-
tive party caucus campaign committee should be even more willing to 
do so, because the change from minority to majority status would 
mean a greater payoff (in terms of committee assignments and suc-
cess of favored legislation). Thus, minority party legislative caucus 
campaign committees should exhibit a greater willingness to fund 
nonincumbent candidates. Once again, this calculus will be different 
for legislatures dominated by one party. When the chances of a 
change in the party's status are very small, the goal of majority party 
status is not a priority and the willingness to allow committee funds 
to go to outsiders does not exist. 
All a majority legislative caucus campaign committee has to do to 
meet the goal of majority party status is to make sure that the party 
retains all of its legislative seats. In other words, the majority party 
must insure that its incumbents are reelected and that the party wins 
any open seats created by a retirement of one of their incumbents. Be-
cause incumbents are almost unbeatable at the national and state 
level, the most efficient way to distribute the committees' resources to 
attain the goal of majority status is to use the resources to reinforce 
the incumbency advantage. 1 Thus, majority party legislative caucus 
campaign committees should follow a defensive strategy that puts a 
top priority on defending vulnerable incumbents. Unlike the minority 
party committees, this strategy is likely to be more prevalent as the 
size of the majority increases. 
These arguments lead to the hypothesis first presented in chap-
ter 2: 
6. Minority legislative caucus campaign committees that have a 
reasonable chance of winning a majority of seats should be 
found to concentrate a greater proportion of their resources on 
nonincumbent candidates than their majority party counterparts. 
The Effects of Partisan Trends in Popularity 
In attempting to gain or maintain a majority it might also be expected 
that the legislative caucus campaign committees would take advantage 
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of swings in party popularity to increase the number of seats they 
hold. When the public's perception of the party is positive, for exam-
ple, because of having a popular candidate at the top of the ticket, 
campaign committees may try to "cash in" on that popularity by sup-
porting nonincumbent candidates and in that way increase their seats 
in the legislature. High popularity, it is assumed, will translate into 
votes. In this way a legislative party is using trends in partisan sup-
port among the public to counter the incumbency advantage. 
If public perceptions of the party are negative, because of such 
things as a scandal or views that the party is not handling the job of 
governing well, campaign committees may try to counteract these 
trends to avoid losing what they already have. In other words, legis-
lative caucus campaign committees whose state or national party's 
popularity is low should be found to focus their efforts on defend-
ing weak incumbents. In this way parties on the down end of a par-
tisan trend make use of the incumbency advantage to try to reduce 
the effects of the negative changes in partisan support among the 
electorate. 2 
These arguments lead to the following hypotheses: 
7. Legislative party caucus campaign committees whose party is 
enjoying a surge of popularity nationally should be more likely 
to fund nonincumbent candidates than legislative party caucus 
campaign committees of the opposition. 
8. Legislative party caucus campaign committees whose party is 
enjoying a surge of popularity at the state level should be more 
likely to fund nonincumbent candidates than legislative party 
caucus campaign committees of the opposition. 
Alternatively, it may be that the claim that "all politics is local" is 
true in the case of legislative caucus campaign committees. 3 That is, it 
is possible that decision makers focus mainly on district level forces-
closeness of the previous race, strength of the candidates, and local 
politics-in their decisions, ignoring national or statewide trends. 
Analysis 
Testing these offensive/defensive hypotheses involves a further exam-
ination of the results of the regressions run in Chapter 6. The reader 
will recall that individual regressions were run for each party com-
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mittee, regressing the proportion of the committee funds received 
by each candidate on the closeness of the race (the previous margin 
for 1984 and 1986, and the average margin for 1982), the square of 
the closeness measure, and incumbency status of the candidate (a 
dummy variable equaling 1 if the candidate was not an incumbent, 
and 0 if the candidate was an incumbent). 4 Or: 
PROPLPCC = b0 + b1(COMPETITION) + b2(COMPETITIONf + 
b3NONINC + e 
where PROPLPCC is the proportion of legislative party campaign 
committee total resources received by a candidate, COMPETITION is 
the measure of closeness, and NONINC is the dummy variable for 
incumbency status. The proportional dependent variable was used to 
make the results comparable across parties, committees and states. 
Party Status. If, as hypothesized, the status of the legislative party 
has an impact on the way the legislative party resources are distrib-
uted, minority legislative party caucus campaign committees that 
have a realistic chance of attaining a majority should be found to be 
more likely to fund nonincumbents than the majority parties. That 
is, the effect of incumbency status (in this case measured as nonin-
cumbency) on the contributions received from caucus campaign 
committees should be greater for minority party caucus campaign 
committees. To determine whether or not this is indeed the case, the 
coefficient for the variable measuring incumbency status in model7-1 
are presented in table 7-1.5 Minority party caucus campaign commit-
tees' results are in bold. Means of the nonincumbent coefficients for 
all states are presented at the bottom of the table to provide an overall 
comparison of minority and majority committees. Two sets of means 
are presented, one including all cases and the second excluding the 
three states that are the lowest in party competition-Tennessee, Mis-
souri, and Indiana. 
Focusing first on the means of the nonincumbent coefficients 
for all states, a comparison of majority and minority caucus campaign 
committee lends support for the hypothesized relationship between 
party status and the funding of nonincumbents in two of the three 
years. Minority party caucus campaign committees in 1984 and 1986 
were slightly more likely than majority caucus campaign committees 
to allocate a greater proportion of their resources to nonincumbents 
candidates. When the caucus campaign committees of entrenched 
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Table 7-1. Effect of Party Status and Trends on Candidates 
Supported* 
1982 1984 1986 
California 
Democrats NA NA 2.307 
Republicans 1.104** 3.152 1.907 
Illinois 
Democrats -.605 -.138 -.424 
Republicans .054 NA • 750 
Indiana 
Democrats .097 -1.005 1.172 
Republicans -. 719 -.905 -.143 
Minnesota 
Democrats .505 .678 .208 
Republicans .390 .339 .557 
Missouri 
Democrats none -.253 -.319 
Republicans none -1.384 .331 
New York 
Democrats NA .021 .109 
Republicans NA .914 .294 
Oregon 
Democrats 1.829 1.197 1. 547 
Republicans 2.190 1.675 2.913 
Tennessee 
Democrats -.468 .684 .953 
Republicans -1.733 -1.471 -.640 
Washington 
Democrats .131 1.172 1.024 
Republicans .707 1.872 1.159 
Wisconsin 
Democrats -.079 .693 .643 
Republicans .095 .088 .619 
Majorit~ Party Committees 
nonincumbent .261 .350 .625 
Minority Party committees 
nonincUIIIbent .209 .464 .871 
Minority Party Committees 
without Low Party Coa2etition 
States 
nonincwabent .551 1.340 1.012 
*Nonincl.lllbent coefficients obtained from regressing the proportion of caucus comnittee funds on 
inci.Bbency status, the previous margin, and the square of the previous margin. 
** The figures for party comnittees that were in the minority before the election are in bold. 
minority parties are excluded from the calculation-because, as ar-
gued above, their limited chance of winning a majority would elimi-
nate the reason for supporting caucus outsiders-the differences 
between majority and minority caucus campaign committees is much 
more distinct. With the minority party caucus campaign committees 
from states with a dominant party excluded, the nonincumbent coef-
ficient means for minority parties is clearly larger than the mean for 
majority parties in every year. 
The mean of the nonincumbent coefficients for the majority party 
caucus campaign committees in 1986 was .625 and the mean for mi-
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nority parties was 1.0U. On average, a nonincumbent candidate of a 
minority party was likely to receive 1.012 percent of a caucus commit-
tee's resources, while a nonincumbent candidate of a majority parties 
was likely to receive .625 percent of the caucus committee's total re-
sources (controlling for the closeness of the race). 
Care must be taken in drawing conclusions from these composite 
results because aggregate-level patterns may mask differences on an 
individual level. A state by state comparison of minority and majority 
campaign committee support for nonincumbents shows that the pat-
tern of greater minority party emphasis on nonincumbents holds for 
twelve of the twenty-five pairs of caucus campaign committees. 6 But 
because Missouri, Indiana, and Tennessee were not expected to evi-
dence this distinction (because of the low levels of interparty compe-
tition), it can be said that in ten out of seventeen cases the minority 
party was likely to give greater assistance to nonincumbent candi-
dates than the majority party. 
Thus, the analysis of the effect of legislative party status provides 
limited support for the hypothesis that party status affects how leg-
islative party caucus campaign committees distribute their resources. 
It apparently affects how some committees allocate their resources, 
but it seems to have no effect on others. The fact that not all minority 
legislative caucus campaign committees provide greater assistance to 
nonincumbent candidates than the majority party committees may be 
caused by any number of factors. It may be because of the state's po-
litical culture, the behavior of other actors in the elections, or it may 
be that the hypothesis is invalid. One other possible explanation is 
that legislative caucus campaign committees also adjust their resource 
allocation strategy over time, according to partisan trends. It is to this 
possibility that the analysis now turns. 
Partisan Trends. To determine whether or not legislative party cau-
cus campaign committees vary their distribution strategy according to 
national or state party trends, the coefficients in table 7-1 will be com-
pared again, but this time in terms of which party benefited from fa-
vorable public opinion before the election. National partisan trends 
are assessed based upon presidential and congressional elections. 
The partisan trends were in favor of the Republicans in 1984, the year 
that Reagan won the presidency in a landslide. The trends favored the 
Democrats in 1982, the year in which the recession peaked, and in 
1986, when the Democrats won back control of the Senate and gained 
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seats in the house. State trends in partisan support are gauged by the 
results of gubernatorial and/or U.S. Senate races. 
If the decision makers in the legislative caucus campaign commit-
tees take into account trends in party popularity in their distribution 
strategies two patterns should be found in the regression results. First, 
Democratic and Republican caucus campaign committees should be 
found to differ in distribution strategies with regard to nonincumbents 
in any one year. Second, caucus campaign committees' distribution 
strategies should be found to change over time with regard to support 
for nonincumbents. The difference in resource distribution should be 
such that the caucus campaign committees give a greater proportion 
of their funds to nonincumbents when party fortunes are high and a 
greater proportion to incumbents when party popularity is down. 
This should be reflected in table 7-1 in terms of the size of the coef-
ficients for nonincumbents, with higher positive coefficients meaning 
that the caucus campaign committee placed a greater emphasis on 
nonincumbents in that election cycle. Table 7-1 is organized in such a 
way as to facilitate comparisons within each year (down) and within 
each caucus campaign committee across the three years (across). 
If national party trends have any impact, one should expect to 
find that the Republicans would give a greater proportion of their 
funds to nonincumbents in 1984, the year Ronald Reagan won the 
presidency in a landslide victory over Walter Mondale, and Demo-
crats should be found to give a greater proportion of their funds to 
nonincumbents in 1982 and 1986. Looking first at each individual 
year, there is evidence-in terms of the difference between the two 
party committees within each state-that some of the legislative party 
caucus committees follow national party trends. Comparing the 
nonincumbent coefficients in each state, the pattern holds for three 
out of seven states in 1982-lndiana, Minnesota, and Tennessee-
four out of seven in 1984-Indiana, New York, Oregon, and Washing-
ton-and four out of seven in 1986-California, Indiana, Tennessee, 
and Wisconsin. In total, the pattern holds in less than half of the 
states. Of those states, Indiana seemed to be the most in tune with 
national party trends. In fact, the Indiana House Republicans were 
one of the few committees, according to Jeff Estich, the Republican 
speaker pro tempore, to considered the effects of national and state 
party trends when making caucus campaign committee decisions. In 
Indiana 1986 the Democrats gave on average 1.172 percent more of 
their resources to nonincumbents in close races while the Republicans 
figure was -.143 percent. 
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Considering each individual committee over time, only seven of 
the fifteen committees appear to be adjusting their strategy for 
changes in national partisan trends from year to year. The Indiana 
Democrats, one positive case, in 1982 and 1986, were more likely to 
give a greater proportion of their resources to nonincumbents, and in 
1984 were more likely to allocate a greater proportion to incumbents. 
As expected, the pattern of resource allocation for the California Re-
publicans was just the reverse-higher emphasis on nonincumbents 
in 1984. For Minnesota Democrats the pattern was the opposite of 
what was expected for Democrats nationally in 1984, which may have 
something to do with the fact that the Democratic presidential candi-
date was from Minnesota, which also was the only state he won. 
The failure to find a consistent pattern in the data that would 
suggest that decision makers on caucus campaign committees take 
national trends into consideration in distributing their resources, may 
indicate that state party trends are more important, or that local, 
district-level factors are more important. An examination of statewide 
elections results in these states might provide insight into the effect of 
state party trends. The Indiana Republicans had a greater emphasis 
on incumbents in 1984, over 1982 and 1986-a pattern just the oppo-
site of what would be expected if national party trends were followed. 
This may be due in part to the competitive race for the governor's 
seat between the incumbent Republican Robert Orr, who won only 
52 percent of the vote, and his Democratic opponent, W. Townsend 
who won 47 percent in 1984. The distribution pattern evidenced by 
the New York Assembly Democrats can not be explained by either 
state or national party trends. This may be due to the mixed signals 
the voters were giving in 1986 by reelecting Democratic Governor 
Cuomo with a 65 percent margin, while reelecting Republican Sena-
tor Alfonse D' Amato by a 57 percent margin. 
The Washington House Democratic Caucus Committee's increase 
in support for nonincumbents in 1984-another finding that goes 
against the grain of national trends-may be explained by state poli-
tics because a Democratic challenger unseated a Republican incum-
bent governor that year. The results in Minnesota can be explained by 
Mandate's candidacy in 1984. The pattern for the Illinois Democrats is 
one in which nonincumbents in each year are given less of an em-
phasis than incumbents: the values are negative for each year. Non-
incumbents were a little more likely to receive help from the Illinois 
Democratic Majority Committee in 1984.7 This reversal of what would 
be expected given national partisan trends, may be because of state 
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level politics, namely, the strong candidacy of incumbent governor 
Jim Thompson in 1982 and 1986 and, in 1984, the candidacy of Paul 
Simon, who won the Illinois Senate seat from incumbent Charles 
Percy despite the landslide victory for Reagan. 8 The distribution of 
legislative caucus committee resources by Democrats in Oregon and 
both parties in Wisconsin cannot be explained by either national or 
state party trends. For Oregon, this may be because of the weakness 
of the political parties in Oregon. 
Thus, information about national and state party trends allows us 
to explain the differences in resource distribution patterns among 
most of the caucus campaign committees. What can not be estab-
lished from this data, however, is whether or not this is a strategy pur-
sued consciously or the result of an indirect impact of these trends on 
the resource distribution. It is possible that these findings are because 
of the impact that party trends have on the viability of candidates, on 
how competitive the races become, and even on the pool of quality 
candidates. That is, it may be that the partisan trends have only an 
indirect effect on the distribution of resources. 
To determine whether or not legislative party caucus campaign 
committees consciously factored national and state party trends into 
their strategies, legislators and staff members who were interviewed 
were asked whether this occurred. Responses were overwhelmingly 
negative, sometimes with the comment that legislative electoral pol-
itics is local politics (see appendix for questionnaire). A few excep-
tions were found. The Illinois House Republicans and the Democrats 
in both chambers indicated that both national and state trends were 
taken into consideration when their caucus campaign committee 
made its decisions. 9 Steve Brown, who works with the Illinois Dem-
ocratic Majority Committee in the house, indicated that the IDMC 
does take national and state partisan trends into consideration, but 
that "the effect was qualified by local politics." Indiana House Repub-
licans claimed to follow national and state party trends, and the Wis-
consin Speaker admitted that they consider national party trends in 
their decisions, but only for the few legislative districts that are close 
to the major media markets of Chicago and Minneapolis/St. Paul. 
The rest of the responses from representatives of caucus cam-
paign committees indicated that national and state partisan trends 
were not considered. A few fell back on the maxim that "all politics is 
local," and others indicated that they are aggressive every year. An 
example of the tendency for partisan trends to be neglected was pro-
vided by Senator Charles Pray, president of the Maine Senate, who 
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illustrated this with a description of the 1980 legislative races. In that 
year, according to Pray, there was "an exceptionally good crop of 
Democratic challengers." The Senate Democratic caucus campaign 
committee backed these candidates and, as a result, won seven seats 
and a majority in that year, the same year that Republicans took over 
the White House and the U.S. Senate. A number of committees ad-
mitted that they worked with the national or state candidates, as in 
having candidates make appearances with presidential candidates, 
but denied that they consciously adjusted strategy of funding candi-
dates according to national or state party politics. 
Thus, although the regression analysis displays some patterns 
that suggest a difference in strategy based upon party trends, state 
and national, interview responses indicate that, with few exceptions-
mainly in Illinois-legislative party campaign committee decision 
makers do not consciously pursue such a strategy. Instead, according 
to the interview responses, it appears that local politics dominates de-
cision making. The patterns that were found in the analysis, then, 
must be a result of an indirect effect that party trends have on the dis-
tribution of resources. That is, what must be happening is that par-
tisan conditions shape the nature of the competition in legislative 
districts, determining which races will be close, which in turn affects 
the committees' distribution of resources. Generally speaking, there 
is no evidence that those who control legislative parties react con-
sciously to partisan trends as the political elites in Jacobson and Ker-
nell's research. 10 
Combined Effects of Party Status and Partisan Trends 
The separate analyses of the effects of party status and partisan 
trends does not take into account that both of these factors are work-
ing on the distribution of resources at the same time. Consequently, 
to more accurately assess the effect of these influences on legislative 
caucus campaign committees' strategy a more sophisticated analysis 
is needed. The purpose of this section is to report results from a multi-
ple regression analysis of the combined effects of party status and 
popularity on legislative caucus campaign committee strategy. To test 
for the independent effects of party status and party popularity the 
data for all of the states was combined into one data set for regres-
sion analysis. Since the interest here is essentially in the effect party 
status and partisan trends have on a nonincumbent's share of caucus 
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committee resources, the most appropriate regression model is one 
that incorporates an interaction effect between incumbency status and 
these factors. The regression model, then, involves regressing the 
proportion of caucus campaign committee resources received by each 
candidate on: the interaction between a dummy variable for candi-
date's party's status and a dummy for incumbency status; the inter-
action between a dummy variable for the effect of state partisan 
trends and national partisan trends and incumbency status; and mea-
sures of the closeness of the race and dummy variables for each state 
· as controls. Formally, the model is such that: 
PROPLPCC = b0 + b1(COMPETITION) + b2(COMPETITION)2 + 
b3(NONINC) + b4(NONINC * PARTYSTAT) + b5(NONINC * 
PARTY) + b6(NONINC * STPARTYTR) + b7(CALIFORNIA) ... 
+ b14(WASHINGTON) + e 
where COMPETITION is the measure of the closeness of the race, 
NONINC is the dummy variable for incumbency status (equaling 1 if 
the candidate is a nonincumbent and 0 if otherwise), PARTYSTAT is 
the dummy variable for party status (equaling 1 if the candidate's 
party is the minority party, 0 if otherwise), PARTY is the dummy vari-
able for party (equalling 1 for Democrats and 0 for Republicans; this 
variable is used to assess national partisan trends), STPARTYTR is 
the dummy variable for state partisan trends (equaling 1 if the trend 
was in favor of the candidate's party, 0 if otherwise), 11 and CALIFOR-
NIA through WASHINGTON are dummy variables for each state, ex-
cluding one from the analysis. 12 Setting up the model this way allows 
for the combination of what is essentially two different equations for 
each hypothesized relationship into one equation. 13 
Table 7-2 presents the results for this regression for each of the 
years of the analysis. As in all previous analyses the relationship be-
tween the contributions and the competitiveness of the race is posi-
tive, and significant, providing yet one more confirmation of the fact 
that legislative caucus campaign committees strategically concentrate 
their resources in close races. 
Turning to the hypothesized differences in strategies, the coeffi-
cients of the interaction terms provide an indication of whether or not 
minority parties are more likely than majority party committees to 
provide greater support to nonincumbents. 14 In the model estimated 
for 1984, the coefficient for the interaction of party status and non-
incumbency does provide support for the hypothesized relationship 
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Table 7-2. Combined Effects of Party Status and Party Popularity* 
Variables 1982 1984 1986 
competition .054** -.063•• -.075** 
competition squared .002** .002•• 
non incumbent .024 .251•• .514•• 
noninc • minority status .193 .474** .105 
non inc • state party trend .378** .413** .135 
noninc • national party trend -.093 -.109 .019 
Wisconsin .031 .053 .060 
California .534** .280 .455** 
Oregon .586** -.488** .316 
Illinois .380** .143 -.066 
Indiana -.340 -.354 
Tennessee 1. 552** .717** .770** 
Washington -.108 -.431** -.345 
Missouri .091 .197 
Minnesota -.219 -.576•• -.600** 
(Constant) -.1067•• .376•• -.188 
R-square .14 .12 .16 
*Unstandardized regression coefficients obtained from regressing the proportion of caucus canpaign 
c011111ittee contributions on the variables. 
** Significant at the .05 level or better. 
between party status and a caucus campaign committee's support for 
nonincumbents-it is significant and in the right direction. Nonin-
cumbents of minority parties were likely to receive almost three times 
more of their caucus campaign committee funds than nonincumbents 
of majority parties. Nonincumbents of a minority party received .725 
percent (.251 + .474) of their party's caucus committees resources 
while nonincumbents of majority parties were likely to receive .251 
percent of their party's caucus committee funds. Thus, in 1984 minor-
ity parties put a greater emphasis on funding nonincumbent candi-
dates than did majority parties (controlling for the effects of party 
trends). Though the coefficients are in the expected direction for 1982 
and 1986, their failure to attain a satisfactory level of significance 
means that these results cannot be said to indicate that minority par-
ties place a greater emphasis on nonincumbents than majority parties 
in these elections. 
Evidence that state party trends increase caucus campaign com-
mittees' willingness to fund caucus outsiders is found in 1982 and 
1984. Nonincumbents of parties that had a good year in 1982 were 
likely to receive .378 percent of their caucus committee funds 
(.378 + 0, 0 because the nonincumbent coefficient is not statistically 
significantly different from 0), while the proportion received by 
nonincumbents of parties that were not having a good year was 0. 
The lack of support for nonincumbents in 1982 is consistent with the 
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findings in the previous chapter, and is undoubtedly because of the 
effect that reapportionment has on the security of incumbent candi-
dates. Following the redrawing of legislative districts the electoral se-
curity of incumbents is probably at its lowest, leading caucus 
campaign committees to invest heavily in incumbents in the election 
year following redistricting. In 1984, nonincumbents of parties that 
were enjoying a good year at the state level were likely to receive .664 
percent (.413 + .251) of their caucus committee funds, while nonin-
cumbents of other state parties received .251 percent. Note that the 
coefficient for the nonincumbent variable is still significant and pos-
itive in 1984 and 1986, lending additional support to the hypothesized 
emphasis caucus campaign committees place on nonincumbents. 
Thus, after combining all of the caucus campaign committee data, 
evidence of varying distribution strategies is not very strong. Minor-
ity parties were more likely to fund nonincumbent candidates than 
majority party committees but only in 1984. Positive state partisan 
trends also increased the proportion of caucus campaign committee 
funds received by a caucus outsider in 1982 and 1984. No impact of 
national party trends is evident in any year-a finding which, given 
the responses from legislative leaders and caucus campaign staff, is 
not very surprising. 
Conclusion 
While there seems to be evidence that some legislative caucus cam-
paign committees in certain years vary their strategies according to 
their status in the legislature and according to state or national party 
trends, generalized conclusions regarding all legislative caucus cam-
paign committees would be erroneous given the results of this anal-
ysis. While differences do appear to exist between some minority and 
majority legislative caucus campaign committees, only in 1984 is there 
clear evidence that this can be generalized to all committees once 
other factors are controlled for. And while some caucus campaign 
committees evidence a pattern that suggests that they are considering 
the impact of national and state party trends on legislative election 
outcomes, the aggregate analysis indicates an effect only for state par-
tisan trends after other factors are controlled for. Furthermore, the in-
terview responses regarding this strategy indicate that, with few 
exceptions, any pattern that does exist is not the result of a conscious 
consideration of the impact of partisan trends. 
8 
Conclusion 
The results of the research and analysis conducted for this book have 
lead to a large number of conclusions about legislative party cam-
paign committees. Two conclusions-one regarding the impact that 
legislative party campaign committees have on the distribution of re-
sources in legislative elections and the other the status of legislative 
caucus campaign committees-are by far the most important and 
thus deserve special attention. 
The analysis of campaign contributions and the interview results 
made it very apparent that legislative party caucus campaign commit-
tees and leadership PACs are having a profound impact on the dis-
tribution of resources in legislative races. They represent a new source 
of campaign resources for candidates and their behavior results in the 
redistribution of old resources. Though the dollar value of the re-
sources distributed by legislative party campaign committees repre-
sents a small proportion of all of the campaign money that is 
transferred in legislative elections, both types of committees were 
found to concentrate those resources in such a way as to maximize 
their effect. Legislative party campaign committees were found to tar-
get their resources, concentrating them in competitive races where 
they were needed the most. This distribution pattern included the 
provision of assistance to nonincumbents-a tactic that helps legisla-
tive parties build and maintain a majority. These findings were cor-
roborated repeatedly by qualitative interview data and by subsequent 
analyses that focused on the proportion of caucus committee re-
sources that went to candidates. 
The role played by caucus campaign committees in providing 
new resources to campaigns was determined to be greater than what 
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records of their expenditures would indicate because these commit-
tees also provide a number of important services to candidates. Ser-
vices such as polling, media consultation and facilities, and mass 
mailings can be purchased by caucus campaign committees at volume 
discounts and passed on to candidates as in-kind contributions at 
much lower costs than if the candidates purchased the services them-
selves. Moreover, the difficulty of assigning value to many of these 
services will mean that they will most likely be undervalued when 
they are reported as contributions. Both of these practices stretch the 
influence of caucus campaign committees far beyond what their ex-
penditures would indicate. 
In addition to representing a new source of campaign assistance, 
the distribution of legislative party campaign committees' resources 
tends to have a redistributive effect on traditional resources in state 
legislative campaigns. Because typical contributors-individuals and 
PACs-want access to policy makers, they tend to contribute to the 
campaigns of those who will likely be members of the legislature-
incumbents. An even better investment for such contributors is to 
give to legislative leaders-speakers, majority and minority leaders, 
whips, and chairs of important committees. This behavior results 
in a situation in which those who do not need any more money con-
tinue to receive it, and those who do need it are largely ignored. The 
development of leadership PACs and caucus campaign committees 
probably arose from this top-heavy distribution when leaders dis-
covered that using their excess campaign funds to assist other candi-
dates would help them attain other goals, goals unrelated to their 
own reelection. Consequently, leadership PACs and caucus campaign 
committees redistribute campaign contributions from incumbents in 
little need of the money to candidates in dose races in great need of 
the money. This, according to the analysis, included nonincumbent 
candidates, who otherwise have a difficult time convincing contribu-
tors that they are a good investment. Moreover, caucus campaign 
committees were found to have a hand in directing the flow of cash 
from other contributors in legislative races-PACs and individuals-
greatly enhancing their effect on the flow of campaign resources in 
state legislative elections. 
The empirical analysis and interview results also made it very 
apparent that legislative party caucus campaign committees have 
developed, or are developing, into what are indisputably party orga-
nizations. As mentioned above, in addition to dispensing cash con-
tributions, the caucus campaign committees provide many services 
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geared toward the candidate-centered campaigns of today. Further-
more, a number of committees also provide candidate-nonspecific, or 
party, services such as registration and get-out-the-vote drives, com-
puterized voter lists, and development of grass-roots organizations. 
Legislative party caucus campaign committees also seem to have 
some input into the selection of their party's nominees: almost all of 
the caucus campaign committees were involved in recruiting candi-
dates and some involved themselves in primary battles. Caucus 
campaign committees influenced the ability of candidates to raise rev-
enues from other sources, either directly, by soliciting PAC money, or 
indirectly, by giving a candidate a mark of legitimacy that assures 
contributors that the candidate is a good investment. Legislative cau-
cus campaign committees also appear to be broad-based organiza-
tions, drawing their resources from a diverse set of sources, including 
individuals, all types of PACs, corporations, legislators, and national 
and state party organizations. 
In terms of resource utilization, legislative party caucus commit-
tees were found to strategically allocate their resources in such a way 
as to differentiate them from those of nonparty contributors and to 
maximize their impact on elections, the party's status in the legisla-
ture, and legislative behavior. Legislative party campaign committees 
were found to target close races and to fund nonincumbents. In a 
number of instances the relative level of resources being provided to 
nonincumbents by minority party caucus campaign committees 
seemed to indicate that caucus campaign committee strategies are de-
signed to maximize the effect the committees have on the balance of 
power within the legislature. Also, some caucus campaign commit-
tees in some states seemed to vary their allocation strategy to take ad-
vantage of partisan trends, though when asked about it, only a few 
contacts in the committees indicated that this was done consciously. 
These distributional patterns indicate that caucus campaign commit-
tees are operating for the purpose of building or maintaining the par-
ty's legislative majority-an inference that is overwhelmingly 
supported by the interview responses. This purpose differs from non-
party contributors, who give largely for the purpose of gaining access 
to, or influence over lawmakers. 
Not all legislative party caucus campaign committees studied 
here have attained a level of organizational sophistication that would 
justify labeling them party organizations. The level of institutionaliza-
tion and the degree to which caucus campaign committees approxi-
mate party organizations, clearly differs from state to state, and 
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sometimes within each state. The differences are in part because of 
the maturity of the caucus campaign committees; the older commit-
tees are more sophisticated and more like party organizations. The di-
verse nature of the sample of states used in this research-states with 
well established caucus committees that have existed for a decade or 
more such as Wisconsin, Illinois, California and Minnesota; states 
with newly formed caucus committees that are just beginning to de-
velop such as Maine and Missouri; and one state, Indiana, with com-
mittees that have existed for a while and are just beginning to provide 
more sophisticated services to candidates-allowed for comparisons 
that provide support for the argument that time plays a major role in 
the level of development of caucus campaign committees. But why 
did caucus campaign committees appear earlier in some states than 
others? The reason can be found in the explanations for why legisla-
tive parties became involved in elections in the first place-the in-
crease in the cost of campaigns, the lack of assistance from other 
regular party organizations, and the level of interparty competition. 
The states with the oldest legislative party campaign committees, Il-
linois, New York, and California, have the most expensive campaigns 
and are competitive states. The fact that the development of Demo-
cratic caucus campaign committees exceeded that of the Republicans 
in a number of states-Wisconsin, Maine, and California-is a reflec-
tion of the relative organizational strength of Democratic and Repub-
lican state party organizations; because of better state organizations, 
the need for Republican caucus campaign committees was not as 
great. And the lack of serious competition in southern states explains 
why caucus campaign committees have yet to develop in southern 
legislative parties, though an effective legislative party organization 
may be just what southern Republicans need to bring their party up 
to a more competitive level. 
Implications 
Given the findings of this research, it should be clear that legislative 
party campaign committees represent an important new development 
with major implications for political parties, legislative behavior and 
legislative elections. The existence of legislative caucus campaign 
committees that can be considered party organizations indicates that 
political scientists need to reassess the way state political parties, and 
political parties in general, are perceived in terms of organization, 
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roles, and strength. Because legislative party campaign committees 
have an effect on the distribution of resources in legislative elections, 
their activity has implications for legislative elections and party com-
petition in those elections, as well as implications for the public 
policy-making process at the state level. 
The fact that legislative party caucus committees exist and resem-
ble party organizations means that our understanding of the structure 
of state party organizations must change. The addition of legislative 
party organizations to the party structure at the state level means that 
many of the state parties now have the same specialized divisions that 
the national parties have, that is, legislative organizations that oper-
ate separately from the central party committees. 
Furthermore, our understanding of the structure and functions 
of political parties in the U.S. in general needs some rethinking. 
Sorauf's classic conceptualization of political parties drew distinctions 
between the party organization, the party-in-government, and the 
party-in-the-electorate. This research, combined with the findings at 
the national level, 1 demonstrates that the lines between the party or-
ganization and the party-in-government may no longer be as clear as 
they once were. Congressional and state legislative parties have, in 
addition to their function of governing, entered into the business pre-
viously thought to be the sole realm of party organizations-political 
campaigns. 
The development of legislative party campaign committees at the 
state level also says something about the viability of political parties in 
American politics. Until the mid- to late 1980s, a strong consensus ex-
isted among political scientists that the political parties were in a state 
of decline. 2 Piece by piece, new research on political parties has come 
to challenge this conclusion. 3 Political parties, some political scientists 
argue, are not continuing their decline, instead they have been adapt-
ing to the new age of candidate-centered campaigns. This adjustment 
is apparent in the types of services parties provide to candidates' cam-
paigns and in the role parties are playing as brokers for resources 
valuable to campaigns. Before the research presented in this book, 
much of the evidence for this change in the political parties came from 
the nationallevel.4 The findings of this research show that this pro-
cess of adaptation has spread to the state level, at least where legis-
lative parties are concerned. 
Legislative party campaign committee behavior also has major 
implications for legislative elections. The campaign committees are 
providing a new source of campaign resources in legislative elections 
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and having a redistributive effect on the old sources. They collect re-
sources from campaign contributors that would normally go to safe 
incumbents and redistribute them to candidates in close races. Legis-
lators who feel they are safe, electorally, are also distributing their 
personal funds to candidates in close races. With national party or-
ganizations following the same strategy, the nature of competition in 
legislative elections is becoming one where the battle between the 
parties is focused on a handful of seats. These races attract all of the 
resources and attention, while the others-those involving incum-
bents-remain largely uncontested. Such a pattern reinforces the high 
rates of incumbency success and has normative implications for the 
level of accountability legislators are held to by their constituents. Add 
to this the effect of the politics of redistricting and even greater rein-
forcement is given to this pattern of competition in legislative elections. 
On the other hand, it may also be argued that the resulting dis-
tribution of campaign resources increases competition. By shifting 
campaign resources from candidates in uncompetitive races to those 
in competitive races legislative party campaign committees are elevat-
ing the level of competition in those races. Their willingness to fund 
nonincumbents means that legislative party campaign committee ac-
tivity may weaken the effect of incumbency and increase the respon-
siveness of legislators. An incumbent who knows that she could be 
targeted by the opposition's campaign committees may be more con-
scious of the demands of her constituents. There is, however, no ev-
idence to date of any weakening of the incumbency advantage at the 
state level. 
Because legislative party campaign committee financing of elec-
tions is done in an attempt to gain or maintain a majority of seats, 
legislative party campaign committee activity also should increase in-
terparty competition in the states. Legislative caucus campaign com-
mittees represent a centralized organization committed to helping the 
candidates based on partisanship and thus furthering the interest of 
the party. These organizations, therefore, can only increase competi-
tion between the parties. Furthermore, minority parties' greater will-
ingness to fund nonincumbents (a finding that, though evident in 
some states, was not universal) increases competition in races with in-
cumbents, and increases the chance that they may gain a majority of 
seats. And, finally, legislative party campaign committee activity may 
expand the number of truly competitive seats if the resources they 
make available, and the candidates they recruit, have the effect of 
changing a district from marginally competitive to competitive. 
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The problem with assessing the effect of legislative party cam-
paign committee activity on elections is similar to the problem asso-
ciated with assessing the impact of money in general on elections-
the effect of expectations on contributions. In other words, are 
candidates who spend more money more likely to win, or do candi-
dates who are more likely to win attract more contributions? In the 
case of legislative party campaign committees' effect, it is a matter of 
whether legislative party campaign committees merely reinforce prior 
expectations regarding competitiveness, or whether the contributions 
they give make races more competitive. It is probably a combination 
of the two. The findings of this study indicate that prior expecta-
tions-as measured by the previous margin-are associated with the 
level of contributions, but the resources legislative campaign commit-
tees put into a race (sometimes as high as 60 percent of a candidate's 
total revenues) surely must have some impact. Whatever one may be-
lieve, this is clearly an interesting topic for future research on legis-
lative party campaign committees. 
The role that legislative party campaign committees play in legis-
lative elections is likely to affect the policy-making process within the 
legislature. One of the important functions that political parties play 
in our political system is to bridge the gap created by the separation 
of powers at both the state and national level. The development of 
legislative party campaign committees may destroy a party's ability 
to provide this bridge if the committees' activities result in a more in-
dependent legislative party. Following reforms aimed at improving 
professionalism, legislatures have become much more independent 
of the governor. Having their own party organization, their own re-
sources to win elections and communicate with the public, may in-
crease this independence even more, making it hard for governors to 
have their way with legislatures. However, if cooperation between 
the legislative organization, the state party, and the governor's orga-
nization develops, legislative party campaign committees could lead 
to better relationships between the governor and legislators as equals 
in state government. This integration of the legislative party cam-
paign committees can occur in a number of ways such as transfers 
from one organization to another, the sharing of poll information, 
or the merging of resources for phone banks or advertising. This re-
search presented some evidence that such cooperation occurs. The 
financial records in a number of states such as California and Illi-
nois show that caucus committees do indeed receive contributions 
from other campaigns, such as gubernatorial campaigns. And many 
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of those interviewed indicated that there was cooperation with other 
party and candidate organizations. 
The development of legislative party caucus and leadership cam-
paign committees may also strengthen party ties by building party 
cohesion within the legislature. Given the way that legislative caucus 
campaign committees distribute their resources and the responses to 
the survey, the potential for increasing cohesion is quite real. Candi-
dates in close races receive substantial contributions, cash and in-
kind, from the legislative party campaign committees. This has the 
potential of making cohorts of legislators who are grateful to either 
the party caucus or to individual leaders. Such gratitude may result in 
greater party cohesion. Greater party unity may also develop if the 
campaign committees create an atmosphere that makes the caucus 
pull together as a team, united behind a common purpose. This was 
reported to have occurred among the Assembly Democrats in Wiscon-
sin. It is clear from the interviews, however, that there is no attempt 
to increase party cohesion by distributing resources on the basis of 
party loyalty or ideology. 
Because legislative party campaign committee activity represents 
a possible strengthening of the political parties, their development 
may also represent a better functioning of the role of political parties 
as a link between the people and government. By collecting resources 
from PACs and from legislators who received contributions from 
PACs, legislative party caucus campaign committees are placing an 
extra step or two between candidates and interest group influence. 
Such a development, along with the potential for greater party cohe-
sion, means the parties may be moving, however slightly, toward the 
model of responsible parties: collective party goals are strengthened 
at the expense of the various special interests, allowing voters to more 
directly select policy alternatives through the selection of party 
candidates. 
The other side of this development, however, is the possibility 
that by having legislative party caucus campaign committees collect 
interest group money, they may actually be centralizing interest 
group influence, consequently making it easier for interest groups to 
influence the policy-making process. This potential for centralized in-
fluence is illustrated by the Washington Senate Republicans who have 
developed a major donor program that gives financially powerful 
groups and individuals frequent and easy access to legislators 
(though it should be noted that Senate Minority Leader Hayner stated 
that one of the purposes of their caucus campaign committee was to 
Conclusion 123 
"get people [legislators] interested in representing the public interest 
as opposed to special interests"). The fact that legislative party caucus 
committees draw their resources from a diverse set of contributors, 
however, means that the possibility of centralized influence by one in-
terest is minimized. The problem this creates for policy representa-
tion, however, remains, because not all interests in society are 
organized or have the resources to contribute to legislative party cam-
paign committees. 
It appears that the campaign activities of legislative party cam-
paign committees, one way or the other, will have an effect on policy 
representation either by increasing special interest representation or 
by increasing representation of the public. It is left to future research 
to determine how legislative party campaign committee activity influ-
ences policy representation. 
The cynical view of the caucus campaign committees (that legis-
lative party campaign committees become captives of the interests 
who provide the resources) is apparently the basis for attacks on these 
committees by "good government" groups in California and New 
York. In California Proposition 73 has temporarily ended legislative 
party campaign committee activity. In New York, the campaign com-
mittees were recently the target of investigations by the New York 
Commission on Governmental Integrity. During the hearings held by 
the commission, Speaker Miller defended the campaign committees 
declaring that in raising the money for the committees "there are no 
promises to be made, there are no quid pro quos to be made, there is 
no pressure to be bought." 
Whether or not this backlash spreads to other states remains to be 
seen. It may depend upon party politics and upon which form of or-
ganization is attacked. Leadership PACs' similarity to PACs in general 
may make them easier targets, especially if they have been used for 
political in-fighting within the legislature. 
California represents a case where partisan politics was involved. 
The Republicans, who relied much less on their caucus campaign com-
mittees and leadership PACs than on their state party, campaigned 
in favor of the proposition that would ban legislative party campaign 
committees while the Democrats, whose legislative party campaign 
committees gave them an advantage in legislative elections, cam-
paigned against it. The result-passage of Proposition 73-was to 
hand the Democrats a significant setback in their attempt to play 
a role in legislative elections. Where such a difference exists between 
the parties in other states, good government groups may find an 
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ally in the party that relies less on legislative party campaign 
committees-most likely Republicans because of their stronger state 
party organizations-and use this alliance to achieve a ban on caucus 
campaign committees or leadership PACs, or limits on such practices. 
Given the conclusion that legislative caucus campaign committees are 
party organizations, the implication is that attempts to destroy these 
organizations represent one party attempting to gain or maintain an 
advantage by leveling its attack at the other party's new form of or-
ganization. An organization that is different from state party organi-
zations only in its location (within the legislature) and in the fact that 
it has not attained a level of acceptance among the public. 
Appendix 
Leadership Interview Schedule 
Name---------------- Date: ____ /_ /89 
State Phone: ( __ ) 
Position __________________________ ___ 
Committee Name------------------------
Chamber: _ Senate _ House 
Party: _ Democrat _ Republican 
I. Legislative Caucus Campaign Committees: I would like to ask you a number 
of questions about the operation of your party's legislative caucus cam-
paign committee. 
A. Structure: First I would like to ask you a few questions about how 
the caucus campaign committee works. 
1. Does the caucus have an actual campaign committee that 
makes the decisions? 
2. How many legislators are involved in the operation of the 
committee? 
3. How are they selected for the committee? 
_ elected by caucus members 
_ selected by the leadership 
_other __________________ _ 
4. How much control or influence would you say the leadership 
(the speaker, the minority leader, or the majority leader) has 
over the committee decisions? 
5. How much control or influence would you say the state party 
organization has over the committee's decisions? 
6. Is there a staff? _ yes _ no 
B. Campaign Support Provided 
1. What types of campaign assistance does your party's caucus 
campaign committee provide candidates? 
_money 
_services 
If in-kind services, what types? 
_polling 
_ campaign consultants 
_ mailing lists 
_ advertisement 
_ campaign seminars 
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_ fund raising help 
_ lists of contributors 
_other ____________________________________ __ 
2. Does the committee play any role in the recruitment of candi-
dates? If so, is the availability of assistance from the committee 
used as an inducement? 
C. Distribution Decisions: Now I would like to ask you a few questions 
about the caucus campaign committee's decisions regarding the 
distribution of campaign funds. 
1. What are the criteria used in order to decide how to distribute 
the campaign resources? How does the committee decide who 
to assist? Do they have to meet any particular standards? If 
yes, what are they? 
2. Are any adjustments made over the course of the election sea-
son? If so, what type of information are they based upon? 
3. Does the committee tend to give any preference to incumbents 
over nonincumbents or the other way around? 
4. In making its decisions in terms of which candidates to assist, 
incumbents versus challengers, does the committee give any 
consideration to national or state party trends? 
5. Does the committee provide assistance for candidates in pri-
mary contests? 
D. Goals: 
1. What is the committee trying to accomplish in funding legis-
lative races? What are your reasons for collecting money and 
providing assistance? Are there any other reasons? 
2. How effective has it been effective in meeting those goals? 
E. Impact: 
1. What type of effect do you feel the committees assistance has 
on the outcome of elections? 
2. Does the fact that your committee provides assistance to a can-
didate help those candidates raise funds from other sources, 
e.g., PACs? 
3. Does this activity have any impact on the behavior of legisla-
tors within the legislature? 
F. History: I would like to ask you a little about the history of the 
committee. 
1. To the best of your knowledge, how many years has the cau-
cus campaign committee been involved in campaign finance? 
(how early) 
2. Are you aware of any changes that have taken place in the 
purpose of the organization since it was first established, or in 
the criteria used in deciding which candidates to support. 
G. State Campaign Finance Laws: How do campaign election laws affect 
how you decide to distribute the funds? Are there limits on 
expenditures? 
H. Source of Funds: Where do the funds come from to supply this effort, 
what type of organizations?(rank) 
_ individuals 
_business PACs 
_labor PACs 
_ professional PACs 
_ legislators 
_ party organization 
_ national party organization 
_ local party organizations 
Appendix 127 
I. Anything else that I should know about your caucus campaign 
committee? 
II. Leadership PACs: In some states individual legislators, especially the lead-
ers, have been found to distribute some of their own campaign funds to 
other legislative candidates, 
A. Does this occur in your state? _ yes _ no 
B. Do you participate? _ yes _ no 
C. Any coordination with party caucus committees or state party or-
ganization? 
_ caucus campaign committees 
_ state party organization 
D. Purpose of contributing funds? 
E. Recipients of funds? 
_ incumbents 
_ challengers 
_ open seat candidates 
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committee can be found in the practice followed by some senate caucus cam-
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up for reelection. 
21. Shepsle and Weingast, "Political Preferences for the Pork Barrel." 
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a pattern in the distribution of funds by the New York state legislative cam-
paign committees suggesting that party trends affected the allocation of re-
sources. John Chubb, "Institutions, the Economy, and the Dynamics of State 
Legislative Elections," American Political Science Review 82 (1988), found that 
national forces seem to have an impact on the outcome of state legislative 
races. Whether these findings are due solely to voting behavior or the behav-
ior of elites, e.g., legislative party decision-makers, remains to be seen. 
28. The procedures for obtaining the data are, however, very different. 
Some states willing shipped summary reports via the mail without any 
charge, others charge around $10 a volume. For some states it was necessary 
to obtain photocopies of the expenditure reports of the campaign committees. 
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itol. The worst case was Illinois, perhaps reflecting its individualistic political 
culture, where one must complete a form, in triplicate, for each candidate's or 
organization's committee record reviewed. One of these forms is sent to the 
candidate or organization. A week following my visit to Illinois I received a 
letter from the chair of one of the campaign committees noting that they were 
aware of my investigation of their records. 
29. The New York data was provided by Jeffrey Stonecash. 
30. See Sorauf, Money in American Elections, for a detailed discussion of 
these problems. 
31. Maine was originally to be included in the analysis of the campaign 
finance data, but the campaign finance records maintained by that state 
proved insufficiently detailed. 
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32. Illinois Sentate Minority Leader, James "Pate" Philip, refused to dis-
cuss the practices of the Republican State Senate Campaign Committee with 
me because I was a Democrat. He said he was afraid he would give away "se-
crets" during an interview. 
3. Finances 
1. The amount of money available to California legislative party cam-
paign committees clearly puts them in a class by themselves. In 1986 the top 
six contributors to all campaigns in the state were caucus campaign commit-
tees and leadership PACs. 
2. For some states, candidates' total revenues were not available, and 
thus the calculation of percent of total revenues from the campaign commit-
tees was impossible. 
4. Legislative Party Campaign Committees: 
Structure and Practices 
1. Herrnson, "Party Strategies and Resource Distribution," found that 
because the DCCC was composed largely of incumbent congressmen, the ef-
ficiency with which DCCC funds were allocated was reduced. 
2. It is important to remember that all discussion of California legislative 
party campaign committees refers to past practices. Proposition 73, passed by 
voters in 1988, has effectively eliminated the committees in California for 
now. 
3. The field workers used to be provided by the state party organization 
in the 1970s. 
4. See Herrnson, Party Campaigning in the 1980s. 
5. Quoted from testimony given before the New York Commission on 
Government Integrity on Mar. 17, 1989, reprinted in "A Public Hearing on 
Campaign Finance Practices," 54. 
6. See Herrnson, Party Campaigning in the 1980s. 
7. See Jewell and Olson, Political Parties and Elections, 221-22. 
8. Sorauf and Beck, Party Politics in America. 
9. Supplemental material was provided by the campaign finance records 
of the caucus campaign committees. 
10. A Republican source in the Tennessee House indicated that the prac-
tice of legislators transferring funds does not occur in house races; however, 
a Republican source in the senate stated that such a practice does occur in 
senate races. 
11. See California Commission on Campaign Financing, The New Gold 
Rush: Financing California Legislative Campaigns, (Los Angeles: Center for Re-
sponsive Government, 1985). 
5. The Allocation of Resources: 
Competitiveness and Incumbency 
1. Respondents indicated that the campaign committees used a variety 
of indicators to determine the competitiveness of the election, ranging from 
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sophisticated polling to subjective perceptions regarding the strength of can-
didates, including demographics research and previous district election re-
sults. Most state that the previous margin was one of those indicators. Some 
committees, such as the Minnesota DFL committees, actually have computer 
generated "DFL Indexes" for each district based upon how DFL candidates 
have performed in those districts. 
2. The scale was folded in this way so that as competitiveness of a par-
ticular race increased so did the measure. Using straight vote percentages ob-
viously is not appropriate because a candidate who won with 51 percent of 
the vote was in just as close a race as the candidate who lost with 49 percent 
of the vote. For incumbents, the measure indicates what their margin of vic-
tory was in the past election, and for nonincumbents the measure indicates 
how close their party came to winning or losing the past election. 
3. Regressing the vote on the previous vote for each district resulted in 
R-squares ranging from a high of .78 to a low of .37, with an average R-square 
of .62. The average margin used in the 1982 analysis performed much better, 
with an average R-square of .83. 
4. This information was obtained in the discussions with legislative lead-
ers and caucus staff members. 
5. The correlations between the previous margin and the final outcome 
of the race, noted in note 3, indicate that the previous margin is a relatively 
good indicator of the competitiveness of an election. 
6. Because all of the regressions use the entire population, significance 
levels are not very relevant. Significance levels are based upon probability 
theory involving the relationship between estimated parameters and actual 
population parameters. The standard errors are included in the tables for 
those who believe significance tests are still relevant under these conditions. 
Most of the coefficients are significant. For those that are not, the failure of the 
coefficient to be twice the size of the standard error is most likely due to the 
imperfect nature of the measure of competitiveness. 
7. Whether the nonlinear model was a better fit for the committee's re-
source allocation pattern was determined by the size of the coefficient for the 
square of the competitiveness measure relative to its standard error and by 
the increase, if any, in the R-square, which indicates the variance explained 
by the regression model. 
8. For an equation in which y = b0 + b1x1 + b2x12 the slope at x1 = b1 
+ 2b2x1 see William Berry and Stanley Feldman, Multiple Regression in Practice 
(Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1985), 59-60. 
9. This was computed by plugging the coefficients into the equation 
COMPETITION = b1 + 2b2 (COMPETmON) and solving it for different val-
ues of COMPETITION. 
10. In interpreting the results of the analysis of the leadership campaign 
committees, caution must to exercised to avoid the ecological fallacy of infer-
ring individual behavior from aggregate statistics. The results must be inter-
preted in terms of the aggregate distributional strategies of legislative 
leadership PACs in each state. 
11. This information was obtained from Rom and Aoki, "How Big the 
Pig," and from interviews with Wisconsin legislators and staff reported in 
chapter 4. 
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12. See note 7 above for an explanation of what constituted a better fit 
and notes 8 and 9 above for how to interpret the coefficients. 
13. See Cotter et al., Party Organization in American Politics. 
14. A ratio could not be calculated in situations in which one group of 
candidates did not receive any assistance from a caucus committee because it 
involved a division by zero. In some cases there were no candidates in a 
group, thus making a comparison of means inapplicable. 
6. Caucus Committees Versus Leadeship PACs 
1. The variables are coded "1" if the candidate is from that state and "0" 
if not. One state is left out because including it would lead to biased estima-
tors. These coefficients are omitted from the tables because they are used 
merely as controls and lack relevance to the research question. 
2. See Eric Hanushek and John E. Jackson, Statistical Methods for Social 
Scientists (New York: Academic Press, 1977), 101-106. 
3. Comparison of the nonlinear model coefficients is more complicated 
because it depends on the relative values of both equations. For the equations 
with the squared term, the relationship between competitiveness and the 
proportion of committee funds received depends on the value of the inde-
pendent variable: xi = bi + 2b2xi. Comparing committees that fit different 
regression models is even more complicated. When the linear model is used 
for all committees very little difference is evident between any two commit-
tees in terms of focusing on competitive races. The nonlinear models are used 
in Table 6-1 because they represent a better test of the difference between 
the committees in funding nonincumbents; i.e., it minimizes bias in the 
coefficients. 
4. For the equations with the squared term, the relationship between 
competitiveness and the proportion of committee funds received is depen-
dent on the value of the independent variable: xi = bi + 2b2xi. For the Dem-
ocrats in 1982, the coefficient for the squared terms (.001 for the caucus 
committees and .004 for the leadership PACs) in relationship to the coefficient 
for the competitiveness measure indicates the leadership committees are bet-
ter at concentrating their resources on close races. When xi is 45, the Demo-
cratic caucus committees in 1982 were likely to give .041 percent of their funds 
for each increase a tenth of a percent in the competitiveness of the race; the 
leadership PACs were likely to give .155 percent. 
7. Strategic Variations in Caucus Committee Tactics 
1. For evidence of the incumbency advantage at the state level see Jewell 
and Breaux, "Effect of Incumbency." 
2. Evidence of this can be found in the research on the national parties. 
See chapter 2, note 27. 
3. This statement is usually attributed to former U.S. Speaker Tip 
O'Neall. 
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4. As in the previous chapter the squared term was included only in 
cases where it was found to significantly add to the regression model. 
5. The rest of the coefficients, the standard errors, the constant, and the 
R2 can all be found in the tables in chapter 6. 
6. The states that support the contention that minority parties will place 
a greater emphasis on nonincumbents (states that have a greater coefficient 
for nonincumbents) are: Wisconsin in 1982; Oregon in 1982, 1984, and 1986; 
Indiana in 1982 and 1986; New York in 1984 and 1986; Washington in 1984 and 
1986; Illinois in 1986. 
7. Because the data for the Illinois House Republicans is missing in 1984, 
nothing can be concluded about their tendency to shift emphasis from non-
incumbents to incumbents or vice versa over time. 
8. Though the race for governor in 1982 turned out to be close, the im-
portant consideration was the expectations regarding partisan performance 
prior to the election. This, it is argued, is what shapes party decision-making 
with regard to incumbent and nonincumbent candidates. The expectation 
prior to the 1982 election was that Thompson would win easily in the race 
against former U.S. Senator Adlai Stevenson-some polls gave Thompson a 
margin of 10 percentage points. What pollsters did not consider was the effect 
of the massive voter registration drive among blacks in the city of Chicago, 
gearing up for the 1983 mayoral election. The result was an extremely close 
race with Thompson winning by about 5,000 votes. See Paul Kleppner, Chi-
cago Divided: The Making of a Black Mayor (DeKalb, Ill.: Northern Illinois Univ. 
Press, 1985). 
9. The Illinois Senate Republicans refused to discuss the practices of the 
Republican State Senate Campaign Committee with me. 
10. Jacobson and Kernell, Strategy and Choice. 
11. State party trends were determined by the votes for governor or sen-
ator in that year, using the National Journal's Almanac of American Politics, 
1988. If a gubernatorial or senate candidate received 60 percent of the vote or 
greater, then that candidate's party was determined to have had a good year. 
If candidates from both parties won with 60 percent of the vote or greater or 
if no candidate won with greater than 60 percent, neither party was deter-
mined to have a positive trend. 
12. Dummy variables for the states are included in the analysis to control 
for any state variation that might result in biased coefficients from the pooled 
data set. Substantively it could be argued that these coefficients represent the 
average proportion of caucus campaign committee funds received by incum-
bents in noncompetitive races; however, the value of the coefficients also de-
pends on the number of districts in the state, the number of competitive 
races, etc. Because they represent these idiosyncratic state factors they should 
not be interpreted as a comparable measure of caucus committee efficiency in 
terms of funding nonincumbents in close races. Hence, these coefficients will 
be of little interest and act merely as control variables. 
13. For example, when the value of the dummy variable for party status 
is equal to 0-i.e., the party holds a majority of seats-the value of the co-
efficient for the nonincumbent variable is the proportion nonincumbents of 
majority parties receive from the caucus committee. When the dummy vari-
able is equal to 1, the proportion of caucus committee funds a candidate can 
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expect is equal to the value of the nonincumbent coefficient plus the coeffi-
cient of the interaction term. For a further discussion of the use of interaction 
effects in OLS regression see William Berry and Stanley Feldman, Multiple 
Regression in Practice. 
14. Interpretation of the interaction terms requires that the coefficient of 
the interaction term be added to the coefficient for the base variable. For ex-
ample, the emphasis placed on nonincumbents for minority parties is equal 
to the coefficient of the interaction term plus the coefficient for nonincum-
bents. The emphasis placed on nonincumbents for majority parties is merely 
the coefficient for the nonincumbent variable. The value of the interaction 
variable (nonincumbency * party status) for all majority parties is equal to 0 
(because party status equals 0 if the party held a majority of seats before the 
election). 
8. Conclusion 
1. Herrnson, "Do Parties Make a Difference?" and Party Campaigning in 
the 1980s. 
2. See Burnham, Current Crisis in American Politics; David E. Price, Bring-
ing Back the Parties (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1984); 
and Crotty, American Parties in Decliue. 
3. See Cornelius Cotter and John Bibby, "Institutional Development and 
the Thesis of Party Decline," Political Science Quarterly 95 (1980): 1-27; Cotter et 
al., Party Organizations in American Politics; Schlesinger, "New American Po-
litical Party"; and Herrnson, Party Campaigning in the 1980s. 
4. Except, of course, the research by Cotter and Bibby, and Cotter et al. 
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